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Abstract	  
	  
	  This	  is	  the	  history	  of	  the	  decade	  prior	  to	  the	  entrance	  of	  Korean	  troops	  into	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  roughly	  covering	  the	  years	  1953-­‐1965.	  	  The	  story	  begins	  with	  the	  turbulent	  relationship	  between	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  and	  Korea’s	  President	  Syngman	  Rhee.	  	  In	  1954,	  fearing	  abandonment	  and	  a	  permanently	  divided	  country,	  Rhee	  first	  offered	  the	  use	  of	  his	  country’s	  soldiers	  to	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower.	  	  But	  owing	  to	  several	  key	  political	  factors,	  Rhee	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  “unsuitable	  ally”	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  his	  offer	  was	  not	  endorsed.	  	  For	  the	  next	  decade,	  Korea	  continued	  to	  offer	  its	  army’s	  services	  to	  the	  US	  government	  for	  use	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  But	  it	  was	  not	  until	  1964,	  when	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  began	  escalating	  the	  US	  role	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  that	  Korean	  President	  Park	  Chung	  Hee’s	  offer	  to	  provide	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  soldiers	  became	  operationally	  desirable	  and	  necessary.	  	  Park	  then	  used	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  to	  build	  a	  more	  equitable	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  one	  that	  gave	  Korea	  a	  newfound	  ability	  to	  dictate	  its	  own	  future	  and	  emerge	  from	  endemic	  poverty.	  	  

	   	   1	   	   	   	  	  
1.	  	  ORIGINS	  OF	  INTERVENTION	  
Syngman	  Rhee’s	  Drive	  for	  Unification	  
	  I	   feel	  sorry	   for	   the	  old	  man.	   	  He	  wants	   to	  get	  his	  county	  unified,	  but	  we	  cannot	  permit	  him	   to	   start	   a	  war	   to	  do	   it.	   	  The	   consequences	  would	  be	  too	  awful.	  	  But	  he	  is	  a	  stubborn	  old	  fellow,	  and	  I	  don’t	  know	  whether	  we’ll	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  him	  in	  line	  indefinitely.	  -­‐President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower,	  19541	  	  
	  
In	   late	   July	   1965,	   United	   States	   Ambassador	   to	   Korea,	   Winthrop	   G.	   Brown,	   and	  General	   Dwight	   E.	   Beach	   drove	   north	   from	   Seoul	   to	   a	   Korean	   army	   base	   and	  observed	   the	   soldiers	   of	   South	   Korea’s	   Capital	   Division.	   	   “We	   were	   very	   much	  impressed	  by	   the	  rigor	  of	   the	   training	  and	  the	  quality	  of	   the	  officers,”	  Brown	   later	  recorded,	  “especially	  General	  Chae,	  the	  commander.”	  	  The	  diplomat	  was	  sufficiently	  impressed,	  noting	  the	  general	  was	  “every	  inch	  a	  professional.”2	  	  When	  Ambassador	  Brown	  parted	  ways	  with	  the	  commander	  he	  took	  a	  moment	  to	  express	  his	  personal	  approval	  and	  gratitude	  for	  Korea’s	  decision	  to	  send	  a	  full	  division.	  	  In	  an	  impassive	  tone	  Chae	  remarked,	  “We	  have	  not	  forgotten	  what	  you	  and	  others	  did	  for	  us	  not	  so	  many	  years	  ago,	  and	  now	  we	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  repay	  in	  some	  small	  part.	  	  Moreover,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hagerty	  Diary	  Extract,	  27	  July	  1954,	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1839.	  (Hereafter	  cited	  as	  FRUS)	  2	  Letter,	  Winthrop	  G.	  Brown	  to	  J.	  Graham	  Parsons	  (United	  States	  Ambassador	  to	  Sweden),	  August	  1,	  1965,	  J.	  Graham	  Parsons	  Papers,	  Box	  #4	  Folder	  #36,	  Georgetown	  University	  Library,	  Special	  Collections	  Division,	  Washington,	  D.C.	  	  
	   	   2	   	   	   	  	  I	  come	  from	  North	  Korea,	  I	  have	  lost	  all	  my	  family	  to	  the	  Communists	  and	  I	  intend	  to	  fight	  them	  to	  the	  last	  drop	  of	  my	  blood.”3	  
Had	   he	   been	   a	   witness	   to	   the	   meeting,	   Korean	   President	   Park	   Chung	   Hee	  would	   have	   been	   pleased.	   After	   all,	   General	   Chae	   Myung-­‐Shin	   was	   charged	   with	  leading	   the	  Republic	   of	  Korea	  Army’s	   first	   combat	   contingent	   into	   South	  Vietnam.	  	  When	  the	  Capital	  or	  “Tiger”	  Division	  completed	  its	  deployment,	  it	  would	  become	  the	  first	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  military	  force	  sent	  to	  fight	  an	  enemy	  beyond	  its	  borders.	  	  Ten	  months	  prior,	  Korea	  made	  its	  first	  contributions	  to	  the	  battle	  against	  the	  Vietnamese	  National	  Liberation	  Front.	  	  Heeding	  the	  United	  States’	  pleas	  for	  assistance,	  President	  Park	  and	  the	  ROK	  National	  Assembly	  consigned	  a	  Reinforced	  Mobile	  Army	  Surgical	  Hospital,	   a	   dozen	   Taekwondo	   instructors,	   and	   a	   Korean	   Marine	   Corps	   Engineer	  Company	   to	   the	   government	   of	   South	   Vietnam.	   	   But	   before	   the	   entire	   group	  was	  deployed,	  the	  war	  plan	  changed,	  and	  the	  U.S.	   implored	  Korea	  to	  make	  the	  ultimate	  commitment:	   dispatch	   their	   nation’s	   soldiers	   to	   fight	   for	   the	   Free	   World	   beside	  American	  Marines	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	  	  Once	  again	  Park	  and	  the	  Assembly	  responded,	  ordering	   General	   Chae	   to	   prepare	   his	   soldiers	   for	   deployment.	   	   Chae’s	   public	  declaration	  and	  presentation	  were	  a	  vital	  component	  of	  Korea’s	  image	  and	  relations.	  
Several	   weeks	   before	   he	   visited	   the	   army	   base,	   Brown	   cabled	   the	   State	  Department	   and	   asserted	   that	   a	   “new	   dimension”	   would	   develop	   in	   US-­‐ROK	  relations	   if	  Korea	   sent	   a	   combat	  group	   to	   the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	   	  The	  prescient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.	  
	   	   3	   	   	   	  	  comment	  was	  largely	  ignored.	  	  President	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  and	  his	  advisors	  were	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  escalating	  war	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  and	  anxiously	  waiting	  for	  the	  Tiger	  Division’s	  arrival—as	  they	  had	  been	  since	  shortly	  after	  United	  States	  Marines	  had	   landed	   near	   Da	   Nang	   in	   March.	   	   The	   presence	   of	   allied	   soldiers	   in	   Vietnam	  would	  allow	  Johnson	  to	  defend	  publicly	   the	  United	  States’	   troop	  deployments	  as	  a	  component	   of	   an	   international	   coalition	   and	   relieve	   the	   U.S.	  military’s	  manpower	  burden.	   	   At	   the	   time,	   by	   all	   official	   accounts	   it	   appeared	   as	   though	  Korea	   sent	   its	  soldiers	   for	   the	   same	   reasons	   General	   Chae	   enunciated	   to	   Ambassador	   Brown—repayment	  of	  a	  moral	  debt	  incurred	  when	  the	  United	  States	  came	  to	  the	  ROK’s	  aid	  during	   the	   Korean	   War	   and	   a	   determination	   to	   fight	   “Communist	   aggression”	  outside	   Korea’s	   borders.	   	   Could	   such	   a	   simple	   deduction	   explain	   how	   or	   why	   an	  impoverished	   and	   divided	   country,	   technically	   still	   at	   war	   with	   the	   North,	   and	  located	  far	  from	  Vietnam,	  came	  to	  provide	  “substantially	  greater	  combat	  manpower	  than	  any	  other	  free	  world	  country	  great	  or	  small	  except	  the	  United	  States?”4	  	  	  	  
The	  publically	  cited	  basis	  for	  Korean	  intervention	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  was	  not	  an	   adequate	   explanation	   for	   the	   Republic’s	   unprecedented	   deployment.	   	   Even	   if	  some	  members	  of	   the	  ROK	  government	   identified	  with	   those	   lofty	  principles,	   they	  were	  not	  an	  inveterate	  component	  of	  the	  government’s	  justification	  for	  war.	  	  Chae’s	  comments	   fit	   into	   the	   larger	  mold	   of	   Korea’s	   official	   rhetoric,	   that	   is,	   the	   rhetoric	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Embtel,	  Seoul	  06816,	  10	  July	  1965,	  Lyndon	  Baines	  Johnson	  Library,	  National	  Security	  File,	  Country	  File,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68.”	  
	   	   4	   	   	   	  	  that	   the	   ROK	   and	   US	   government	   conveyed	   to	   the	   American	   people	   and	  international	   community.	   	   As	   will	   be	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   adequate	  public	  support	  for	  troop	  deployments	  was	  directly	  tied	  to	  the	  expectation	  that	  Korea	  would	  accrue	  substantial	  economic	  and	  military	  benefits	  as	  a	  result	  of	   its	  sacrifice.	  	  Thus,	  justifications	  including	  moral	  and	  “cold	  warrior”	  sentiments	  were	  hollow	  and	  did	   not	   provide	   the	   critical	   impetus	   behind	   Korea’s	   commitments.	   	   In	   fact,	   ROK	  offers	   of	   troops	   to	   serve	   in	   Vietnam	   had	   a	   historical	   precedent.	   	   The	   only	   unique	  aspect	  of	  President	  Park’s	  1965	  troop	  offer	  was	  that	  the	  United	  States	  government	  accepted	  the	  proposal.	   	  Over	  a	  decade	  earlier,	  Korea’s	   first	  President,	  Dr.	  Syngman	  Rhee,	  made	  repeated	  overtures	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  offering	  to	  transfer	  as	  many	  as	   three	  ROK	  Army	  Divisions	   to	   Indochina	   or	   elsewhere	   abroad.∗	   	   Rhee,	   not	   Park,	  was	  the	  first	  Korean	  official	  to	  volunteer	  his	  country’s	  soldiers	  for	  duty	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	   	   In	   the	   twelve	   years	   since	   the	   initial	   proposal,	   the	  Republic’s	   two	  presidents	  and	   a	   multitude	   of	   diplomats	   issued	   an	   astonishing	   number	   of	   requests	   to	   the	  United	  States,	   each	   time	  asking	   if	   the	  ROKA	  was	  needed	   to	   fight	  outside	  of	  Korea.	  	  Surprisingly,	   the	   unofficial	   tactic	   was	   only	   held	   in	   abeyance	   for	   one	   year	   (1960-­‐1961)	  between	  1953	  and	  1965,	  during	  the	  short	  political	  reign	  of	  Chang	  Myông.	  	  
Understanding	  Korea’s	  sanguine	  proposals	  to	  bear	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  Free	  World’s	  fight	  against	  Communism	  requires	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  partitioned	  Peninsula’s	  early	   interactions	  with	   the	   United	   States.	   	   	  When	   Rhee	   framed	   and	   proposed	   the	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  dispatch	  of	  Korean	  forces	  to	  Southeast	  Asia	  in	  1953,	  he	  did	  so	  because	  he	  believed	  the	   dispatch	   would	   prevent	   the	   United	   States’	   “abandonment”	   of	   Korea,	   which	  would	  weaken	  his	  personal	  power	  and	  authority.	   	  Beginning	  with	  his	  self-­‐imposed	  exile	   in	   the	  United	  States	   in	  1904,	  Rhee	  attempted	   to	  use	   the	  prospects	  of	  Korean	  manpower	   and	   resources	   as	   leverage	   for	   his	   own	   gain-­‐-­‐going	   so	   far	   as	   to	   offer	  Korean	   land	   and	   soldiers	   to	   the	   United	   States	   Army.	   	   Amid	   the	   stormy	   months	  surrounding	  France’s	  defeat	  in	  Indochina,	  Rhee	  proffered	  Korea’s	  soldiers	  to	  the	  US	  for	  use	  in	  Laos	  or	  Vietnam	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  gaining	  U.S.	  acquiescence—intentionally	  or	  unintentionally—for	  South	  Korea’s	  invasion	  of	  North	  Korea.	  	  Rhee’s	  designs	  were	  different	   from	   the	  ones	  harbored	  by	  Park,	  which	  were	   largely	   economic,	  when	  he	  proposed	  the	  United	  States’	  use	  of	  the	  ROK	  Army	  and	  Marines	  first	  in	  1961	  and	  then	  repeatedly	   throughout	   1964-­‐65.	   	   Ultimately,	   Syngman	   Rhee’s	   proposals	   were	  rejected	  as	  President	  Eisenhower	  was	  unwilling	  and	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  unable	  to	  employ	  Korean	  soldiers.	  	  	  
The	   Eisenhower	   Administration	   seriously	   considered	   the	   Korean	   offer;	  several	  studies	  of	  the	  matter	  were	  ordered	  and	  the	  issue	  was	  broached	  again	  when	  a	  French	  military	  defeat	  at	  Dien	  Bien	  Phu	   in	  May	  1954	  appeared	   imminent.	   	   For	   its	  own	   political	   reasons,	   France	   rejected	   the	   seemingly	   generous	   offer	   almost	  instantaneously,	  although	  senior	  US	  officials	  never	  acknowledged	  this	  and	  it	  did	  not	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  affect	  their	  military	  and	  political	  planning.5	  	  President	  Eisenhower	  and	  his	  advisors	  ultimately	   rejected	   the	   troop	   offers	   for	   several	   reasons.	   	   First,	   South	   Korea	   was	  economically	   and	   militarily	   dependent	   on	   the	   Untied	   States	   in	   1954.	   	   Domestic	  opinion,	  it	  was	  hypothesized,	  would	  not	  favor	  the	  deployment	  of	  ROK	  soldiers	  while	  American	  soldiers	  guarded	  the	  38th	  parallel.	   	   In	  addition,	  if	  Washington	  sanctioned	  the	   removal	   of	   Korean	   soldiers	   it	   would	   also	   have	   needed	   to	   provide	   for	   their	  replacement.	   	   Second,	   any	   Korean	   division	   would	   have	   required	   transportation,	  logistical	   support,	   and	   possibly	   even	   leadership.	   	   If	   the	   US	   government	   provided	  these	   tools,	   the	   American	   flag	   and	   prestige	   would	   become	   inexorably	   linked	   to	  Indochina.	   	   French	   support	   for	   ROK	   soldiers,	   even	   if	   funded	   by	   expanded	   US	  monetary	   aid,	  was	  not	   possible.	   	   France	   and	  Korea,	   for	   separate	   political	   reasons,	  only	  desired	   the	  military	   assistance	  of	   the	  United	  States.	   	   Finally,	   less	   than	  a	   year	  after	   the	  Korean	  armistice,	   the	   specter	  of	  Chinese	   intervention	   still	   hung	  heavy	   in	  the	  National	  Security	  Council’s	  meetings	  
	  
“An	  Unsatisfactory	  Ally”	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Korea	  in	  1953	  	  
Fate	  was	  not	  kind	  to	  Korea	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  For	  the	  better	  part	  of	  fifty	  years	   the	   Korean	   Peninsula	   was	   exploited	   as	   part	   of	   Japan’s	   powerful	   imperium.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Memcon,	  Robert	  McBride	  and	  Henri	  Bonnet,	  12	  Feb.	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  13:1040-­‐1041.	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  Suppressed	   and	   governed	   by	   the	   Japanese,	   the	   majority	   of	   people	   lacked	   basic	  resources.	   	  When	   Japan	  was	  defeated	   in	  August	  of	  1946,	  Korea	  was	   split	   into	   two	  zones	  of	  occupation—north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  south	  was	  controlled	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Cold	  War	  ideological	  tensions	  prevented	  the	  world’s	   powers	   from	   reconciling	   their	   differences	   and	   unifying	   the	   Peninsula.	  	  With	   official	   unification	   hopelessly	   mired	   in	   politics,	   two	   separate	   nations	   were	  formed,	  each	  opposed	  to	  the	  other’s	  existence.	  	  South	  of	  the	  demilitarized	  zone,	  Dr.	  Syngman	   Rhee	   won	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea’s	   first	   presidential	   election	   in	   1948.	  	  Northward,	  Premier	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung,	  a	  veteran	  revolutionary	  leader	  that	  battled	  Japan’s	  army,	  led	  the	  Soviet	  sponsored	  Democratic	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Korea.	  (DPRK)	  	  	  
Syngman	  Rhee	  took	  a	  long	  and	  unconventional	  route	  to	  power,	  one	  that	  left	  an	  indelible	  mark	  on	  his	  psyche.	  	  Born	  in	  1875,	  he	  witnessed	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Choson	  dynasty,	  Japanese	  colonization,	  liberation,	  division,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War—although,	  he	  spent	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  colonial	  period	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  When	  Japan	  began	  its	   territorial	   conquest	   of	   the	  peninsula	   in	   the	   late	  19th	   century	  he	  participated	   in	  demonstrations	  that	  led	  to	  his	  arrest.	  	  Upon	  release,	  Rhee	  began	  a	  self-­‐imposed	  exile	  in	  the	  Unites	  States.	  	  He	  completed	  his	  undergraduate	  degree	  at	  Harvard	  University	  and	   received	   a	   doctorate	   in	   international	   law	   in	   1910	   from	   Princeton	   University.	  	  During	   his	   studies	   and	   travels,	   Rhee	   spent	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   time	   lobbying	   different	  government	   officials	   and	   offices	   for	   Korea’s	   right	   to	   independence,	   and,	   not	  coincidentally,	  his	  qualification	  as	  its	  leader.	  	  Certainly,	  Rhee	  did	  have	  support	  in	  the	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  community	  of	  Korean	  exiles.	  	  His	  prison	  dissertation,	  The	  Spirit	  of	  Independence,	  was	  printed	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  his	  influence	  should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  	  Even	  as	  late	  as	   1944,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Cordell	   Hull	   believed	   that	   a	   group	   of	   Rhee’s	   acolytes	  were	  attempting	  to	  meet	  him	  in	  the	  US	  in	  order	  “to	  give	  support	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Syngman	   Rhee	  which	   [was]	   believed	   to	   be	   somewhat	   insecure.”6	   	   	   In	   post-­‐World	  War	   I	   America,	   Rhee’s	   Christianity,	   self-­‐ascribed	   “Jeffersonian	   democratic”	   values	  and	  advocacy	  of	  Woodrow	  Wilson’s	  “self-­‐determination”	  for	  Korea	  earned	  him	  allies	  in	   the	   US.	   	   Some	   of	   those	   allies	   became	   paid	   advisors	   to	   Rhee	   after	   he	   won	   the	  presidency.	  	  His	  pronounced	  anti-­‐communism	  greatly	  aided	  his	  domestic	  appeal	  and	  led	  Henry	  Luce’s	  Time	  magazine	  to	  write	  an	  exaggerated	  account	  of	  the	  statesman,	  claiming	  that,	  “to	  his	  countrymen,”	  Rhee	  had	  the	  “stature	  of	  George	  Washington.”7	  	  
While	  heralded	  as	  a	  patriot,	  Rhee	  was	  also	  decried	  as	  an	  autocrat,	  but	  in	  fact,	  Rhee	  was	  the	  latter	  and	  only	  nominally	  the	  former.	   	  Followers	  cited	  his	  nationalist	  credentials	   by	   pointing	   to	   his	   stature	   in	   the	   Korean	   Provisional	   Government.	  	  	  Centered	   in	   Chungking	   after	   Japan’s	   annexation	   of	   Korea,	   the	   KPG	   was	   a	  constellation	  of	  exiled	  Koreans—many	  of	  whom,	  like	  Rhee,	  had	  lived	  and	  studied	  in	  foreign	   countries.	   	   The	  members	   of	   the	  KPG	   (headed	   by	   Chairman-­‐elect	   Syngman	  Rhee)	  beseeched	  US	  politicians	  to	  aid	  Korea	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  1882	  Amity	  Treaty.	   	   The	   future	   president	   was	   charged	   to	   lead	   the	   KPG	   in	   the	   west	   and	   he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  the	  Ambassador	  in	  China	  (Gauss),	  28	  March	  1944,	  Foreign	  
Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1944,	  V:1290	  (Hereafter	  cited	  as	  FRUS);	  7	  “Korea:	  The	  Walnut,”	  Time,	  9	  March	  1953.	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  devoted	   a	   considerable	   effort	   toward	   this	   endeavor.	   	   In	   pursuit	   of	   his	   objectives,	  Rhee	  did	  not	  shy	  from	  employing	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  latitude	  in	  his	  appeals.	  	  Displaying	  his	   zeal	   for	   exaggeration,	   Rhee	   routinely	   proclaimed	   to	   Presidents	   Franklin	  Roosevelt	  and	  Truman	  that	  his	  government,	  alone,	   spoke	   for	   the	  23,000,000	  souls	  living	  in	  Korea—an	  absurd	  statement	  since	  Korea	  was	  fragmented	  and	  an	  inchoate	  entity	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Rhee’s	  protestations	  for	  independence	  were	  notable	  for	  his	  pronounced	  declarations	  that	  he	  had	  the	  expertise	  (or	  right)	  to	  lead	  a	  free	  Korea.	  	  The	  State	  Department	  remarked	  in	  1946	  that	  Rhee’s	  great	  efforts	  to	  place	  himself	  at	  the	   front	   of	   the	   independence	  movement	  were	   probably	   an	   attempt	   to	   “steal	   the	  show	  at	  home,”	  lest	  he	  not	  become	  Korea’s	  first	  leader.8	  	  	  
Three	   decades	   of	   exile	   and	   diplomatic	   fighting	   profoundly	   affected	   Korea’s	  future	   president.	   	   Rhee’s	   efforts	   to	   “steal	   the	   show”	   in	   1946	  were	   his	   attempts	   to	  expand	   and	   cultivate	   a	   “personal	   popularity”	   based	   on	   “his	   legend	   as	   a	   resistance	  hero.	  	  Rhee	  continued	  to	  see	  himself	  as	  the	  center	  of	  current	  events	  in	  Korean	  life.”9	  	  The	   legend	   was	   based	   largely	   on	   Rhee’s	   anti-­‐Japanese	   resistance	   and	   political	  imprisonment,	   but	   it	   was	   also	   founded	   on	   his	   repute	   as	   the	   preeminent	   Korean	  independence	  lobbyist	  in	  America.	   	  And	  in	  fact,	  Rhee	  did	  possess	  a	  lengthy	  resume	  of	  correspondence	  and	  meetings	  with	  various	  US	  statesmen.	  	  Less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  Political	  Advisor	  in	  Korea	  (Langdon)	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Undated	  (Early	  December	  1946),	  FRUS,	  1946,	  13:778.	  9	  John	  Huer,	  Marching	  Orders:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Military	  in	  South	  Korea’s	  ‘Economic	  
Miracle,’	  1961-­1971	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1989),	  12.	  
	   	   10	   	   	   	  	  arriving	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Rhee	  met	  with	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Hay	  in	  February	  1905.	  	  That	  same	  year	  Rhee	  arranged	  a	  meeting	  with	  President	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  and	   implored	   the	   statesman	   to	  honor	  America’s	   treaty	   responsibilities	  with	  Korea	  and	   halt	   Japanese	   imperialism	   in	   Northeast	   Asia.	   	   Roosevelt	   did	   not	   come	   to	   the	  Korean’s	  assistance;	  rather,	  he	  struck	  a	  compromise	  with	  Japan,	  known	  as	  the	  Taft-­‐Katsura	   agreement,	   which	   allowed	   each	   country	   to	   respect	   the	   other’s	   colonial	  designs	   in	   the	   Pacific—thus	   paving	   the	   way	   for	   Japan’s	   1910	   annexation	   of	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  	  When	  the	  sub	  rosa	  pact	  was	  later	  exposed,	  along	  with	  Roosevelt’s	  complicity,	   Rhee	   and	   the	   KPG	   believed	   that	   the	   United	   States	   abandoned	   their	  country	   to	   colonial	   dereliction.10	   	   Adding	   insult,	   Woodrow	   Wilson,	   his	   former	  university’s	  president,	  refused	  to	  incorporate	  Korea’s	  independence	  into	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles,	  not	  wanting	  to	  upset	  Japan’s	  relatively	  stable	  control	  of	  Northeast	  Asia.	  	  The	  president’s	  character	  development	  began	  a	  profound	  change	  at	  this	  point	  as	  he	  devoted	  his	  time	  trying	  to	  redress	  the	  wrongs	  he	  believed	  were	  committed	  against	  his	   country;	   and	   more,	   Rhee	   largely	   undertook	   this	   gargantuan	   task	   alone.	  	  According	   to	   Robert	   Oliver,	   (Rhee’s	   friend,	   advisor,	   and	   biographer)	   the	   future	  Korean	  president	  was	  at	  this	  time	  “a	  David	  without	  a	  slingshot,	  assailing	  an	  army	  of	  Goliaths,“	  in	  what	  had	  become	  a	  “painful	  and	  lonely	  endeavor.”11	  	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  during	   these	   decades	  Rhee	   saw	  himself	   as	   a	   crusader	  who	  was	   carrying	   forth	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  John	  Edward	  Wilz,	  “Did	  the	  United	  States	  Abandon	  Korea	  in	  1905?,”	  The	  Pacific	  
Historical	  Review	  54	  (1985):	  243-­‐270.	  11	  Robert	  T.	  Oliver,	  Syngman	  Rhee:	  The	  Man	  Behind	  the	  Myth	  (NY:	  Dodd	  Mead	  &	  Company,	  1954),	  156.	  
	   	   11	   	   	   	  	  people’s	   chance	   to	   escape	   their	   colonial	   fetters.	   	   The	   time	   spent	   fighting	   for	   his	  country	   in	   forums	   as	   large	   as	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   and	   US	   State	   Department,	  engendered	   his	   belief	   that	   Korea’s	   hopes	   for	   independence	   and	   his	   ability	   to	  win	  personal	  and	  political	  power	  were	  inextricably	  linked.	  	  	  	  	  	  
By	  the	  1940’s	  he	  was	  a	  man	  with	  a	  highly	  hubristic	  and	  mercurial	  demeanor.	  	  John	  Muccio,	  the	  United	  States	  Ambassador	  to	  Korea	  from	  1949-­‐1952,	  believed	  that	  General	   MacArthur,	   Chiang	   Kai-­‐shek,	   and	   Syngman	   Rhee	   shared	   similar	   flawed	  personalities.	  	  “Ego,”	  he	  described,	  “was	  a	  predominant	  trait	  in	  each,”	  fostered	  by	  a	  sense	   of	   “isolation.”12	   	   Indeed,	   the	   ego	   aspect	   of	   Rhee’s	   temperament	   was	   the	  primary	   impulsion	   behind	   his	   policies,	   actions,	   and	   statements.	   	   The	   Princeton	  graduate	   suffered	   repeated	   humiliation	   when	   American	   statesman	   rebuffed	   him,	  fueling	   his	   desire	   to	   establish	   virility	   as	   a	   leader	   and	   prove	   Korea’s	   capability	   to	  become	  a	  regional	  power.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  part	  of	  the	  president’s	  authoritarianism	  and	  brutal	  suppression	  of	  opponents	  was	  more	  a	  result	  of	  his	  time	  spent	  in	  the	  west,	  and	  not,	  as	  the	  racial	  stereotypes	  of	  the	  1950’s	  defined,	  his	  oriental	  background.	  	  
Even	   though	   Rhee	   was	   dependent	   on	   economic	   and	   military	   aid	   from	   the	  United	  States,	  he	  was	  far	  from	  a	  complaisant	  ally;	  much	  of	  the	  president’s	  diplomacy	  was	   conducted	   through	   brinksmanship,	   bluffing,	   and	   autocratic	   policies.	   	   The	  president’s	  ego,	  but	  lack	  of	  conventional	  diplomatic	  power,	  led	  to	  his	  unique	  tactics.	  	  Using	  deceit	  and	  stubbornness	  to	  his	  advantage,	  Rhee	  declared	  apparently	  spurious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ambassador	  John	  Muccio,	  Oral	  History,	  The	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library.	  
	   	   12	   	   	   	  	  and	   desultory	   policies.	   His	   obdurate	   stance	   earned	   him	   a	   poor	   reputation	   in	   the	  Washington,	   where	   US	   officials	   frequently	   described	   the	   president	   as	   stubborn,	  intractable,	   and	   recalcitrant	   in	   their	   memorandums.	   	   The	   Korean	   president’s	  intransigence	  frequently	  drew	  severe	  criticism	  from	  the	  highest	  levels.	  	  On	  different	  occasions	  President	  Eisenhower	  bitterly	  complained	  about	  Rhee’s	  use	  of	  “blackmail”	  and	  referred	  to	  him	  as	  one	  of	  those	  “penny	  ante	  dictators“	  that	  was	  an	  “s.o.b.”	  and	  “an	   unsatisfactory	   ally.”	   13	   In	   one	   National	   Security	   Council	   meeting,	   Secretary	   of	  State	   John	  Foster	  Dulles	  became	  enraged	  while	  discussing	  Korea	  and	  quipped	  that	  the	   Korean	   President	   was	   a	   “master	   of	   evasion,”	   and	   an	   “Oriental	   bargainer.”14	  	  Certainly,	   Rhee’s	   use	   of	   defiant	   acts	   made	   him	   appear	   cantankerous	   (and	   even	  insane)	   to	   many	   American	   diplomats,	   but	   all	   policies	   were	   guided	   by	   one	  incontrovertible	  rule:	  never	  jeopardize	  personal	  power.	  
In	   advance	   of	   the	   Korean	   War,	   President	   Rhee	   advocated	   war	   with	   the	  communist	  elements	  of	  his	  country—the	  underlying	  goal	  being	  the	  consolidation	  of	  power	  under	  his	  offices.	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  paramilitary	  organizations	  worked	  with	  Korean	  guerilla	  fighters	  during	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Much	  like	  the	  United	  States’	  Office	   of	   Strategic	   Services	   (OSS)	  had	  done	   in	   Southeast	  Asia,	   the	  Russians	  collaborated	   and	   trained	  with	   the	   local	   revolutionaries	   in	   order	   to	   defeat	   Japan’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Record	  of	  National	  Security	  Council	  Meeting,	  13	  April	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1787;	  Record	  of	  NSC	  Meeting,	  15	  Nov.	  1956,	  FRUS,	  1955-­‐1957,	  23:348;	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  The	  Eisenhower	  Diaries,	  ed.	  Robert	  H	  Ferrell	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  1981),	  248.	  14	  As	  quoted	  in	  Jung-­‐en	  Woo,	  Race	  to	  the	  Swift,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  44.	  
	   	   13	   	   	   	  	  Imperial	  Army.	  	  	  Rhee	  used	  this	  fact	  to	  make	  exaggerated	  claims	  that	  the	  USSR	  was	  creating	  a	  proxy	  government	  in	  his	  home	  country	  and	  warned	  diplomats	  that	  if	  the	  KPG	  were	  not	  recognized,	  Korea	  would	  be	  lost	  to	  the	  Soviets	  forever.	  	  Even	  as	  early	  as	  1946,	  Rhee	  tried	  to	  obtain	  US	  backing	  for	  a	  military	  “mop	  up”	  of	  communists	  in	  the	  north	  of	  Korea.	  	  His	  most	  likely	  fear	  was	  that	  guerilla	  leaders,	  who	  spent	  the	  war	  battling	  the	  Japanese	  in	  Manchuria	  and	  Korea	  and	  not	  in	  Ivy	  League	  school	  rooms,	  would	   exert	  more	   influence	   in	   his	   country	   than	   himself:	   the	   chairman	   of	   Korea’s	  “official”	   government.	   	   His	   opinion	   was	   no	   different	   in	   the	   1946-­‐1950	   period	   of	  tentative	   peace.	   	   In	   one	   particular	   incident,	   Ambassador	   Muccio	   recommended	   a	  small	   fleet	   of	   US	   Naval	   vessels	   visit	   Korea	   after	   the	   1949	   US	   troop	   withdrawal,	  mainly	   as	   a	   show	   of	   support.	   	   When	   the	   USS	   Saint	   Paul	   sailed	   into	   Inchon,	   the	  cruiser’s	  sailors	  welcomed	  President	  Rhee	  for	  a	  lunch	  and	  photo	  opportunity.	  	  After	  the	   meal,	   the	   ship’s	   commander	   invited	   the	   president	   to	   speak	   to	   the	   crew	   and	  reporters.	   	   After	   he	   issued	   a	   cordial	   welcome	   and	   thanked	   his	   visitors,	   Rhee	  launched	   into	   a	   tirade,	   “declaring	   war	   against	   the	   communists	   throughout	   the	  world.”	  	  In	  summarizing	  the	  autocrat’s	  antagonistic	  demeanor,	  a	  former	  ambassador	  lamented,	   “Well,	  we	  had	   recurring	   problems	  with	   old	  man	  Rhee.	  We	   just	   couldn’t	  shut	   him	   up.”15	   	   President	   Eisenhower	   was	   also	   conscious	   of	   the	   impromptu	  outbursts	   and	   accordingly	   refused	   to	   allow	   television	   cameras	   that	   could	   record	  sound	  to	  be	  at	  his	  reception	  for	  President	  Rhee’s	  visit	  to	  Washington.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Muccio,	  Oral	  History,	  61-­‐62.	  
	   	   14	   	   	   	  	   When	  the	  United	  States	  responded	  to	  the	  DPRK’s	  1950	  southward	  offensive,	  its	  goal	  was	  a	  restoration	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  status	  quo.	  	  United	  Nations’	  Resolution	  84	  recommended	  a	  UN	  coalition	  commanded	  by	  the	  U.S.	  military	  “assist	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	   in	   defending	   itself	   against	   armed	   attack	   and	   thus	   to	   restore	   international	  peace	   and	   security	   in	   the	   area.”16	   	   Spurred	   by	   early	   victories,	   General	   Douglas	  MacArthur	  stormed	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  in	  fall	  of	  ‘50	  and	  declared	  that	  he	  was	  close	   to	   achieving	   the	   U.N.’s	   “objective	   to	   bring	   unity	   and	   peace	   to	   the	   Korean	  Nation.”17	   	   MacArthur’s	   bravado	   and	   comments	   exacerbated	   President	   Rhee’s	  defiant	   position	   that	   the	   U.S.	  mission	   should	   be	   unification	   of	   the	   Peninsula—not	  simply	  a	  ceasefire,	  peace,	  and	  a	  restoration	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  By	  spring	  of	  1953	  the	  U.N.	  nations	  were	  weary	  of	   the	   stalemated	  war	  and	  armistice	   talks	  were	   resumed	  with	  seriousness.	  	  
When	   Washington	   appeared	   receptive	   to	   China	   and	   the	   DPRK’s	   offer	   to	  resume	   negotiations,	   Rhee	   realized	   his	   fate	  was	   being	   sealed	   and,	   accordingly,	   he	  employed	   his	   most	   radical	   political	   tactics.	   	   His	   agents	   launched	   a	   successful	  propaganda	  campaign	  that	  included	  a	  50,000-­‐person	  “Unification	  or	  Death”	  parade	  and	   an	  April	   21st	  National	  Assembly	   resolution	   to	  pursue	  military	   reunification	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Security	  Council	  Resolutions-­‐1950,	  “Resolution	  84:	  Complaint	  of	  aggression	  upon	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  7	  Jul,”	  (United	  Nations,	  Documents,	  Security	  Council,	  Resolutions,	  2009),	  http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm.	  	  17	  “Text	  of	  MacArthur	  Statement,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  6	  Nov.	  1950.	  (my	  emphasis)	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  Korea.18	   	   From	   this	   time	   forward,	   Rhee’s	   threats	   to	   march	   north	   and	   fight	   alone	  occurred	  with	  regular	  frequency.	  	  The	  ploys	  helped	  stave	  off	  peace	  in	  the	  near	  term,	  but	   by	   summer	   the	   negotiations	   were	   nearly	   complete.	   	   One	   of	   the	   pending,	   and	  highly	   contentious,	   issues	   was	   prisoner	   of	   war	   repatriation.	   	   Despite	   Rhee’s	  vociferous	  opposition	   to	  a	   lengthy	  detention	  of	  Korean	  POWs,	   the	  U.S.	  negotiators	  agreed	   to	   a	   compromise	   without	   Rhee’s	   consent.	   	   Three	   weeks	   after	   he	   was	  informed	   of	   the	   concession,	   the	   president	   staged	   a	   mass	   escape	   of	   25,000	   North	  Korean	  POWs	  who	  did	  not	  want	  to	  return	  to	  the	  North.	  	  The	  same	  day,	  in	  a	  prepared	  radio	   announcement,	   he	   avowed	   his	   responsibility	   for	   the	   escapes.	   	   POWs	   were	  unjustly	   imprisoned,	   Rhee	   claimed,	   and	   deprived	   of	   human	   rights	   “due	   to	  international	  complications.”	   	  The	  president	  concluded	  unequivocally,	   “The	  reason	  why	  I	  did	  this	  without	  full	  consultation	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  Command	  and	  other	  authorities	  concerned	   is	   too	  obvious	  to	  explain.”19	  At	   this	  moment,	  Rhee	  must	  have	  recalled	  his	  years	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  slighted	  by	  the	  world’s	  great	  powers.	  	  The	  POW	  issue	  was	  an	  opportunity	  to	  assert	  his	  influence.	  	  Ironically,	  weeks	  before	  Rhee’s	  act	  of	  defiance	  Eisenhower’s	  staff	  considered	  creating	  a	  fake	  POW	  escape	  to	  resolve	  the	  prisoner	  debate.	  At	   the	   following	  meeting	  of	   the	  National	   Security	  Council,	   the	  US	  President	   was	   still	   furious	   with	   his	   “client’s”	   intransigence.	   	   Ike	   complained	  with	  notable	   asperity,	   “[i]f	   [Rhee]	  did	  not	  behave	  himself	  we	  might	  have	   to	  move	  out,”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Walter	  G.	  Hermes,	  U.S.	  Army	  in	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Truce	  Tent	  and	  Fighting	  Front	  (Washington	  DC:	  United	  States	  Army,	  2005),	  442.	  19	  Press	  Release,	  Office	  of	  Public	  Information,	  ROK,	  18	  June	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1199.	  (Emphasis	  mine)	  
	   	   16	   	   	   	  	  which	   would	   mean	   “goodbye”	   to	   Korea.	   	   Harold	   Stassen,	   the	   Director	   of	   Mutual	  Security,	   voiced	   the	   lone	   justification,	   asking	   the	  obvious	  question:	  How	  could	   the	  U.S.	  accuse	  President	  Rhee	  of	  breaking	  his	  word	  if	  he	  never	  agreed	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  armistice?	  Dulles	  and	  Eisenhower	  countered	  by	  telling	  Stassen	  that	  Rhee	  needed	  to	   be	   rebuked	   or	   the	   United	   States	   “would	   go	   down	   as	   the	   biggest	   frauds	   in	  history.”20	  
The	   Eisenhower	   Administration	   was	   not	   willing	   to	   let	   Rhee	   fully	   dictate	  Korea’s	   future.	   	   It	   began	   to	   hedge	   its	   bets	   after	   the	   anti-­‐armistice	   events	   in	  April.	  	  General	   Maxwell	   Taylor,	   Commander	   U.S.	   Eighth	   Army,	   created	   a	   military	  contingency	   plan	   the	   very	   next	   month.	   	   EVER	   READY	   was	   the	   U.S.	   military’s	  response	   for	   Rhee’s	   unwillingness	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   State	   Department’s	   Korea	  policy.	  It	  was	  designed	  to	  subvert	  or	  overthrow	  Rhee’s	  government	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  ROKA	  officers	  trusted	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Army.21	  	  	  
EVER	   READY	   [revised	   edition]	   provides	   for	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   UNC	  forces	   and	   supplies	   and	   insures	   that	   the	   UN	   position,	   relative	   to	   the	  armistice,	   is	   maintained	   in	   the	   event	   operational	   control	   of	   the	   ROK	  forces	   is	   weakened	   or	   lost	   prior	   to,	   during,	   or	   following	   the	   political	  settlement…	  The	  over-­‐all	  assigned	  tasks…	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  It	  is	  relevant	  to	  note	  that	  Mr.	  Stassen	  was	  a	  progressive	  and	  open-­‐minded	  politician	  in	  the	  1950’s.	  During	  his	  time	  as	  Governor	  of	  Minnesota,	  prior	  to	  WWII	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  he	  brought	  the	  first	  black	  officer	  into	  the	  state	  National	  Guard,	  in	  Albin	  Krebs,	  “Harold	  E.	  Stassen	  Dies	  at	  93,”	  NYT,	  5	  March	  2001.;	  Record	  of	  NSC	  Meeting,	  19	  June	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1201-­‐1204.	  21	  Tae	  Yang	  Kwak,	  “The	  Anvil	  of	  War:	  Legacies	  of	  Korean	  Participation	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War”	  (Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Harvard	  University,	  2006),	  53.	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   2.Relieve	  disloyal	  ROK	  commanders…	  4.	   Withdraw	   air	   support,	   ground	   the	   ROK	   Air	   Force,	   and	   bomb	  designated	  ROK	  ammunition-­‐supply	  points.	  5.	  Secure	  custody	  of	  dissident	  military	  and	  civilian	  leaders…	  	   The	  Eight	  Army	  Commander	  may	  also	  recommend	  to	  CINCUNC	  (General	  Hull)…	  1.	  	  Demand	  that	  Rhee	  comply	  with	  the	  UNC	  declaration	  of	  policies	  and	  disseminate	  this	  decision	  to	  the	  ROK	  Army,	  et	  al…	  3.Withdraw	  recognition	  of	  the	  Rhee	  government	  and	  expel	  ROK	  forces	  from	  the	  UNC…	  6.	  Initiate	  an	  anti-­‐Rhee	  publicity	  campaign	  7.	  Proclaim	  martial	  law.22	  The	   president’s	   continued	   defiance	   of	   the	   armistice	   hardened	   American	  sentiments.	   	   In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   POW	   release,	   General	   Clark,	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  Far	  East	  and	  United	  Nations	  Command,	  proposed	  meeting	  with	  military	   leaders	   from	   North	   Korea	   and	   China.	   	   According	   to	   Clark,	   U.S.	   delegates	  needed	   to	   share	   their	   honest	   appraisal	   of	   Rhee,	   explain	   what	   avenues	   of	   control	  were	   available	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   Command,	   and	   ascertain	   if	   the	   Communists	  were	   still	   willing	   to	   sign	   an	   armistice.23	   	   Clark’s	   proposal	   was	   rejected	   in	   a	   joint	  State-­‐Defense	  telegram	  the	  next	  day,	  but	  the	  implication	  was	  significant.	   	  Cold	  War	  solidarity	  weakened	  in	  East	  Asia	  as	  enthusiasm	  waned,	  the	  American	  public	  soured,	  and	  policy	  maker’s	  expectations	   leveled	  with	   reality.	   	   	  The	  concept	  of	   rolling	  back	  Communist	   aggression	   was	   popular,	   but	   a	   protracted	   war	   in	   Asia	   was	   not	  acceptable.	  	  	  For	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration,	  stalemate	  in	  Korea	  was	  not	  a	  loss;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	  tasks	  chosen	  to	  appear	  are	  those	  that	  would	  be	  particularly	  threatening	  to	  Rhee.	  Walter	  Scott	  (Director	  of	  the	  Executive	  Secretariat)	  to	  Dulles,	  28	  Oct.	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1569-­‐70.	  23	  Clark	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Army,	  21	  June	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1230.	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  rather,	   it	  was	   a	  welcomed	   solution	   that	   allowed	   reallocation	   of	   valuable	   time	   and	  resources	  to	  regional	  theaters	  deemed	  more	  pressing.	  
President	   Eisenhower	   and	   Secretary	   Dulles	   made	   it	   abundantly	   clear	   in	  subsequent	  weeks	  that	  they	  only	  favored	  a	  peaceful	  unification	  of	  Korea.	  	  However,	  Rhee	   continued	   to	   advocate,	   whether	   justified	   or	   not,	   that	   the	   United	   should	  prosecute	   the	   Korean	  War	   until	   unification	   was	   achieved.	   	   In	   late	   June,	   the	   Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  (JCS)	  members	  thoroughly	  discussed	  the	  options	  available	  to	  win	  (or	  force)	  the	  ROK’s	  acceptance	  of	  peace.	  	  When	  a	  participant	  suggested	  moving	  ahead	  without	   Rhee’s	   consent,	   the	   entire	   group	   was	   reminded	   that	   General	   Clark	   had	  spoken	  with	  Rhee	  about	  this	  possibility.	  In	  such	  an	  event,	  the	  ROK,	  according	  to	  its	  president,	  would	  withdraw	  its	  armed	  forces	  from	  the	  UNC,	  refuse	  to	  withdraw	  to	  the	  armistice	  line,	  and	  continue	  fighting.	  Aware	  of	  the	  Rhee’s	  desire	  for	  a	  defense	  treaty,	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  pondered	  a	  trade—a	  US-­‐Korea	  security	  pact	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	   ROK’s	   compliance	   and	   acceptance	   of	   an	   armistice.	   	   The	   offer	  was	   substantial.	  Since	  the	  war’s	  inception,	  the	  US	  had	  maintained,	  although	  on	  a	  tenuous	  basis,	  that	  the	   Republic	   of	   Korea’s	   defense	  was	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   United	   Nations,	   not	  America.	   	  The	  generals	  were	  reminded	  that	  Rhee	  had	  already	  refused	  to	  barter	  for	  the	  armistice.	  Even	  though	  an	  official	  alliance	  would	  give	  Korea	  the	  ability	  to	  remain	  sovereign,	   lest	   the	   DPRK	   attack	   southward	   and	   incur	   Dulles’	   often	   cited	   massive	  retaliatory	  attack,	  it	  did	  nothing	  to	  ensure	  unification.	  	  Rhee	  continued	  to	  hope	  that	  he	   could	   fuse	   the	   country	   together	   through	   war	   and	   maintain	   his	   presidential	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  position.	   	   	   At	   this	   early	   juncture	   of	   post-­‐armistice	   relations,	   Rhee	   did	   not	   have	   to	  concede	   easily.	   	   The	   threats	  were	   a	   relatively	  new	   tactic	   and	   therefore	  held	  more	  weight.	   	   	  Exasperated,	   the	   JCS	  discussion	  ended	  on	  the	  same	  tone	  as	  Eisenhower’s	  earlier	  NSC	  meeting	  where	  Ike	  condensed	  the	  Korean	  position.	  “The	  long	  and	  short	  of	  it”	  was	  the	  “simple	  fact	  that	  President	  Rhee	  and	  his	  supporters	  wanted	  to	  keep	  on	  fighting.”24	  
Walter	   Robertson	   spent	   the	   better	   part	   of	   the	   summer	   of	   1953	   trying	   to	  dissuade	   President	   Rhee	   of	   his	   opinions.	   	   As	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Far	   Eastern	  Affairs	  he	  was	  responsible	   for	   implementing	  Washington’s	  decisions	   in	  Korea,	  and	  in	  late	  June	  and	  July	  that	  entailed	  exchanging	  proposals	  with	  the	  ROK	  president.	  	  In	  late	  June	  he	  was	  still	  locked	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Rhee,	  whom	  he	  characterized	  as	  a	  “shrewd,	  resourceful	  trader.”25	  As	  time	  began	  to	  run	  short	  the	  Secretary	  once	  again	  tried	  to	  cajole	  the	  stubborn	  leader.	  	  His	  recent	  string	  of	  harangues,	  which	  focused	  on	  the	  world	  battle	  against	  Communism	  and	  Korea’s	  role	  in	  the	  struggle,	  fell	  on,	  not	  so	  much	  deaf,	  but	  exhausted	  ears.	   	  The	  U.S.	  position	  on	  Korea	  had	  hardened,	  and	  the	  State	   Department	   approached	   Rhee	   as	   someone	   who	   needed	   to	   be	   “pushed.”26	  	  Altering	   his	   approach,	   the	   president	   sent	   a	   letter	   to	   Robertson	   that	   gave	   subtle	  mention	  of	  what	  Korea	  was	  willing	  to	  do	  for	  the	  Free	  World.	  	  “We	  hope,	  however,”	  Rhee	   wrote,	   “that	   the	   further	   strengthening	   of	   the	   ROK	   forces	   may	   be	   found	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Record	  of	  NSC	  Meeting,	  19	  June	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1202.	  25	  Robertson	  to	  the	  Dept.	  of	  State,	  1	  July	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1291.	  26	  Ibid.	  
	   	   20	   	   	   	  	  desirable	  with	  a	  view	  to	  fitting	  the	  Korean	  military	  build-­‐up	  into	  the	  American	  plan	  of	  global	  strategy.	  	  We	  have	  tasted	  the	  benefits	  of	  collective	  security,	  and	  we	  feel	  it	  our	  duty	  to	  subscribe	  to	  it	  not	  merely	  in	  words	  but	  in	  deeds.”27	  	  The	  subtle	  message,	  possibly	  meant	  to	  elicit	  a	  troop	  request	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  the	  first	  attempt	  made	   by	   President	   Rhee	   to	   raise	   Korea’s	   worth	   and	   stature	   in	   Washington’s	  calculations.	   	   It	  also	  marked	  the	  first	   time	  Rhee	  mentioned	  Korea’s	   involvement	   in	  “collective	  defense”	  and	  the	  ROK’s	  willingness	  to	  participate	  actively	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “deeds.”	   	   The	   tone	  was	   surprising,	   but	   it	   did	  not	   appear	   spontaneously,	  Rhee	  was	  merely	  repeating	  what	  he	  had	  been	  told	  by	  Secretary	  Dulles	  three	  years	  earlier.	  On	  that	  occasion,	  the	  written	  record	  noted:	  
Mr.	   Dulles	   went	   to	   considerable	   length	   to	   explain	   that	   formal	   pacts,	   alliances	   or	  treaties	  were	  not	  necessarily	  the	  prerequisite	  to	  common	  action	  against	  a	  common	  foe	  and	  that	  the	  important	  thing	  was	  for	  a	  government	  to	  prove	  by	  its	  actions	  that	  it	  was	   in	   fact	   a	   loyal	  member	   of	   the	   free	  world	   in	  which	   case	   it	   could	   count	   on	   the	  support	  of	  other	  members	  of	  the	  free	  world	  against	  the	  forces	  of	  communism.28	  President	  Rhee’s	   rephrasing	  of	   this	   language	  was	   specifically	  used	   to	  heighten	  his	  nation’s	  worth	  at	   a	   time	  when	  his	   its	  value	  was	  plummeting	   fast	   and	  entangle	  his	  nation’s	  global	  worth	  with	  that	  of	  Indochina—an	  area	  of	  the	  world	  that	  was	  rapidly	  overshadowing	  and	  minimizing	  Korea.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Rhee	  to	  Robertson,	  1	  July	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1294.	  28	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Northeast	  Asian	  Affairs	  (Allison),	  19	  June,	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950,	  7:107.	  
	   	   21	   	   	   	  	  	   The	  Korean	   president’s	  willingness	   to	   offer	   Korea’s	   resources,	  without	   any	  mandate,	   dates	   back	   to	  World	  War	   II;	   and	   it	   highlights	   the	   overriding	   goal	   of	   his	  machinations—power.	  	  As	  early	  as	  1943,	  Rhee	  tried	  to	  barter	  for	  recognition	  of	  his	  government,	   telling	  President	  Roosevelt	   that	   if	   he	  and	   the	  KPG	  were	  anointed	   the	  official	  government	  of	  Korea,	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  organize	  an	  armed	  resistance	  to	  Japan	  and	  deter	  Soviet	  expansion	  in	  the	  peninsula.	  	  Rhee	  condensed	  and	  concluded	  his	  position	  by	  stating	  that	  recognition	  of	  the	  KPG	  would	  “thereby	  render	  a	  material	  service	  to	  the	  United	  States.”29	  	  Five	  years	  later	  he	  did	  more	  to	  entice	  US	  support	  for	  his	  position.	  	  Months	  before	  the	  presidential	  election,	  while	  Rhee	  was	  in	  no	  position	  to	   do	   so,	   he	   offered	   use	   of	   Cheju	   Island	   as	   a	   United	   States	   Naval	   base	   to	   Under	  Secretary	   of	   War,	   Admiral	   William	   Draper.	   	   Roughly	   a	   month	   later,	   Rhee	   again	  offered	   the	   prospective	   naval	   base	   to	   Draper.	   	   But	   tied	   to	   the	   offer,	   which	   Rhee	  claimed	   with	   certainty	   the	   future	   Korean	   government	   would	   approve,	   was	   one	  important	  corollary.	   	   In	  return	   for	   the	   island,	  Rhee	  wanted	  assurances	   that	   the	  US	  would	  help	  him	  “drive	  the	  Soviets	  from	  Korea.”30	  
Washington’s	  persistent	  avowal	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  truce	  and	  Eisenhower’s	  stiff	  admonishment	  of	  the	  Korean	  president	  impressed	  upon	  Rhee	  the	  strength	  of	  US	  intentions.	   	   Despite	   his	   outwardly	   volatile	   temperament,	   Korea’s	   president	  was	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Rhee	  to	  President	  Roosevelt,	  15	  May	  1943,	  FRUS,	  1943,	  3:1094.	  30	  Jacobs	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  30	  March	  1948,	  FRUS,	  1948,	  6:1163;	  Draper’s	  account	  quoted	  in	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  Child	  of	  Conflict:	  The	  Korean-­American	  Relationship	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1983),	  816n.	  
	   	   22	   	   	   	  	  “genius	   of	   political	  manipulation”	   that	   exercised	   his	   power	   and	   persuasion	   to	   the	  fullest	   extent,	   but	   still	   knew	  when	   to	   concede.31	  As	   events	   in	   July	  wore	  on,	  Rhee’s	  previously	  defiant	  stance	  continued	  to	  soften.	  Secretary	  Robertson	  received	  a	  letter	  from	   President	   Rhee,	   which	   adopted	   a	   conciliatory	   attitude	   that	   appeared	  anachronistic	   in	   light	   of	   his	   recent	   resistance	   to	   US	   policies.	   	   Robertson	   quickly	  relayed	  the	  letter’s	  contents	  back	  to	  the	  State	  Department,	  noting	  in	  particular	  that	  while	  the	  ROK	  would	  not	  sign	  the	  armistice	  agreement,	  it	  pledged	  not	  to	  obstruct	  it.	  	  In	  addition,	  Rhee	  dropped	  his	  demands	  for	  a	  unification	  of	  the	  peninsula	  prior	  to	  the	  armistice	   and	   withdrew	   his	   refusal	   to	   submit	   Korea’s	   predicament	   to	   a	   political	  conference.	   	   “While	  Rhee’s	   letter	   is	  not	  entirely	   satisfactory,”	  Dulles	   replied	   to	   the	  cable,	   “it	   represents	   great	   progress	   from	   [the]	   situation	   that	   existed	   at	   [the]	   time	  you	  undertook	   your	  mission	   and	  probably	   is	   about	   all	  we	  will	   be	   able	   [to]	   obtain	  from	  him	  at	  this	  time.”32	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  Korea	  had	  assented	  to	  the	  armistice	  and	  the	  fighting	  had	  stopped.	  	  Rhee	  was	  not	  left	  empty	  handed,	  though.	  	  He	  managed	  to	  keep	  the	  Tasca	  report	  alive,	  which	  proposed	  awarding	  Korea	  a	  much-­‐needed	  $300	  million	   in	   US	   aid	   after	   the	   ceasefire.	   	   Additionally,	   Rhee	   wrested	   from	   the	  Eisenhower	   Administration	   what	   would	   become	   the	   Mutual	   Defense	   Treaty.	  	  Paramount,	   though,	   in	   the	   president’s	   mind	   was	   the	   United	   States	   agreement	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Carter	  J.	  Eckert,	  Ki-­‐baik	  Lee,	  Young	  Ick	  Lew,	  Michael	  Robinson,	  and	  Edward	  W.	  Wagner,	  Korea:	  Old	  and	  New,	  A	  History	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  348.	  32	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  the	  Embassy	  in	  Korea,	  9	  July	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1362.	  
	   	   23	   	   	   	  	  walkout	  of	  the	  forthcoming	  Korean	  unification	  conference	  if	  an	  agreement	  was	  not	  concluded	  after	  90	  days—actually	  a	  watered	  down	  version	  of	  Rhee’s	  demand	   that	  war	   be	   resumed	   at	   full	   force	   if	   negotiations	   were	   unsuccessful.	   	   The	   negotiation	  issue	  highlights	  the	  president’s	  continued	  aversion	  to	  sacrifice	  part	  of	  his	  personal	  power.	  	  The	  walkout	  clause	  was,	  in	  Rhee’s	  estimation,	  an	  avenue	  through	  which	  the	  war	   could	   be	   resumed.	   If	   the	   conference	   failed	   to	   unify	   the	   peninsula,	   as	   Rhee	  believed,	  he	  would	  have	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  convincing	  the	  US	  to	  resume	  war	  through	  his	   frequent	   assertion	   that	   negotiations	   with	   China	   and	   North	   Korea	   were	   a	  hopeless	  endeavor.33	  	  
	  
Asians	  fighting	  Asians	  
Syngman	  Rhee,	  France,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  	  	  	  As	  discussed,	  President	  Rhee’s	  decision	  to	  extend	  Korean	  military	  aid	  to	  Indochina	  was	   triggered	  by	  an	  amalgamation	  of	   factors,	  but	   the	   first	  offer	  was	  most	  directly	  precipitated	  by	  the	  Pentagon’s	  reduction	  of	  US	  military	  forces	  in	  South	  Korea.	   	  The	  Eisenhower	  administration	  was	  determined	  to	  reel	  in	  the	  vast	  military	  budget	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “New	  Look”	  doctrine,	  which	  emphasized	  mobility	  in	  response	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  In	  October	  of	  1953,	  the	  CIA,	  Joint	  Staff	  and	  Departments	  of	  Army,	  Navy,	  Air	  Force	  and	  State	  collaborated	  to	  write	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  ROK’s	  probable	  actions	  regarding	  the	  armistice.	  In	  it,	  they	  agreed	  “Rhee	  will	  attempt	  to	  make	  the	  conference	  an	  object	  lesson	  for	  the	  US	  on	  the	  futility	  of	  negotiating	  with	  the	  Communists.”	  Special	  Estimate,	  16	  Oct.	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1539.	  
	   	   24	   	   	   	  	  threat	  of	  massive	  nuclear	  retaliation.	  	  The	  eight	  divisions	  stationed	  in	  Korea	  were	  a	  drain	  of	   capital	   and	  manpower	   resources,	   and	  accordingly	  on	  December	  26,	   1953	  the	   White	   House	   announced	   that	   two	   of	   the	   eight	   divisions	   in	   Korea	   would	   be	  recalled	   in	  the	   immediate	   future	   followed	  by	  a	  reduction	  of	  another	  two	  divisions.	  	  Ambassador	   Briggs	   reported	   Rhee’s	   displeasure	   and	   “apprehension	   over	  abandonment.”	  	  In	  a	  heated	  response,	  Rhee	  penned	  a	  letter	  to	  President	  Eisenhower	  that	   was	   so	   vitriolic	   and	   bitter	   the	   State	   Department	   refused	   to	   deliver	   it	   to	   the	  White	  House.	   34	   	   The	  withdrawal	   of	   soldiers	  was	   a	   definitive	   sign	   of	   the	   changing	  world	   dynamic	   and	   Rhee	   recognized	   that	   his	   role	   was	   diminishing	   in	   US	   foreign	  policy.	  	  Korea	  and	  its	  mercurial	  leader	  had	  enjoyed	  a	  consequential	  bump	  in	  prestige	  following	   Chiang	   Kai-­‐shek’s	   expulsion	   from	   Mainland	   China,	   an	   “ally”	   and	  competitor	   for	  military	  aid	  who	  had	  always	  held	  a	  more	   influential	  position	   in	  US	  diplomacy	   and	   domestic	   opinion.	   	   Rhee	   demonstrated	   his	   intent	   to	  maintain	   this	  advantage	  when	  he	  categorically	  rejected	  Chiang’s	  offer	  of	   supplies	  and	   troops	   for	  the	   Korean	   police	   action.35	   	   Ironically,	   Chiang,	   who	   became	   increasingly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Briggs	  to	  Dept.	  of	  State,	  26	  June	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1816;	  For	  the	  text	  of	  Rhee’s	  undelivered	  letter	  see:	  Ibid.,	  1745-­‐1747.	  	  35	  Chiang	  made	  an	  initial	  offer	  of	  assistance	  when	  the	  war	  broke,	  but	  it	  was	  rejected	  for	  fear	  of	  Chinese	  intervention	  and	  poor	  publicity.	  But,	  in	  a	  June	  memorandum	  to	  the	  NSC,	  a	  possible	  reaction	  to	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war	  was	  the	  “employment,	  as	  desirable	  and	  feasible,	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  Chinese	  forces,	  including	  Chinese	  Nationalist	  forces	  in	  military	  operations	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  Korea,	  or	  China	  proper.	  Memorandum	  of	  the	  Executive	  Secretary	  of	  the	  NSC	  (Lay),	  11	  June	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  12:112.	  In	  early	  1954,	  President	  Eisenhower	  recalled,	  “We	  wanted	  to	  use	  them	  [Republic	  of	  China	  troops]	  in	  Korea,	  but	  Rhee	  wouldn’t	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  them.”	  As	  cited	  in	  James	  C.	  Hagerty,	  The	  Diary	  of	  James	  C.	  Hagerty:	  Eisenhower	  in	  Mid-­Course,	  1954-­1955,	  ed.	  Robert	  H.	  Ferrell	  (Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  15.	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  marginalized	  after	  1950,	  probably	  made	  this	  gesture	  inspired	  by	  some	  of	  the	  same	  motives	  as	  Rhee’s	  Indochina	  offers.	  	   The	   Pentagon’s	   troop	   reduction	  was	   the	   latest	   sign	   of	   Indochina’s	   elevated	  importance.	   	   Three	  months	   prior,	   Life	   magazine	   ran	   an	   article	  written	   by	   Donald	  Heath,	   the	  United	  States	  Ambassador	   to	  Vietnam,	  Laos,	   and	  Cambodia.	   	   “France	   is	  fighting	  the	  good	  fight	  in	  Indochina,”	  he	  contended,	  and	  that	  fight	  was	  “the	  fight	  of	  the	   free	  world	   against	   Communism.”	  Heath	   contextualized	   his	   argument	  when	   he	  concluded,	  “Just	  as	  the	  U.N.	  fought	  to	  check	  Communist	  aggression	  in	  Korea,”	  France	  was	   fighting	   the	   same	   battle.36	   	   While	   this	   statement	   was	   not	   revolutionary,	   it	  demonstrated	   the	   global	   shift.	   	   Korea	   had	   “fought”	   Communism	  much	   like	   Chiang	  had	   fought	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party—to	  a	  standstill.	   	   In	  contrast,	  France	  was	  “fighting”	   at	   the	   moment	   to	   halt	   the	   Vietminh	   and,	   as	   US	   policymakers	   were	  convinced,	   world	   Communism.	   	   Early	   into	   1953,	   President	   Eisenhower,	   Secretary	  Dulles,	   and	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Wilson	   concluded	  matter-­‐of-­‐factly	  over	  breakfast	  that	   Indochina	  was	   “the	   top	  priority	   in	   foreign	  policy,”	   and	   “more	   important	   than	  Korea	   because	   the	   consequences	   of	   loss	   there	   could	   not	   be	   localized.”37	   	   In	   1953	  alone,	   Congress	   allotted	   close	   to	   $550	   million	   in	   aid	   for	   France’s	   war,	   which	  accounted	  for	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  conflict’s	  cost,	  and	  the	  Pentagon	  had	  already	  created	  the	  Military	   Assistance	   Advisory	   Group	   to	  monitor	   the	   distribution	   of	   supporting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  “’France	  is	  Fighting	  the	  Good	  Fight’,”	  Life,	  21	  Sept.	  1953.	  37	  Memcon	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  24	  March	  1953,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  8:419.	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  aid.38	   Syngman	   Rhee	   was	   no	   longer	   at	   the	   vanguard	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   	   From	   his	  vantage	   point,	   he	   appeared	   destined	   to	   occupy	   a	   role	   similar	   to	   the	  marginalized	  Chiang	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  China,	  where	  Eisenhower	  had	  strategically	  removed	  the	  US	  Navy’s	  7th	  Fleet	  during	   the	  Korean	  War.	   	  The	   impending	  withdrawal	  of	  20,000	  American	  soldiers	  was	  an	  unfavorable	  harbinger	  of	  Washington’s	  shifting	  focus.	  	   Syngman	   Rhee	   made	   his	   first	   explicit	   offer	   of	   military	   aid	   to	   Indochina	   in	  1954	  with	  specific	  designs	  to	  tighten	  his	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Had	  his	  maneuverings	  actually	  resulted	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  Korean	  soldiers,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  among	  the	  cleverest	  of	  his	  political	  maneuverings.	   	  Ironically,	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  frequent	  complaints	  of	  Rhee’s	  “oriental	  bargaining”,	  neither	  Eisenhower	  nor	  Dulles	  raised	  doubts	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  Korea’s	  proposal.	  	  In	  early	  February	  1954,	  during	  a	  private	  meeting,	  President	  Rhee	  informed	  the	  Commander	  of	  the	  Far	  East,	  General	  Hull,	  that	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Laos	  had	  recently	  requested	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  lend	  its	  military	  assistance	  to	  defeat	  the	  Vietminh—a	  concept	  that	  appeared	  credible,	  as	  the	  Laotian	   royal	   capital	   of	   Luang	   Prabang	   was	   under	   siege	   at	   that	   moment.	   	   Rhee	  explained	  that	  he	  was	   inclined	  to	  offer	  one	  ROKA	  division	  to	  the	  Laos,	  but	  wanted	  Washington’s	  approval.	  	  The	  issue	  was	  tabled,	  and	  Hull	  promised	  the	  president	  that	  he	   would	   broach	   the	   topic	   on	   an	   impending	   trip	   to	   the	   White	   House.	   	   Ever	   the	  personal	   strategist,	   Rhee	   was	   quick	   to	   turn	   his	   privileged	   information	   into	   a	  publicity	  ploy.	  	  By	  February	  11th,	  the	  story	  was	  leaked	  to	  US	  newspapers	  across	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Melanie	  Billings-­‐Yun,	  Decision	  Against	  War:	  Eisenhower	  and	  Dien	  Bien	  Phu,	  1954	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  7.	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  eastern	  seaboard	  and	  on	  the	  12th	  the	  ROK’s	  official	  press	  release	  appeared	  in	  major	  publications.	   	   “If	   we	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   finish	   our	   own	  war,”	   the	   lengthy	   Korean	  statement	  offensively	  posited,	  “or	  to	  assist	  another	  country	  in	  distress,	  what	  hope	  is	  there	  for	  saving	  any	  of	  the	  free	  nations,	  including	  the	  United	  States…Our	  token	  army	  [will]	  help	  those	  in	  distress	  [and]	  will	  encourage	  all	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  peoples	  of	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  should	  persuade	  many	  of	  them	  to	  join	  with	  those	  of	  us	  who	  are	  now	  fighting	  the	  enemy.”39	   	  The	  statement	  painted	  a	  picture	  of	  responsibility,	  only	  making	  one	  request:	  “We	  want	  Gen[eral]	  Van	  Fleet	  to	  come	  and	  help	  us	  organize	  our	  own	  forces	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  train	  and	  organize	  the	  armies	  of	  Indochina.”40	  	  The	  antagonistic	  statements	  revealed,	  in	  part,	  there	  was	  more	  to	  Korea’s	  offer	  than	  just	  a	  generous	  offer	  of	  aid.	  	   Despite	  his	  recent	  threats	  to	  unilaterally	  resume	  the	  Korean	  War,	  Rhee	  was	  not	   capable	   or	   willing	   to	   do	   so	   in	   February	   of	   1954.	   	   With	   the	   1954	   Geneva	  Convention	  approaching—which	  many	  forget	  was	  also	  designed	  to	  address	  the	  state	  of	  Korea	  and	  Vietnam—the	  ROK	  government’s	  apprehension	  was	  boiling	  over.	  	  The	  day	   Korea’s	   offer	   went	   public,	   its	   Foreign	   Minister	   Pyun	   Yung	   Tai	   lamented	   to	   a	  reporter	   at	   the	  St.	   Petersburg	  Times,	   “Here	   is	   the	   tragedy…both	  our	   allies	   and	  our	  enemies	  have	  agreed	  upon	  the	  division	  of	  Korea.”	  	  From	  the	  government	  in	  Seoul’s	  perspective	   this	  meant	   that	   the	  United	   States	  was	   “cooperating	   in	   something	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  “South	  Korea	  Accepts	  ‘Plea’	  of	  Indochinese,”	  St.	  Petersburg	  Times,	  13	  Feb.	  1954.	  40	  “ROK	  Offer	  Laos	  Aid,	  Want	  Van	  Fleet	  Back,”	  Miami	  Daily	  News,	  12	  Feb.	  1954.	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  means	   the	   death	   of	   Korea.”41	   	   While	   the	   Eisenhower	   administration	   pulled	   back	  from	   Korea,	   it	   embraced	   oratorical	   brinksmanship,	   which	   called	   for	   thinly	   veiled	  threats	  of	  “massive	  retaliation”	   in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  communist	  offensive.	   	  The	  strategy	  was	   designed	   to	   appease	   an	   American	   public	   that	   wanted	   no	   further	   losses	   to	  Communist	   groups,	   but	   also	  wanted	   to	  prevent	  unpopular	  Korea-­‐type	   scenarios.42	  	  From	   Rhee’s	   standpoint,	   one	   of	   the	   only	   viable	   options	   to	   reverse	   the	   “death	   of	  Korea”	  (or	  more	  aptly,	  the	  “death	  of	  Rhee’s	  Korea”)	  was	  to	  incite	  a	  Chinese	  violation	  of	  the	  Korean	  Armistice	  or	  provoke	  a	  Chinese	  offensive	  action	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  that	  would	   lead	   to	   direct	   United	   States	   involvement.43	   	   Since	   American	   advisors	   were	  explicitly	  clear	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  duped	  by	  covert	  actions	  designed	  to	  incite	  an	  attack	  from	  China	  or	  North	  Korea,	  Rhee	  had	  little	  recourse.	  	  His	  best	  option	  was	  the	  one	   he	   elected	   to	   use—send	   ROK	   Army	   troops	   in	   Indochina,	   where	   China	   was	  actively	  supplying	  the	  Vietminh’s	  war	  effort	  while	  the	  US	  supplied	  France’s	  military	  mission.	   	   Indeed,	  Foreign	  Minister	  Pyun	  was	   surprisingly	  blunt	  when	  asked	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Chinese	  retaliation	  to	  the	  deployment	  of	  Korean	  soldiers,	  telling	  a	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  “South	  Korean	  Irritation	  With	  U.S.	  Grows	  Rapidly,”	  St.	  Petersburg	  Times,	  13	  Feb.	  1954.	  42	  Richard	  A.	  Melanson,	  “The	  Foundations	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  Foreign	  Policy,”	  in	  
Revaluating	  Eisenhower:	  America	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Fifties,	  ed.	  Richard	  A.	  Melanson	  and	  David	  Meyers	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1987),	  54.	  43	  When	  Eisenhower	  announced	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  troops	  in	  Korea,	  he	  proclaimed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  prosecute	  the	  war	  “with	  even	  greater	  effect	  than	  heretofore”	  if	  Communist	  “aggression”	  occurred;	  in	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  Public	  Papers	  of	  the	  
Presidents	  of	  the	  United	  States:	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  1953	  (Washington,	  DC;	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1960),	  860.	  
	   	   29	   	   	   	  	  reporter	  “it	  was	  quite	  probable.”44	  	  When	  several	  of	  his	  offers	  were	  deflected,	  Rhee	  dropped	   his	   guard	   and	   responded	   with	   a	   polarizing	   speech	   before	   Congress	   in	  which	   he	   presented	   his	   stratagem	   to	   beat	   Communism.	   	   Given	   the	   pulpit,	   the	  president	  laid	  bare	  his	  aims	  for	  the	  Far	  East,	  calling	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  use	  its	  Navy	   and	   Air	   Force	   to	   support	   the	   invasion	   of	   China’s	   mainland	   with	   20	   ROK	  divisions	  and	  630,000	  of	  Chiang’s	  Nationalist	  soldiers.	  	  In	  his	  estimation,	  a	  victory	  in	  China	  was	  the	  Far	  East’s	  panacea,	  capable	  of	  producing	  a	  “victorious	  end	  to	  the	  wars	  in	   Korea	   and	   Indochina.”	   Rhee	   allayed	   his	   audience’s	   fear	   of	   Soviet	   intervention,	  opining	  that	  such	  an	  event	  “would	  be	  excellent	  for	  the	  free	  world”	  since	  the	  United	  States	   could	   justifiably	   invoke	   the	  massive	   retaliation	  doctrine	  and	  use	   its	  nuclear	  power	   to	   obliterate	   “the	   Soviet	   centers	   of	   production.”	   45	   	   The	   speech	   had	   the	  opposite	  effect	  Korea’s	  president	  had	  hoped	  for.	  	  Instead	  of	  ingratiating	  himself	  with	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  most	  ardent	  warriors,	  he	  set	  himself	  apart,	  further	  if	  possible,	  as	  an	  addled	  and	  unreliable	  ally.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Ironically,	  when	  Rhee	  offered	  up	  his	  soldiers,	  he	  hoped	  it	  would	  increase	  his	  political	  prestige	  and	  elevate	  his	  status	  from	  a	  lesser	  to	  a	  greater	  ally	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  And	  he	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  his	  tactic	  could	  be	  successful.	  	  During	  Eisenhower’s	   successful	   presidential	   campaign,	   he	   decried	   the	   way	   America	   had	  been	  forced	  into	  “bearing	  the	  brunt”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  “constantly	  compelled	  to	  man	  those	  front	  lines”	  in	  Asia.	   	  “If	  there	  must	  be	  war	  there,	  let	  it	  be	  Asians	  against	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  “ROK	  Offer	  Laos	  Aid,	  Want	  Van	  Fleet	  Back,”	  Miami	  Daily	  News,	  12	  Feb.	  1954.	  45	  Congressional	  Record,	  83rd	  Cong.,	  2nd	  sess.,	  1954,	  12434-­‐12436.	  
	   	   30	   	   	   	  	  Asians	  with	  our	  support	  on	  the	  side	  of	  freedom.”46	   	   	  Korean	  troops	  would,	   literally	  and	   metaphorically,	   also	   maintain	   congruency	   with	   the	   French	   jaunissement	   or	  “yellowing”	   approach,	   later	   resuscitated	   by	   President	   Nixon	   under	   the	   name	  “Vietnamization”.	  	  When	  pressed	  by	  reporters	  during	  his	  Washington	  visit,	  General	  Hull	   admitted	   that	   he	   saw	   an	   opportunity	   in	   the	   Korean	   offer,	   as	   it	   meant,	   “one	  Asiatic	  country	  would	  be	  going	  to	  the	  assistance	  of	  another.”47	  	  Additionally,	  Rhee’s	  offer	  to	  Laos	  and	  proposal	  to	   invade	  Communist	  China	  were	  designed	  to	  eliminate	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  US	  Army’s	  foot	  soldier.	  	  Similar	  in	  some	  respects	  to	  the	  massive	  retaliation	   doctrine,	   his	   proposals	   were	   designed	   to	   theoretically	   eliminate	  American	  casualties,	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  souring	  of	  public	  opinion	  on	  Korea.	  	  If	  Rhee	  could	  manage	  to	  get	  ROK	  soldiers	  in	  Laos	  or	  China,	  it	  would	  place	  him	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  United	  States’	  Cold	  War.	  	  Indeed,	  Ambassador	  Briggs	  was	  convinced	  that	  Korea’s	   sanguine	   offer	   to	   Laos	  was	   driven	   by	   Syngman	   Rhee’s	   “burning	   desire	   to	  mobilize	   an	   anti-­‐communist	   front	   in	   Asia	   under	   his	   leadership	   and	   to	   court	   U.S.	  public	   opinion.”48	   	   But	   Rhee	   wisely	   adduced	   his	   ambitious	   goals	   with	   Ike’s	   own	  campaign	  promises,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  it	  would	  leave	  the	  president	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  accept,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  commend	  his	  tenacity.	  	  	  	   Rhee	   also	   wanted	   to	   highlight	   the	   comparative	   worth	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	  Korea	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   neighbor	   Japan.	   	   Lindsay	   Parrott,	   a	   New	   York	   Times	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  “Mme.	  Sun	  Scolds	  President	  Elect,”	  NYT,	  14	  Dec.	  1952.	  47	  “Use	  of	  Rhee	  Troops	  to	  Fight	  in	  Indo-­‐China	  is	  Discussed,”	  NYT,	  12	  Dec.	  1952.	  48	  Ronald	  H.	  Spector,	  The	  United	  States	  Army	  in	  Vietnam,	  Advice	  and	  Support:	  The	  Early	  
Years,	  1941-­1960	  (Washington,	  DC:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1983),	  198.	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  correspondent,	   was	   quick	   to	   notice	   this	   gambit.	   	   “It	   is	   probably	   not	   without	  significance,”	  Mr.	  Parrott	  observed,	  “that	  the	  offer	  to	  send	  a	  division	  to	  Indo-­‐China	  immediately	   followed	   a	   series	   of	   anti-­‐Japanese	   declarations	   by	   the	   R.O.K.	  Executive.”49	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1940’s,	  American	  policy	  in	  Japan	  gradually	  came	  to	   support	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   business	   conglomerates	   or	   zaibatsu	   and	   a	  move	  towards	   rearmament,	   but	   after	   the	   Korean	   War	   broke	   the	   US	   wanted	   Japan	   to	  accelerate	  its	  development	  to	  counter	  Communist	  gains	  in	  East	  Asia.	   	  The	  pressure	  had	   little	   effect,	   garnered	   few	   results,	   and	   retarded	  American	  hopes	   for	   a	   defense	  bloc	   in	  the	  East	   that	   incorporated	  Japan.	   	   In	   the	  summer	  of	  1953,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  continued	  to	  press	  Prime	  Minister	  Yoshida	  to	   increase	  Japan’s	  military	  beyond	  the	  National	  Security	  Forces	  created	  in	  1952.	  	  Then,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  alter	  public	  opinion	  in	   Japan,	  Vice	  President	  Nixon	   lauded	   the	   former	  empire	  as	  a	   “key	  bastion	   for	   the	  defense	  of	  Asia,”	  and	  proclaimed	  the	  United	  States	  “made	  a	  mistake	  in	  1946”	  when	  it	  encouraged	  disarmament.50	  	  For	  a	  man	  like	  Rhee,	  who	  professed	  the	  Japanese	  were	  treacherous	   people—in	   fact	   worse	   than	   Communists—such	   signs	   and	   statements	  surely	   caused	   distress;	   especially	   given	   his	   longstanding	   suspicion	   that	   United	  States	  policy	  makers	  desired	  a	  resurgence	  of	   Japan’s	   imperium.51	   	   In	  effect,	  Rhee’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  “Rhee	  Tries	  New	  Tack	  To	  Challenge	  U.N.,”	  NYT,	  14	  Feb.	  1954.	  50	  “Japan’s	  Disarming	  Wrong,	  Nixon	  Says,”	  NYT,	  19	  Nov.	  1953;	  John	  Welfield,	  An	  Empire	  
in	  Eclipse:	  Japan	  in	  the	  Postwar	  American	  Alliance	  System	  (Atlantic	  Highlands,	  NJ:	  1988),	  78-­‐83.	  	  51	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  and	  Army	  were	  strategically	  determined	  to	  resurrect	  Japan	  as	  a	  balance	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  General	  Hull	  believed	  that	  “Korea	  must	  align	  itself	  with	  Japan	  or	  forever	  be	  a	  millstone	  around	  the	  neck	  of	  the	  United	  
	   	   32	   	   	   	  	  offer	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Indochina	  contrasted	  his	  small,	  war	  torn,	  and	  divided	  nation	  with	  the	  Japanese—who	  were,	   in	  Washington’s	  eyes,	  exceedingly	  reluctant	  to	  even	  raise	  an	  army	  sufficient	   for	   their	  self-­‐defense.	   	  Mr.	  Parrott	  concluded	  his	  report	   to	  the	   Times	   with	   a	   contention	   that	   Rhee’s	   “neat	   propaganda	   maneuver”	   was	   likely	  designed	  to	  elicit	  the	  following	  sentiment	  in	  the	  White	  House	  and	  Pentagon:	  “‘Which	  then	  is	  the	  real	  ally	  against	  communism	  in	  Asia?’”52	  	   President	  Rhee’s	  offer	  of	  troops	  was	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  piece	  of	  clever	  subterfuge	  concealing	  ulterior	  motives,	  not	  an	  act	  of	  solidarity	  and	  assistance,	  when	  the	  request	  from	   Laos	   was	   revealed	   to	   be	   a	   “fabrication.”	   	   Many	   papers	   in	   the	   United	   States	  noted	  that	  France	  was	  unlikely	  to	  accept	  Rhee’s	  offer	  in	  fear	  of	  provoking	  a	  Chinese	  intervention	   similar	   to	   the	  Korean	  War.	   	  But	   it	  was	  only	   in	  Europe	   that	   reporters	  keyed	   in	  on	   the	   irregularities	   in	   the	  Korean	   story.	   	  The	  Times	   in	  London	   reported	  that	   Laotian	   diplomats	   denied	  making	   any	   request,	   “pointing	   out…as	   South	  Korea	  has	   never	   extended	   diplomatic	   recognition	   to	   Laos,	   any	   communications	   between	  the	  two	  countries	  would	  have	  to	  be	  made	  through	  France.”53	  Out	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  their	  ally,	  France	  kept	  their	  displeasure	  over	  the	  Korean	  chicanery	  limited	   to	   back-­‐channel	   communication.	   	   The	   unlucky	   Foreign	   Service	   Officer	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  States.	  Korea’s	  value	  to	  the	  US	  is	  only	  in	  the	  degree	  it	  protects	  Japan	  militarily	  and	  supports	  Japan	  economically…Unless	  Japan	  is	  far	  stronger	  militarily	  than	  Korea	  and	  unless	  Korea	  feels	  the	  need	  for…Japanese	  protection	  we	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  these	  two	  powers	  together.”	  Hull	  to	  Ridgeway,	  5	  July	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1823-­‐1824.	  52	  “Rhee	  Tries	  New	  Tack	  To	  Challenge	  U.N.,”	  NYT,	  14	  Feb.	  1954.	  53	  “Rebel	  Moves	  in	  Laos:	  Patrols’	  Failure	  to	  Make	  Contact,”	  The	  Times,	  13	  Feb.	  1954.	  
	   	   33	   	   	   	  	  charge	   of	   French-­‐Iberian	   affairs	   received	   a	   late	   phone	   call	   on	   the	   11th	   from	   the	  agitated	  French	  Ambassador	   to	   the	  US,	  Henri	  Bonnet.	   	  Mr.	  Bonnet	   launched	   into	  a	  protest	  of	  the	  day’s	  reports	  and	  asserted	  that	  the	  Laotian	  Government	  “had	  certainly	  never	   in	   fact	   requested	   troops	   from	   President	   Rhee.”	   	   Further,	   the	   ambassador	  reckoned	  Rhee	  “was	  of	  course	  offering	  them	  [his	  soldiers]	  for	  his	  own	  political	  ends.	  	  Paris	  did	  not	  request	  a	  redaction	  of	  the	  stories	  because	  it	  would	  “do	  more	  harm	  than	  good,”	   but	   rather	   issued	   a	   firm	   statement	   that	   explained	   France	   would	   not	   be	  “disposed”	   to	   fight	  with	  South	  Korean	   troops	  due	   to	   “the	   critical	  danger”	  of	   “open	  large-­‐scale	   Chinese	   intervention.”54	   	   The	   fabrication	   of	   Laos’	   request	   is	   important	  because	  it	  alludes	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  Rhee’s	  offer.	   	  This	  was	  not	  a	  brash	  maneuver;	  it	  was	  a	  relatively	  thoughtful	  plan	  where	  the	  ROK	  executive	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  Viet	  Minh’s	  siege	  on	  Luang	  Prabang	  and	  a	  blighted	  French	  war.	  	  By	  sending	  his	  offer	  first	  to	  General	  Hull	  he	  elevated	  his	  prestige	  and	  successfully	   interjected	  himself	   in	   the	  ever-­‐inflating	  press	  coverage	  of	  the	  Indochina	  War.	  	  What	  occurred	  at	  this	  moment	  is	  most	  curious	  not	  because	  Rhee	  showed	  a	  surprisingly	  political	  acumen,	  but	  rather	  because	   no	   one	   in	   the	   United	   States	   Government	   took	   note	   that	   Rhee’s	   offer	   was	  
derived	  from	  a	  rouse.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Memcon,	  Robert	  McBride	  and	  Henri	  Bonnet,	  12	  Feb.	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  13:1040-­‐1041.	  55	  In	  particular,	  Ambassador	  Bonnet	  was	  angered	  over	  a	  Pentagon	  officer	  being	  quoted.	  Bonnet	  “thought	  having	  a	  Defense	  Department	  spokesman	  quote	  such	  a	  fabrication	  was	  going	  too	  far.”	  	  Mr.	  McBride	  reported	  back	  to	  the	  ambassador	  a	  day	  later	  and	  informed	  him	  that	  the	  responsible	  official	  at	  the	  Pentagon	  had	  been	  taken	  “to	  task	  for	  his	  error.”	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No	  “Adventuring”	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  Indochina	  
Rejection	  of	  the	  Rhee	  Offer	  	  
	  President	  Rhee’s	  troops	  offer	  was	  received	  with	  caution	  and	  optimism	  during	  a	  mid-­‐February	  National	   Security	   Council	  meeting.	   	   From	   a	  military	   perspective	   Korean	  troops	  appeared	   to	  be	  a	   viable	   alternative.	  General	  Ridgeway,	  Chief	  of	   Staff	   of	   the	  Army,	  and	  General	  Hull	  each	  believed	  “Rhee’s	  proposal	  had	  merit.”	  	  Admiral	  Radford	  noted	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  keeping	  with	  its	  policies	  in	  Korea,	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	   transport	   the	   ROK	   soldiers	   and	   provide	   logistical	   support—neither	   of	   which	  would	   have	   presented	   a	   problem	   since	   the	   supplies	   were	   available	   in	   Korea	   and	  Indochina.	   	   The	   JCS	   also	   concluded	   Rhee	   should	   tender	   his	   offer	   to	   the	   French	  government	   event	   though	   Laos	   “had	   originally	   appeal	   for	   assistance.”	   	   President	  Eisenhower	  adopted	  a	  decidedly	  critical	  opinion	  and	  enunciated	  his	  belief	  that	  “Our	  most	  immediate	  concern	  has	  been	  to	  assist	  Korea	  to	  take	  care	  of	  itself.”	  	  It	  would	  be	  counter-­‐productive	   to	   “let	   the	   South	   Koreas	   go	   ‘adventuring’	   in	   foreign	   parts,”	  which,	  he	  believed,	  public	  opinion	  in	  America	  would	  not	  allow.	   	   	  Subsequently,	  the	  president	   questioned	   whether	   moving	   an	   ROK	   division	   to	   Indochina	   was	   not	  “sufficient	  notice	   that	   the	  United	  States	  was	   involving	   itself	   in”	  France’s	  war.	   	  Hull	  affirmed	   the	   president’s	   line	   of	   thought	   and	   opined,	   “The	   problem	   was	   more	  political	  than	  military.”	  All	  Hull	  really	  needed	  to	  establish	  was	  the	  US	  “Government’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  the	  only	  mention	  of	  a	  US	  governmental	  official	  acknowledging	  the	  falsity	  of	  Rhee’s	  claims.	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  reaction	   to	   Rhee’s	   proposal	   to	   make	   this	   offer.”	   	   The	   NSC	   held	   its	   judgment	   in	  abeyance	   while	   the	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency,	   State	   Department,	   and	   Defense	  Department	  created	  separate	  studies	  of	  the	  issue.56	  	  	  	   When	  the	  NSC	  met	  two	  weeks	  later,	  all	  members	  believed,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	   three	   studies	   on	   the	   topic,	   Syngman	   Rhee	   should	   be	   informed	   that	   his	   offer,	  while	   commendable,	   was	   not	   desirable.	   	   The	   members	   were	   in	   “unanimous	  agreement”	  that	  the	  offer	  should	  be	  rejected,	  but	  they	  differed	  on	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  decision.	  	  While	  the	  State	  Department	  believed	  the	  decision	  should	  be	  based	  on	  “military	   reasons,”	   Defense	   and	   the	   JCS	   believed	   the	   issue	   was	   not	   in	   “the	   best	  interests	  of	  the	  free	  world.”57	  	  Among	  the	  disadvantages	  were:	  
f.	   It	  would	  provide	  Rhee	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  exploit	  the	  situation	  to	  his	   ulterior	   purposes.	   It	   might	   be	   his	   hope	   that	   the	   transfer	   of	   a	   ROKA	  division	  to	  Indochina	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  renewal	  of	  hostilities	  in	  Korea;	  	  g.	   The	  burden	  of	  moving	  and	  providing	  logistic	  support…would	  impose	  additional	   responsibilities,	   commitments,	   and	   costs	   on	   the	   United	   States	  Government…	  	  i.	   It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  explain	  and	  justify	  to	  the	  American	  public	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  ROKA	  division	  to	  Indochina	  while	  still	  requiring	  the	  retention	  of	  United	  States	  ground	  forces	  in	  Korea.	  In	  all	  probability,	  serious	  criticism	  by	  the	  American	  public	  would	  ensue...58	  	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  was	  point	  “i.”	  which	  proved	  most	  persuasive.	  	  Eisenhower	  elaborated	  on	   the	   points	   he	   made	   previously,	   voicing	   his	   opposition	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  185th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  NSC,	  14	  February	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  13:1054-­‐1056.	  57	  187th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  NSC,	  4	  March	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  13:1094-­‐1095;	  Executive	  Secretary	  (James	  S.	  Lay	  Jr.)	  to	  the	  NSC,	  2	  March	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  15:1754-­‐1755.	  58	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  United	  States-­Vietnamese	  Relations	  1945-­1967	  (Washington	  DC:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1971),	  259-­‐263.	  	  
	   	   36	   	   	   	  	  “domestic	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  would	  never	  stand	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  Korean	  division	  to	  Indochina”	  while	  American	  soldiers	  were	  forced	  to	  guard	  the	  38th	  parallel.	   	  The	  president	   illustrated	  his	  point	   “with	  great	  emphasis,”	   stating	   that	  he	  would	  “certainly	  hate”	  to	  explain	  to	  the	  mothers	  of	  American	  soldiers	  why	  Korean	  soldiers	  were	  allowed	  to	  undertake	  “adventures	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world”	  while	  their	   sons	   were	   obliged	   to	   guard	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea.59	   	   Eisenhower’s	   attitude	  appeared	  peculiar	   only	  when	   compared	   to	  his	  more	   favorable	   attitudes	   regarding	  Formosa	  and	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek.	  	  Less	  than	  a	  week	  before	  Rhee’s	  offer	  was	  publicized,	  Ike	  remarked	  to	  Press	  Secretary	  James	  Hagerty,	  “I’d	  like	  to	  see	  Chiang’s	  troops	  used	  in	   Indochina.”	   	   Unlike	   Korean	   soldiers,	   his	   only	   objection	  was	   Chinese	   retaliation	  “would	   then	   be	   too	   great.”60	   	   The	   president’s	   divergent	   opinions	   most	   likely	  reflected	  his	  belief	  that	  Korea	  was	  a	  clear	  dependent	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  one	  that	  demanded	   great	   care	   and	   support	   since	   its	   inception.	   	   Despite	   Chiang’s	  shortcomings,	  he	  still	  held	  greater	  prestige	  in	  the	  president’s	  mind	  as	  a	  World	  War	  II	  comrade	  and	  an	  ally	  closer	  to	  building	  an	  autarkic	  nation	  in	  East	  Asia.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	   Korean	   executive’s	   storied	   reputation	   of	   truculent	   defiance	   had	   cast	   him	   as	   a	  highly	  unreliable	  partner.	   	   If	  Korea	  were	   incorporated	   into	   the	   Indochina	   fiasco	   it	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  re-­‐opening	  the	  hard	  fought	  armistice	  agreement.	  	  In	  light	  of	  recent	  past,	  Eisenhower	  was	  wary	  of	  Rhee’s	  motives	  and,	  thus,	  only	  saw	  his	  offer	  as	  an	  “adventure”	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Op.	  cit.	  60	  Hagerty,	  The	  Diary	  of	  James	  C.	  Hagerty,	  15.	  
	   	   37	   	   	   	  	  	   Even	   if	   Syngman	  Rhee	  had	  been	   the	   consummate	   ally	   and	  American	   client,	  his	   proposed	   offered	   would	   still	   not	   have	   been	   actionable.	   	   When	   the	   battle	   at	  Dienbienphu	  escalated	  in	  early	  spring	  of	  1954	  and	  the	  situation	  aggregated	  a	  wealth	  of	   importance,	   in	   public	   opinion	   alone,	   the	   French	   adamantly	   refused	   to	   cede	  political	   or	   military	   control.61	   	   In	   response	   to	   domestic	   pressure,	   French	   Prime	  Minister	   Joseph	   Laniel	   declared	   in	   Assembly	   he	   would	   “do	   everything	   to	   achieve	  victory…with	  matériel	  aid	  which	  Franco-­‐Vietnamese	  forces	  are	  receiving	  from	  US,”	  and	   to	   “take	   up	   under	   full	   liberty	   of	   action	   the	   negotiations	   at	   Geneva	   with	   the	  intention	  of	  arriving	  at	  a	  solution.”	   62	   	  An	  expansion,	  or	   internationalization,	  of	   the	  war	   was	   not	   an	   acceptable	   position.	   Surely,	   la	   guerre	   sale	   would	   not	   have	  accumulated	   integrity	   by	   virtue	   of	   Rhee	   or	   Chiang’s	   soldiers	   openly	   entering	   the	  conflict.	  	  	  	   The	   deteriorating	   situation	   in	   Vietnam	   dictated	   a	   coalition	   that	   went	   far	  beyond	   a	   division	   or	   two	   of	   ROK	   soldiers.	   	   France’s	   indecision,	   waning	  determination,	   and	   poor	   war	   prosecution	   worried	   President	   Eisenhower	   and	  Secretary	  Dulles,	  each	  of	  whom	  firmly	  believed	  the	  1954	  Geneva	  Conference	  would	  serve	  only	  as	  a	  “face-­‐saving	  device”	  for	  a	  French	  or	  Communist	  capitulation.63	  	  Given	  the	   increasingly	   poor	   performance	   of	   General	   Navarre’s	   plan,	   they	   had	   strong	  reasons	   to	  believe	   that	   the	  French—and	  by	  virtue	   the	   free	  world—would	  concede	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Anderson,	  Trapped	  By	  Success,	  44;	  Spector,	  Advice	  and	  Support,	  183-­‐186.	  62	  Ambassador	  in	  France	  (Dillon)	  to	  Dept.	  of	  State,	  9	  April	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  13:1299	  [my	  emphasis].	  63	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  Mandate	  for	  Change,	  1953-­1956	  (Garden	  City,	  NY:	  1963),	  346.	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  their	  position	  at	  Switzerland.	   	  In	  late	  March,	  Dulles	  gave	  a	  deliberately	  threatening	  speech	   at	   the	   Overseas	   Press	   Club	   of	   America	   in	   which	   he	   enunciated	   the	   global	  importance	  of	  the	  Indochina	  War.	   	  The	  Secretary	  warned,	  “Under	  the	  conditions	  of	  today,	  the	  imposition	  on	  Southeast	  Asia	  of	  the	  political	  system	  of	  Communist	  Russia	  and	  its	  Chinese	  Communist	  ally,	  by	  whatever	  means,	  would	  be	  a	  grave	  threat	  to	  the	  whole	   free	  community.	   	  The	  United	  States	   feels	   that	   that	  possibility	   should	  not	  be	  passively	   accepted,	   but	   should	   be	   met	   by	   united	   action.”	   	   	   The	   speech,	   which	  Eisenhower	  approved,	  established	  America’s	  acceptable	  parameters:	  no	  Communist	  expansion	   “by	   whatever	   means,”	   including	   Geneva,	   and	   a	   US	   led	   anticommunist	  alliance	  for	  S.E.	  Asia.64	  	  	  	  	   In	   order	   to	   amass	   anti-­‐Communist	   ammunition,	   the	   Eisenhower	  administration	   began	   a	   whirlwind	   campaign	   designed	   to	   create	   a	   formidable	  alliance	  that	  would	  ensure	  “united	  action”	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	  	  British	  support	  for	  the	  coalition	  would	  mitigate	  France’s	  colonial	  past,	   lend	  credibility	  to	  French	  promises	  of	  independence,	  and,	  according	  to	  Eisenhower,	  a	  “moral	  meaning	  to	  intervention.”65	  Using	   this	   framework,	   the	   president	   outlined	   his	   argument	   in	   a	   lengthy	   letter	   to	  Winston	   Churchill.	   	   Ike	   implored	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   to	   recognize	   their	   shared	  interests	   in	   Asia	   and	   to	   join	   an	   ad	   hoc	   group	   of	   nations;	   which	   he	   envisioned	  including	  the	  United	  States,	  Britain,	  and	  France	  with	  Asian	  regional	  allies	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  Thailand	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  	  If	  enacted,	  the	  alliance	  would	  preclude	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Billings-­‐Yun,	  Decision	  Against	  War,	  61-­‐62.	  65	  Eisenhower,	  Mandate,	  341.	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  French	  surrender	  and	  alleviate	  concerns	   in	  Congress	   that	   the	  military	  was	  headed	  toward	  a	  new	  Korean	  conflict,	  whereby	  the	  US	  would	  be	  supporting	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  materials	  and	  manpower.66	  	  	  Intermixed	   with	   his	   call	   to	   unite,	   Eisenhower	   left	   some	   ambiguity	   in	   his	  political	   machinations.	   	   	   One	   short	   and	   disjointed	   paragraph	   stated:	   “I	   would	  contemplate	   no	   role	   for	   Formosa	   or	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea	   in	   the	   political	  
construction	  of	  this	  coalition.”67	  	  While	  Eisenhower	  likely	  mentioned	  this	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  allay	  British	   fears	  of	  Chinese	  Communist	   intervention,	  (and	  possibly	  the	  not-­‐so-­‐desirable	   prospect	   of	   allying	   with	   American-­‐cultivated	   autocrats	   like	   Rhee	   and	  Chiang)	   the	   statement	  only	   limited	  Korea’s	  participation	   in	   the	  diplomatic	   sphere.	  	  The	  administration	  hoped	  a	  collation	  could	  deter	  China’s	  support	  for	  the	  Viet	  Minh	  before	   and	   during	   the	   Geneva	   conference;	   however,	   even	   if	   “united	   action”	  eventually	   necessitated	   united	   military	   action	   Dulles	   believed	   America	   “could	   do	  better”	  providing	  naval	  and	  air	  support,	  training	  indigenous	  soldiers,	  and	  outfitting	  allies	  with	  money	  and	  supplies.68	   	  After	  his	  speech,	  Dulles	  concentrated	  his	  efforts	  on	   securing	   Great	   Britain’s	   support,	   but	   the	   English	   wanted	   the	   matter	   settled	  quickly	   and	   peaceably	   at	   Geneva.	   	   In	   the	   midst	   of	   a	   particularly	   contentious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Congressional	  leaders	  unanimously	  agreed:	  “We	  want	  no	  more	  Koreas	  with	  the	  United	  States	  furnishing	  90%	  of	  the	  manpower.”	  Memcon,	  Eisenhower,	  Dulles,	  and	  Congressional	  leaders,	  3	  April	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1954-­‐1952,	  13:1224.	  67	  Dulles	  to	  the	  Embassy	  in	  the	  UK,	  4	  April	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1954-­‐1952,	  13:1240.	  	  68	  George	  C.	  Herring	  and	  Richard	  H.	  Immerman	  “Eisenhower,	  Dulles,	  and	  Dienbienphu:	  ‘The	  Day	  We	  Didn’t	  Go	  to	  War’	  Revisited,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  71	  (1984):	  350.	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  exchange	  with	  British	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Sir	  Anthony	  Eden,	  Dulles	  openly	  lamented:	  	  
If	   the	   effort	   to	   develop	   a	   united	   position	  with	   reference	   to	   southeast	   Asia	  collapsed,	  we	  would	  be	   faced	  by	   the	  problem	  of	   going	   it	   alone.	   This	  would	  
probably	  mean	  increasing	  the	  close	  relations	  with	  Syngman	  Rhee	  and	  Chiang	  
Kai-­shek,	   who,	   whatever	   their	   difficulties	   defects,	   were	   at	   least	   willing	   to	  stand	  strong	  against	  the	  Communists.69	  	  	  	  	  The	   president	   and	   secretary	   likely	   did	   not	   rule	   out	   future	   use	   of	   ROK	   soldiers	  because	   they	   were	   aware—as	   the	   Korean	  War	   demonstrated	   so	   well—that	   most	  nations,	   even	   those	   willing	   to	   join	   the	   United	   States	   in	   consular	   solidarity,	   often	  declined	   to	  provide	   soldiers.	   	   The	   administration	  hedged	   its	   bets	   against	   “going	   it	  alone.”	  	  In	  fact,	  over	  the	  next	  four	  months	  the	  NSC	  reconsidered	  the	  ROK	  troop	  issue	  several	  times,	  eventually	  holding	  the	  offer	  in	  abeyance	  until	  circumstances	  dictated	  a	  reevaluation.70	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Memcon,	  Dulles	  and	  Eden,	  30	  April	  1954,	  Foreign	  Relations	  Series	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Microfiche	  Supplement,	  Secretary	  of	  State’s	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  November	  1952-­‐1954,	  Document	  440.	  [my	  emphasis]	  70	  Three	  days	  after	  Dulles’	  meeting,	  as	  the	  French	  position	  at	  Dien	  Bien	  Phu	  deteriorated	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  briefly	  discussed	  resurrecting	  the	  ROK,	  but	  President	  Eisenhower	  order	  the	  issue	  tabled.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  fortress	  fell	  and	  negotiations	  were	  well	  underway	  in	  Geneva,	  General	  Radford	  suggested	  the	  US	  Navy	  transport	  three	  ROK	  divisions	  to	  Indochina.	  	  This	  time	  Eisenhower	  unequivocally	  stated	  that	  the	  French	  must	  make	  a	  formal	  request	  before	  any	  ROK	  troops	  could	  be	  mobilized.	  200th	  NSC	  Meeting,	  3	  June	  1954,	  FRUS,	  1952-­‐1954,	  13:1660-­‐1661.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  reportedly	  could	  not	  believe	  that	  France	  would	  reject	  the	  offer	  yet	  again.	  Philippe	  Devillers	  and	  Jean	  Lacouture,	  End	  of	  a	  War:	  Indochina,	  1954	  (New	  York:	  Frederick	  A.	  Praeger,	  1969),	  220n.	  The	  NSC	  referred	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  for	  further	  evaluation.	  	  Finally,	  at	  a	  late	  July	  NSC	  meeting	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  “U.S.	  policy	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  possible	  use	  of	  ROK	  forces	  in	  Indochina	  not	  be	  changed	  at	  this	  time,	  but	  be	  kept	  under	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  review	  in	  the	  light	  of	  future	  developments.”	  207th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  NSC,	  22	  July	  1954,	  13:1867-­‐1868.	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Conclusion	  
In	  late	  1953,	  Syngman	  Rhee	  faced	  a	  crisis	  nearly	  equal	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	   	   He	   had	   recently	   been	   forced	   into	   an	   armistice	   agreement	   that	   indefinitely	  suspended	   the	   war	   he	   hoped	   could	   reunify	   Korea	   under	   his	   control.	   	   Shortly	  thereafter,	   President	  Eisenhower	   announced	  a	   two-­‐division	   troop	  withdrawal	   and	  reassured	  the	  ROK	  executive	  that	  the	  international	  community	  would	  work	  to	  bring	  about	   a	   peaceful	   unification	   of	   the	   country.	   	   Already	   late	   in	   his	   life,	   the	   Korean	  executive	  saw	  the	  opportunity	   to	  unite	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  under	  his	   leadership	  fade	  away.	  	  When,	  in	  the	  estimation	  of	  US	  policy	  makers,	  Indochina	  surpassed	  Korea	  in	  Cold	  War	  strategic	  significance,	  Rhee	  crafted	  a	   fictional	  Lao	  request	   for	  military	  assistance.	  	  Rhee	  hoped	  ROK	  armed	  intervention	  in	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  newest	  “hot	  war”	  would	   reinsert	   South	  Korea	   into	  a	  position	  of	   importance	   in	  United	  States	   foreign	  policy	  estimations	  and	  create	  the	  circumstances	  necessary	  for	  the	  resumption	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	   	   	  Even	  though	  the	  offer	  was	  a	  fabrication,	  the	  ROK	  received	  expanded	  attention	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Indochina	   War.	   	   At	   the	   very	   least,	   Rhee	   successfully	  interjected	  the	  ROK	  into	  Eisenhower’s	  Indochina	  policy	  formations	  so	  much	  so	  that	  the	   National	   Security	   Council	   revaluated	   Korea’s	   utility	   several	   times	   and	   never	  completely	  discarded	  the	  possibility.	   	  Rhee	  even	  desperately	  resurrected	  the	  troop	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   tactic	   five	   years	   later	   as	   he	   and	   his	   Liberal	   party	   became	   increasingly	  unpopular	  and	  his	  political	  life	  appeared	  threatened.1	  	  
In	  contrast,	  President	  Eisenhower	  fulfilled	  his	  campaign	  promise	  and	  ended	  the	  Korean	  War.	   	  He	  and	  his	  administration,	   through	  great	  effort,	  acquired	  Korean	  President	   Syngman	  Rhee’s	   acquiescence	   in	   the	  matter.	   	   In	   concert	  with	   an	  overall	  shift	   in	  policy,	  Eisenhower	  announced	  the	  removal	  of	  two	  army	  divisions	  from	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  	  American	  policy	  makers	  determined	  South	  Korea	  little	  strategic	  importance	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  attention	  it	  had	  occupied	  for	  the	  past	  three	  years.	  	  If	   the	   small	   nation	   wanted	   to	   survive	   surrounded	   by	   Communist	   Russia,	   North	  Korea,	   and	   Communist	   China,	   it	   would	   need	   to	   align	   with	   its	   more	   powerful	  neighbor,	   Japan.	   	  Conversely,	   Indochina	  was	  an	  immediate	  threat.	   	   If	   this	  corner	  of	  Southeast	  Asia	  fell	  to	  the	  Communists,	  the	  administration	  declared,	  then	  the	  entire	  Asian	  landmass	  would	  fall	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  
While	   the	   Korean	   troops	   offer	   did	   not	   succeed	   in	   full,	   it	   was	   a	   fixture	   of	   policy	  discussions	   on	   Indochina	   and	   generated	  no	   less	   than	   four	   State,	  Defense,	   and	  CIA	  reports	   on	   the	   utility	   and	   feasibility	   of	   ROK	   combat	   soldiers	   in	   Vietnam.	   	   The	  Eisenhower	   administration	   was	   unable	   to	   flatly	   reject	   Rhee’s	   loaded	   proposal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Rhee	  tried	  to	  avoid	  US	  complications	  and	  presented	  the	  offer	  directly	  to	  South	  Vietnamese	  President	  Diem’s	  government.	  South	  Vietnamese	  Charge	  “Dat,	  recalling	  ROK	  proposal	  made	  by	  ex-­‐ROK-­‐Amb[assador]	  Choi	  Duk-­‐shin	  in	  1959	  offering	  military	  assistance	  from	  ROK…”	  Embtel,	  Seoul	  1142,	  11	  March	  1964,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Central	  Files	  1964-­‐1965,	  “POL	  7	  KOR	  S,	  Visits.	  Meetings	  1/1/64”	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  because	  America’s	  traditional	  allies	  did	  not	  support	  US	  intervention	  and	  politicians	  feared	   “going	   it	   alone,”	   in	   a	   war	   similar	   to	   Korea.	   	   For	   this	   reason,	   Korea’s	   offer	  floated	   about	   in	   NSC	   meetings	   during	   the	   spring	   and	   summer	   of	   1954	   until	   the	  Geneva	  Convention	  concluded	  and	  Vietnam	  was	  divided;	  at	  which	  point	   there	  was	  no	   longer	   a	   possibility	   of	   overt	   intervention,	   lest	   America	   blatantly	   violate	   the	  accords.	   	   For	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	   years	   and	   the	   Kennedy	   years,	   US	  policy	  pulled	  back	  from	  the	  brink	  and	  maintained	  an	  advisory	  and	  training	  role.	  	  The	  Republic	   of	   Korea’s	   future	   efforts	   to	   form	   a	  military	   alliance	  with	   the	  Republic	   of	  Vietnam	   (South	   Vietnam)	  were	   contingent	   upon	   Vietnamese	   support—which	  was	  not	  forthcoming.	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2.	  	  THE	  THIRD	  REPUBLIC	  
Korea’s	  Military	  Junta	  &	  The	  United	  States,	  1961-­1963	  	   More	  than	  anything	  else,	  [we]	  need	  money.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  US	  helps	  us,	  I	  can’t	  expect	  that	  the	  US	  would	  double	  its	  aid	  and	  I	  can’t	  trust	  the	  US…	  	   -­‐Chairman	  Park	  Chung	  Hee1	  	  For	  every	  government	  Korea	  has	  had,	  and	  I	  have	  seen	  four	  of	  them	  in	  my	  two	  years	  in	  Korea,	  economics	  has	  been	  a	  major	  problem.	  -­‐General	  Carter	  B.	  Magruder	  speaking	  in	  Seoul,	  19612	  	  
The	   seven	   years	   following	   the	   Korean	   War	   saw	   little	   economic	   or	   social	  progress.	  	  Government	  suppression,	  abject	  poverty,	  pervasive	  unemployment,	  and	  a	  weak	   economy	   hampered	   the	   former	   Kingdom.	   	   Tensions	  mounted	  when	   Korean	  students	   led	  urban	  protests	  of	   Syngman	  Rhee	  and	   the	  Liberal	  Party’s	   rigged	  1961	  elections.	   	  The	  police	  force	  of	  Syngman	  Rhee	  killed	  200	  demonstrators	  and	  injured	  another	   6,000,	   while	   the	   government	   declared	   the	   protests	   the	   “work	   of	  Communists,”	   and	   a	   “plot	   of	   the	   opposition	   party.”3	   	   Instead	   of	   consolidating	  support,	  the	  comments	  of	  the	  government	  galvanized	  further	  protest	  and	  increased	  public	   enmity	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   public.	   	   In	   desperation,	   Rhee	   tried	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  As	  cited	  in	  Kim	  Hyung-­‐A,	  Korea’s	  Development	  Under	  Park	  Chung	  Hee:	  Rapid	  
Industrialization,	  1961-­79	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Routledge	  Curzon,	  2004),	  95.	  2	  Address	  by	  General	  Carter	  B.	  Magruder	  on	  the	  Occasion	  of	  Receiving	  an	  Honorary	  Degree	  of	  Doctor	  of	  Laws	  From	  Seoul	  National	  University,	  28	  June	  1961,	  The	  United	  States	  Army	  Heritage	  &	  Education	  Center,	  The	  Papers	  of	  General	  Carter	  B.	  Magruder,	  “Speeches,	  Carter	  B.	  Magruder,	  1959-­‐1961.”	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  “AHEC”)	  3	  Bong-­‐youn	  Choy,	  Korea,	  A	  History	  (Tokyo,	  Japan:	  Charles	  E.	  Tuttle	  Company,	  1971),	  310-­‐312.	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divorce	  himself	  from	  the	  unpopular	  Liberal	  Party,	  but	  failed	  to	  sway	  the	  protesters.	  	  On	  the	  April	  27th,	  1961	  Rhee	  accepted	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  submitted	  his	  resignation	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  	   Korea’s	  Second	  Republic	  was	  comprised	  of	  a	  new	  parliamentary	  government,	  which	  relegated	  the	  presidential	  office	  to	  a	  figurehead,	  and	  placed	  executive	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  prime	  minister.	  	  In	  July,	  the	  Democratic	  Party’s	  members	  ran	  on	  a	  conservative	   international	   platform	   of	   continued	   close	   relations	   with	   the	   United	  States	  and	  pledged	  a	  domestic	  policy	  devoted	  to	  ending	  government	  corruption,	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  political	  freedoms,	  and	  punishment	  of	  former	  government	  abuses.	  	  They	  won	  a	  majority	  176	  parliamentary	  seats	  out	  of	  233	  while	  the	  crippled	  Liberal	  Party	  gathered	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  seats.4	   	  Former	  Vice-­‐President	  Chang	  Myong,	  who	  resigned	   in	   protest	   of	   the	   fraudulent	   elections,	   was	   successfully—though	  narrowly—nominated	   as	   Prime	   Minister.5	   	   Certainly,	   Chang	   faced	   extensive	  problems.	   	   Students,	   emboldened	   by	   their	   grassroots	   success,	   demonstrated	  frequently,	   even	   interrupting	  parliamentary	   sessions.	   	  Korea’s	  weak	  economy	  also	  added	   to	   the	   Republic’s	   hardships.	   	   Finally,	   corruption	   remained	   a	   fixture	   in	  government	  and	  business.	   	  Eleven	  months	  after	   the	  April	  19th	  Student	  Revolution,	  the	  Second	  Republic	  fell	  victim	  to	  a	  bloodless	  coup	  d’état.	   	   In	  60	  hours,	  fewer	  than	  20	  army	  officers	  and	  3,600	  soldiers	  (less	  than	  0.05%	  of	  the	  armed	  forces)	  wrested	  control	  of	   the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	   from	   its	  elected	  officials,	  600,000-­‐man	  army,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Rhee’s	  Foes	  Win	  Korean	  Election,”	  NYT,	  30	  July	  1960.	  	  5	  Chang	  Myong	  is	  also	  known	  by	  the	  name	  John	  M.	  Chang.	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50,000	  UN	  commanded	  advisors.	   	   In	  the	  coming	  weeks,	  Major-­‐General	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  emerged	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  military	  junta.	  	  	  
Park	  Chung	  Hee	  	  
In	  many	  ways,	  Park	  Chung	  Hee’s	  path	  to	  the	  presidency	  differed	  vastly	  from	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea’s	  first	  president.	  	  Syngman	  Rhee	  grew	  up	  in	  relative	  privilege,	  engaged	  in	  anti-­‐Japanese	  protests	  during	  his	  youth,	  and	  lived	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  three	  decades	  while	   earning	   a	  PhD	   in	   international	   law	  and	  American	  history.	   	   In	  contrast,	   following	   his	   birth	   into	   meager	   circumstances	   in	   rural	   Korea,	   Park	  completed	  his	  studies	  in	  military	  academies,	  served	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Army,	  and	  spent	  only	  one	  year	  living	  in	  the	  West.	  In	  late	  1917,	  Park	  was	  born	  into	  a	  large	  and	  rather	  ignoble	  family	  who	  settled	  in	  a	  rural	  Korean	  village.	  	  He	  regularly	  attended	  a	  primary	  school	  which	  required	  he	  learn	  Japanese	  language	  and	  culture.	  	  After	  graduation,	  Park	  continued	  his	  education	  at	  a	  teaching	  academy	  in	  Taegu	  and	  continued	  his	  instruction	  in	  Japanese	  tradition.	  	  After	  graduation	  he	  displayed	  little	  vocational	  aptitude,	  performing	  poorly	  in	  school,	  and	  only	  remained	  a	  teacher	  for	  a	  short	  time.	  	  For	  largely	  mysterious	  reasons,	  Park	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resigned	  his	  teaching	  post	  and	  entered	  the	  Manchurian	  Military	  Academy.	  	  In	  1942,	  the	  regular	  Japanese	  Military	  Academy	  in	  Tokyo	  	  admitted	  Park	  .6	  Following	  his	  academy	  graduation,	  Second	  Lieutenant	  Park	  was	  assigned	  to	  the	  8th	  Corps	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Kwangtung	  Army.	  	  His	  unit	  earned	  a	  reputation	  as	  an	  effective	   anti-­‐guerilla	   squad,	   reputed	   to	   have	   squashed	   Chinese	   and	   Korean	   anti-­‐Japanese	   resistance	   fighters.	   	   Far	   from	   a	   Korean	   patriot,	   Park	   was	   a	   “thoroughly	  colonized	  soldier.”7	  	  	   After	   the	   fall	   of	   Japan’s	   colonial	   empire	   in	   1946,	   Park	  was	   recruited,	   along	  with	  many	  former	  Imperial	  soldiers,	  to	  join	  the	  newly	  formed	  Korean	  military.	   	   	  At	  nearly	   the	   same	   moment,	   police	   forces	   executed	   his	   brother	   following	   his	  participation	   in	  pro-­‐Communist	   riots.	   	  The	  death	  of	  his	  brother	  was	  a	   radicalizing	  experience	  that	  engendered	  a	  disdain	  for	  rightist	  Korean	  police	  and	  their	  American	  military	  advisors,	  whom	  he	  blamed	  for	  his	  loss.8	  	  For	  the	  next	  two	  years,	  while	  still	  an	   active	  military	   officer,	   Park	   participated	   in	   underground	   Communist	   activities,	  culminating	  with	  his	  arrest,	  trial,	  and	  death	  sentence	  in	  1948.	  	  Park’s	  death	  sentence	  was	   commuted	   in	   part	   because	   he	   named	   hundreds	   of	   other	   subversives	   and,	  according	   to	  one	  researcher,	   “the	  key	   factor	   that	  enabled	  Park	   to	  obtain	  clemency	  was…	   the	   collective	   forces	   of	   [his]	   personal	   connections,”	   fostered	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Se-­‐jin	  Kim,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Military	  Revolution	  in	  Korea	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1971.	  7	  Kim,	  Korea’s	  Development	  Under	  Park	  Chung	  Hee,	  21.	  I	  have	  drawn	  heavily	  from	  Kim’s	  work	  in	  this	  section	  due	  to	  her	  study’s	  abundance	  of	  interviews	  with	  former	  ROK	  military	  officers	  and	  excellent	  collection	  of	  pertinent	  Korean	  language	  sources.	  8	  Ibid.,	  23.	  
	   	   49	   	   	   	  	  
	   	   	  
Manchurian	  Army	  and	  Japanese	  Military	  Academy.9	  	  When	  the	  Korean	  War	  erupted	  in	   June	   1950,	   the	   Army	   needed	   to	   mobilize	   all	   available	   soldiers	   and	   Park	   was	  reinstated	  as	  an	  officer.	   	  From	  that	  point	  on,	  he	  earned	  respect	   for	  his	  managerial	  aptitude,	  industriousness,	  honesty	  and,	  particularly,	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  	   Park’s	  military	  experiences	  left	  him	  with	  an	  ambivalent	  view	  of	  the	  American	  military	  establishment	  in	  Korea	  and	  US	  aid	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  government.	  	  As	  mentioned,	  Park	  resented	  and	  blamed	  rightist	  elements	   in	   the	  National	  Police	  and	  the	  US	  occupational	   forces	   for	  his	  brother’s	  execution.	   	  Park’s	  enmity	   towards	   the	  overwhelming	  US	  presence	   became	   apparent	   during	   his	   first	   tour	   at	   the	  DMZ.	   	   In	  addition	  to	  reportedly	  calling	  a	  US	  advisor’s	  instructions	  “Yankee	  interference”	  and,	  when	   instructed	   to	   learn	   English,	   he	   remarked,	   “Is	   this	   the	   American	   or	   Korean	  Army?”10	  His	  own	  arrest	  undoubtedly	   aggravated	   these	   sentiments.	   	   Furthermore,	  Park	   saw	   the	   United	   States	   as	   a	   party	   to	   the	   endemic	   corruption	   present	   in	  Republic’s	   army	   and	   political	   system.	   	   A	   former	   US	   advisor	   believed	   Park	  “sometimes	  blamed	  the	  US…	  for	  not	  doing	  something	  about	  the	  mess,	  or	  at	  least	  for	  seeming	  to	  condone	  it.”11	  	  	  	  	   As	  one	  of	  Park’s	  defining	  traits,	  incorruptibility	  played	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  his	  rise	   to	   power.	   	   The	   exigencies	   and	   turmoil	   of	   the	   Korean	  War	   dictated	   a	   sloppy	  military	   stratum	   in	   which	   officers	   were	   rapidly	   promoted.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   post-­‐war	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.,	  24.	  10	  Kim,	  Korea’s	  Development	  Under	  Park	  Chung	  Hee,	  23.	  11	  Michael	  Keon,	  Korean	  Phoenix:	  A	  Nation	  from	  the	  Ashes	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  NJ:	  Prentice-­‐Hall	  International,	  1977),	  51.	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professional	  mobility	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  was	  inhibited.12	  	  Because	  the	  early	  groups	  of	   officers	   were	   promoted	   quickly,	   they	   were	   actually	   under-­‐trained	   and	   less	  experienced	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   younger	   rising	   officers	   who	   received	   better	  training	  in	  the	  US/UN	  Command.	   	  Younger	  professional	  officers	  grew	  to	  resent	  the	  graft	  and	  corruption	  practiced	  by	  many	  of	  the	  older	  officials	  at	  “the	  very	  time	  that	  frustrated	   ambition	   could	   combine	  with	  national	   sentiment.”13	   	   Park	   exploited	  his	  position	  as	  a	  senior	  officer	  and	  his	  reputation	  for	  probity	  to	  command	  the	  group	  of	  discontented	  soldiers	  who	  launched	  the	  military	  coup	  in	  May	  of	  1961.	  	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  US	  Embassy	  in	  Seoul’s	  1961	  assessment,	  Park	  led	  the	  coup	  group	   and	   subsequently	   served	   as	   chairman	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Council	   for	   National	  Reconstruction	  (SCNR)	  “through	  [the	  use	  of]	  his	  ability	   to	  balance	  and	  manipulate	  opposing	  factions”	  and	  an	  abundance	  “of	  initiative	  and	  drive.”	  14	  	  Similarly,	  members	  of	   the	   coup	   faction	   gave	   testimony	   that	   corroborated	   the	   US	   profile.	   	   One	   co-­‐collaborator	   summed	   up	  General	   Park	  when	   he	   stated:	   “Whatever	   President	   Park	  may	   be,	   he	   is	   not	   a	   man	  who	  waits	   for	   things	   to	   come	   to	   him.”	   	   Another	   former	  Korean	  military	  officer	   labeled	  Park’s	  negotiating	  acumen	  as	  his	   “trademark.”	   	   “He	  would	  go	  to	  no	  end	  of	  trouble—his	  or	  yours,”	  the	  officer	  contended,	  “to	  hammer	  into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  Chapter	  V	  in	  Kim,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Military	  Revolution	  in	  Korea.	  13	  Gregory	  Henderson,	  Korea,	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Vortex	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1968),	  357.	  14	  Profile	  of	  Pak	  Chong-­‐hui,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  for	  National	  Reconstruction	  (SCNR),	  Nov.	  1961,	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  Library,	  National	  Security	  Files,	  Country	  Files,	  Korea,	  “Subjects,	  Park	  Briefing	  Book,	  11/14/61-­‐11/15/61,	  Part	  III.”	  (Hereafter	  cited	  as	  “JFK,	  NSF,	  Korea”)	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you	   his	   angle	   on	   the	   matter	   under	   discussion	   or	   dispute.	   	   He	   made	   enemies	   or	  friends,	  he	  never	  seemed	  to	  care	  which.”15	  	   At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   military	   coup,	   Park	   came	   to	   terms	   with	   the	   American	  presence	  and	  understood	  its	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  defense	  of	  Korea	  and	  Korean	  politics.	  	  The	  marked	  change	  was	  noted	  in	  a	  1961	  US	  Embassy	  memo	  that	  described	  Park	  as	  “perceptibly	   friendlier	  and	  more	  cooperative	  with	   the	  United	  States.”	   	  Evidence	  of	  this	   transformation	   is	   also	   found	   in	   the	   pre-­‐coup	   planning,	   which	   showcased	   the	  future	  president’s	  ability	  to	  combine	  his	  acuity	  with	  practicality.	  	  Acknowledging	  the	  importance	  and	  power	  of	  General	  Carter	  Magruder,	  Commander	  of	  United	  Nations	  and	   US	   soldiers	   in	   Korea,	   Park	   went	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   ensure	   the	   coup	   would	  succeed.	  	  Declassified	  US	  CIA	  and	  State	  Department	  documents	  make	  clear	  that	  CIA	  Director	  Dulles	  was	  apprised	  of	  plans	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Chang	  Myong	  Government	  but	  there	  has	  been	  no	  proof	  linking	  the	  US	  to	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  planning.16	  General	  Magruder	  recalled	  two	  separate	  conversations	  with	  Park:	  	   [General]	  Park	  voiced	  concern	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  or	  that	  I,	  might	  intervene	  in	  the	  revolution…when	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  did	  emerge	  as	  the	  strong	  man	  of	  the	  group	  and	  incident	  to	  our	  discussion	  as	  to	  the	  operational	  control,	  he	  said	  he	  felt	  he	  had	  to	  have	  my	  agreement	  that	  I	  would	  not	  use	  the	  Korean	  Armed	  Forces	  under	  my	  control	  to	  overthrow	  the	  revolutionary	  government	  and	  I	  agreed	  to	  provide	  him	  such	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  As	  cited	  in	  Keon,	  Korean	  Phoenix,	  62-­‐64.	  16	  Avery	  Dulles	  to	  JFK,	  several	  reports	  dated	  21	  April	  –	  26	  April	  1961,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  22:456-­‐457.	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statement,	  feeling	  that	  my	  functionality	  was	  primarily	  to	  defend	  Korea	  against	  external	  threat.17	  	   	  	  	  	  Magruder’s	  statement	  lends	  credence	  a	  former	  ROKA	  officer,	  and	  coup	  participant,	  who	  asserted	  that	  “some	  time	  well	  before	  the	  actual	  revolution	  occurred,	  [General]	  Park	   had	   it	   mapped	   out,	   in	   his	   mind	   and	   in	   his	   contacts.”	   	   While	   it	   remains	  impossible	   to	   discern	   whether	   Magruder’s	   recollection	   conveys	   the	   entire	   story,	  which	   it	   almost	   certainly	   does	   not,	   it	   still	   demonstrates	   something	   remarkable:	  General	   Park	   succeeded	   in	   winning	   the	   US	   Army’s	   acquiescence	   in	   his	   plot	   to	  overthrow	  the	  democratically	  elected	  government	  of	  a	  US	  ally.	  	  Several	  months	  later,	  Park	  refined	  his	  demeanor	   to	  such	  a	  degree	   that	   the	  US	  Embassy	  penned	  a	  report	  stating	   he	   had	   “emerged”	   from	   his	   “ultranationalism,	   becoming	   perceptibly	  friendlier	  and	  more	  cooperative	  with	  the	  United	  States.”18	  	  The	  coup	  d’état’s	  success	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  This	  statement	  was	  redacted	  at	  General	  Magruder’s	  request	  and	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  final	  oral	  history	  produced	  by	  the	  AHEC.	  	  This	  statement	  was	  found	  in	  the	  original	  transcript	  of	  the	  oral	  interview,	  which	  General	  Magruder	  later	  crossed	  out	  during	  an	  editing	  session.	  Publication	  of	  said	  statement	  would	  have	  embarrassed	  Magruder	  because	  he	  issued	  a	  repudiation	  of	  the	  coup	  on	  the	  day	  it	  was	  carried	  out	  and	  instructed	  the	  Korean	  soldiers	  under	  his	  command	  “to	  support	  the	  duly	  recognized	  government	  of	  Korea	  headed	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Chang	  Myung.”	  Oral	  History	  [Original	  Version],	  General	  Carter	  B.	  Magruder	  with	  Lt.	  Col.	  Charles	  E.	  Tucker,	  1972,	  AHEC,	  Magruder	  Papers.	  	  Magruder	  recycled	  this	  logic	  when	  he	  sent	  a	  telegram	  to	  Washington	  24	  hours	  after	  the	  coup	  launched:	  “Basically	  my	  mission	  is	  to	  protect	  Korea	  from	  external	  aggression.	  	  To	  this	  end	  the	  Korean	  Forces	  appear	  steadfast.	  	  I	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  also	  a	  part	  of	  my	  mission	  to	  protect	  Korea	  from	  internal	  subversion	  by	  the	  Communists.	  	  The	  uprising	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  Communist…Accordingly	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  to	  direct	  FROKA	  to	  suppress	  the	  uprising	  on	  my	  own	  authority	  only.	  Magruder	  to	  JCS,	  17	  May	  1961,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  22:459-­‐460.	  18	  Profile	  of	  Pak	  Chong-­‐hui,	  Nov.	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSF,	  Korea,	  “Subjects,	  Park	  Briefing	  Book,	  11/14/61-­‐11/15/61,	  Part	  III.”	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illustrates	   Park’s	   ability	   to	   carefully	   plan	   and	   implement	   his	   own	   policies	   while	  working	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  United	  States	  control.	  	  	  	  In	  mid-­‐November,	  shortly	  after	  General	  Park	  became	  chairman	  of	  the	  SCNR,	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  welcomed	  him	  in	  Washington	  for	  an	  informal	  meeting	  with	  President	  Kennedy.	   	  On	   that	  occasion	  Park	  made	  his	   first	  unsolicited	  offer	  of	  military	  assistance,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Korean	  troops,	  for	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  	  	  	  
An	  Economic	  Mandate	  
Chairman	  Park’s	   first	  offer	  of	  soldiers	  was	   inspired	  by	  a	  more	  concrete	  and	  simplistic	  rationale	  than	  his	  forerunner,	  Syngman	  Rhee.	  	  For	  Park,	  the	  first	  proposal	  was	  literally	  a	  matter	  of	  dollars	  and	  cents—those	  dollars	  being	  in	  the	  form	  of	  US	  aid	  to	   Korea.	   	   The	   military	   coup	   group	   was	   able	   to	   successfully	   seize	   power	   in	   part	  because	  bureaucratic	  inefficiency	  and	  corruption	  squandered	  US	  aid	  and	  in	  part	  due	  to	   the	   lack	  of	  economic	  progress.	   	  Upon	  wresting	  power	  of	   the	  country,	   the	  group	  had	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  popular	  support	  and	  their	  prospects	  for	  continued	  rule	  were	  dependent,	   in	  large	  part,	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  effect	  domestic	  economic	  reform.	   	  Park	  extended	   the	   troop	   offer	   to	   Kennedy	   as	   a	   bargaining	   maneuver	   intended	   to	   win	  more	   US	   aid.	   	   This	   applied	   to	   US	   aid	   across	   the	   board,	   from	   military	   aid	   to	  Supporting	  Assistance	  grants	  and	  loans.	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   Beginning	  with	   the	  division	  of	   the	  Korean	  peninsula,	   the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  suffered	   from	   an	   economic	   disadvantage.	   	   Although	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   Korean	  populace	  lived	  in	  the	  ROK,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  peninsula’s	  mineral	  deposits	  and	  natural	  resources	   lay	   north	   of	   the	   38th	   parallel,	   leaving	  many	   South	  Koreans	   unemployed	  and	   hungry.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   ROK	   was	   burdened	   with	   a	   far	   larger	   military	  establishment	  than	  it	  was	  able	  to	  support,	  which	  increased	  the	  US-­‐Korean	  tendency	  to	  divert	  a	  majority	  of	  aid	  to	  defense	  expenditures.19	  	  Combined	  with	  Rhee’s	  US	  aid-­‐oriented	  economy,	  little	  growth	  was	  achieved.	  	  The	  country’s	  plight	  was	  such	  that	  it	  prompted	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Walt	  Rostow	  to	  inform	  President	  Kennedy	  “that	  all	  hands	  agree	  the	  situation	  in	  Korea	  is	  not	  good.”20	   It	  also	  inspired	  this	  US	  policy	  paper’s	  overwhelmingly	  negative	  assessment	  of	  the	  Korean	  economy:	  Economically,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  faces	  grave	  problems,	  many	  of	  which	  derive	  from	  social	  and	  political	  factors.	  	  The	  nation	  is	  not	  self-­‐sufficient	  at	  present	  in	  food	  grains	  or	  fibers.	  Its	  forests	  are	  denuded;	  its	  minerals	  scanty;	  its	  fuel	  and	  power	  resources	  poor	  and	  insufficiently	  developed	  to	  meet	  demand.	  	  Capital	  and	  managerial	  talent	  are	  in	  short	  supply	  and	  inadequately	  utilized;	  credit	  institutions,	  and	  other	  institutions	  and	  social	  practices	  vital	  to	  a	  modern	  economy	  are	  inadequate	  or	  lacking.	  	  Communications	  are	  poor.	  	  Unemployment	  and	  underemployment	  are	  high,	  as	  are	  unrealistic	  popular	  expectations	  of	  rapid	  improvement	  in	  living	  standards…21	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Memo,	  Walt	  Rostow,	  15	  March	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea	  General,	  1/61-­‐3/61.”	  	  20	  Memo,	  Walt	  Rostow	  to	  the	  President,	  15	  March	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea	  General,	  1/61-­‐3/61.”	  21	  Guidelines	  for	  U.S.	  Policy	  and	  Operations	  in	  Korea	  (Draft),	  Undated,	  National	  Archives	  College	  Park,	  Record	  Group	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  East	  Asian	  Affairs,	  Office	  of	  the	  Country	  Director	  for	  Korea,	  “K-­‐POL-­‐1.”	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  “NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs”)	  
	   	   55	   	   	   	  	  
	   	   	  
Writing	  a	  year	  after	  the	  coup,	  Chairman	  Park	  expressed	  his	  belief—which	  concurred	  with	   the	   sentiments	   in	   Rostow’s	   evaluations—that	   American	   aid	   to	   Korean	   was	  “frittered	   away”	   by	  his	   forerunners.	   	   “I	   felt,”	   Park	  wrote,	   “as	   if	   I	   had	   taken	  over	   a	  robbed	  ruined	  house.	  	  It	  was,	  in	  all	  reality,	  empty.”	  	  According	  to	  an	  ROK	  general	  and	  acquaintance	  of	  Park,	  the	  chairman	  planned	  to	  “eliminate	  incompetence	  within	  the	  Government	  in	  order	  to	  proceed	  with	  economic	  development.”22	  	   Economic	  reform	  and	  increased	  modernization	  was	  the	  key	  theme	  of	  the	  May	  16th	  military	   revolution.	   	   Immediately	   after	   assuming	   control	   of	   the	   radio	  waves,	  the	  coup	  group	  cited	  among	  their	  six	  pledges,	  “The	  condition	  of	  national	  life	  which	  is	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  despair	  and	  starvation	  will	  be	  quickly	  ameliorated	  and	  all	  out	  efforts	  will	  be	  made	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  a	  self-­‐reliant	  national	  economy.”	  	  Above	  that,	  when	  Park	  personally	  described	  what	  he	  believed	  the	  revolution	  would	  accomplish,	  it	  was	  economically	  centered.	  	  “Socially,	  [the	  revolution]	  is	  to	  modernize	  our	  society.	  	  Economically,	  it	  is	  to	  industrialize	  our	  nation.	  	  It	  is	  to	  revive	  our	  people,	  reconstruct	  our	   nation	   and	   reform	  us.	   	   This	   is	   a	   revolution	   of	   national	   reform.”23	   After	   Park’s	  ascension	   to	   chairman	   of	   the	   SCNR	   he	   publicized	   his	   intent	   to	   increase	   Korea’s	  economic	   potency,	   leading	   the	  US	  Bureau	  of	   E.	   Asian	  Affairs	   to	   conclude	   the	  Park	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Park	  Chung	  Hee,	  The	  Country,	  The	  Revolution	  and	  I	  (Seoul,	  Korea:	  Hollym	  Corporation	  Publishers,	  1970),	  28,	  61;	  Memorandum,	  Bacon	  to	  McConaughy,	  24	  May	  1961,	  RG	  59,	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Far	  East	  Affairs,	  1961	  Geographic	  Files,	  Japan	  to	  Laos,	  “Korea,	  Jan.-­‐June,	  1961.”	  23	  Kim,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Military	  Revolution	  in	  Korea,	  94-­‐94;	  Park,	  The	  Country,	  The	  
Revolution	  and	  I,	  22-­‐3.	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regime’s	   “political	   future	  depends	   largely	  on	   [the]	  domestic	   record	   it	  makes.”24	   	  A	  study	  conducted	  by	  a	  contemporary	  Korean	  researcher	   found	  a	  marked	  difference	  between	   the	   public	   speeches	   of	   Syngman	   Rhee	   and	   Park	   Chung	   Hee.	   	   Analyzing	  major	  symbols	  and	  themes	  of	  different	  speeches,	  the	  researcher	  found	  the	  pre-­‐1960	  speeches	  dwelled	  on	  security	  and	  unification,	  which	  contrasted	  with	  the	  post-­‐coup	  speech	   that	   focused	   on	   national	   economic	   advancement.	   	   Furthermore,	   he	   found	  Park	  and	  the	  military	  leaders’	  speeches	  were	  more	  achievement,	  change,	  and	  future	  oriented.25	   	   Thus,	   given	   the	   dismal	   state	   of	   the	   Korean	   economy	   and	   Park’s	  usurpation	   of	   the	   democratic	   government	   primarily	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   Prime	  Minister	   Myong	   failed	   to	   implement	   economic	   modernization,	   it	   is	   a	   reasonable	  deduction	  that	  the	  SCNR	  created	  an	  “economic	  mandate”	  for	  itself,	  one	  that	  tied	  its	  existence	  to	  real	  economic	  progress.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Memo,	  Robert	  W.	  Komer	  (National	  Security	  Council)	  to	  McGeorge	  Bundy	  (National	  Security	  Advisor),	  17	  August	  1962,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea	  General,	  8/62-­‐3/63.”	  25	  In-­‐joung	  Whang,	  “Elite	  Change	  and	  Program	  Change	  in	  the	  Korean	  Government,	  1955-­‐1967,”	  Korean	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Administration,	  12.1	  (1969):	  235-­‐266.	  As	  cited	  in	  Song-­‐chol	  Yang,	  Revolution	  and	  Change:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  of	  1960	  and	  the	  May	  Military	  
Coup	  D’Etat	  of	  1961	  in	  Korea,	  Unpublished	  PhD	  Dissertation,	  University	  of	  Kentucky,	  1970,	  247-­‐248.	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November	  1961	  
Chairman	  Park	  and	  President	  Kennedy	  	  
We	  shall	  repay	  the	  United	  States	  and	  our	  other	  free	  world	  allies	  for	  their	  support	  and	  assistance	  by	  reconstructing	  our	  nation,	  to	  make	  it	  a	  better	  place	  for	  our	  people	  to	  live	  in.	  Doing	  this,	  I	  feel,	  will	  enable	  us	  to	  fulfill	  our	  responsibilities	  more	  effectively	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  free	  world.	  We	  shall	  make	  every	  effort	  to	  promote	  better	  understanding	  and	  close	  ties	  with	  all	  our	  allies.	  	  	  	   -­‐Chairman	  Park	  Chung	  Hee’s	  Arrival	  Statement,	  Washington	  19611	  	  	  For	   political	   reasons,	   Chairman	   Park	   needed	   to	   utilize	   his	   informal	  Washington	  visit	  to	  the	  utmost.	  	  If	  Park	  returned	  to	  Northeast	  Asia	  after	  a	  successful	  visit,	   the	   consequential	   elevation	   in	   his	   prestige	   would	   help	   bolster	   his	   regime,	  which	  according	  to	  US	  Embassy	  observations	  had	  “little	  positive	  support”	  in	  October	  1961.	   	  From	  the	  Ambassador’s	  vantage,	  many	  Koreans	  appeared	  ambivalent	  to	  the	  governmental	   flux,	   which	   left	   them	   with	   a	   “non-­‐committal”	   or	   “wait	   and	   see”	  attitude.2	  	  The	  State	  Department	  recognized	  the	  resulting	  importance	  of	  Park’s	  trip	  to	  the	  US	  as	  a	  means	  to	  elevate	  his	  own	  “prestige	  and	  that	  of	  his	  government,	  both	  domestically	   and	   internationally.”3	   However,	   the	   Department’s	   analysts	   did	   not	  speculate	   what	   measures,	   beyond	   his	   appointment	   with	   Kennedy,	   would	   be	  necessary	  for	  Park	  to	  achieve	  his	  aimed	  bump	  in	  prestige.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Press	  Release,	  Chairman	  Park’s	  Arrival	  Statement	  in	  Washington,	  Undated,	  National	  Archives	  College	  Park,	  Record	  Group	  59,	  1961	  Subject	  Files,	  Subject	  Personal	  Name	  and	  Country	  Files	  1960-­‐63,	  “Pak	  Visit.”	  2	  Embassy	  Seoul	  to	  Dept.	  of	  State,	  28	  October	  1961,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  22:523.	  3	  As	  cited	  in	  Kwak,	  The	  Anvil	  of	  War,	  77.	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   When	   Park	   spoke	  with	   President	   Kennedy	   during	   an	   afternoon	  meeting	   at	  the	  White	  House	   on	  November	   14,	   he	   requested	   a	   new	   economic	   aid	   package—a	  total	   of	   $178	  million	   in	   combined	   loans	   and	   assistance—for	   his	   inchoate	  military	  government.	   	   Park’s	   request	  was	   the	   vehicle	  missing	   from	   the	   State	  Department’s	  analysis;	   economic	   aid	  was	   Park’s	   path	   to	   prestige.	   	   Given	   Korea’s	   recent	   history	  during	  President	   Syngman	  Rhee’s	   rule,	   this	  was	   not	   a	   surprise.	   	   The	  Rhee	   regime	  employed	  a	  litany	  of	  economic	  tactics	  to	  create	  an	  economy	  conducive	  to	  absorption	  of	  outside	  aid	  at	  the	  detriment	  of	  real,	  sustainable	  financial	  progress.	  	  This	  was	  done	  to	   increase	   the	   amount	  of	   claimable	   foreign	  aid,	   overwhelmingly	  American,	  which	  was	  cited	  by	  the	  Rhee	  government,	  and	  accepted	  by	  many	  Koreans,	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  domestic	  success.4	  	  As	  SCNR	  chairman,	  Park	  needed	  new	  aid	  to	  kick	  start	  his	  newly	  created	  Five	  Year	  Economic	  Development	  Plan	  and	  thereby	  accumulate	  the	  people’s	  support	  and	  erase	  their	  “non-­‐committal”	  disposition.	  	  	   The	   second	   component	   of	   Park’s	   plan	   sought	   the	   maintenance	   of	   Korea’s	  current	  armed	  force	  levels	  so	  as	  to	  prevent,	  what	  NSC	  staff	  member	  Robert	  Komer	  referred	  to	  as,	  “robbing	  military	  Peter	  to	  pay	  civilian	  Paul.”	   	  The	  chairman	  was	  not	  particularly	   worried	   about	   a	   reduction	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   because	   the	   US	   appeared	  opposed	   to	   such	   a	   measure.	   	   A	   year	   prior,	   when	   Chang	  Myong	   campaigned	   on	   a	  promise	  to	  cut	  100,000	  soldiers	  and	  reduce	  Korea’s	  budgetary	  burden,	  Washington	  refused	  to	  comply.	  	  Komer	  noted	  this	  was	  the	  “first	  time	  an	  ally	  ever	  proposed	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  David	  C.	  Cole	  and	  Princeton	  N.	  Lyman,	  Korean	  Development:	  The	  Interplay	  of	  Politics	  
and	  Economics	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1971),	  85,	  170.	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sort	  of	  thing”	  and	  it	  was	  the	  Pentagon	  “who	  objected	  most.”5	  	  In	  addition,	  just	  a	  week	  before	   Park’s	   Presidential	   meeting,	   Secretary	   Rusk	   met	   with	   the	   chairman	   and	  informed	   him	   the	   United	   States	   felt	   it	   was	   paramount	   that	   Korea	   maintains	   its	  current	   military	   strength.6	   	   Therefore,	   the	   request	   for	   a	   continued	   600,000-­‐man	  military	   was	   included	   as	   a	   preemptive	   measure.	   	   Park	   sought	   new	   sources	   of	  financial	  assistance,	  not	  a	  reshuffling	  of	  funds	  from	  the	  Military	  Assistance	  Program	  (MAP)	  to	  the	  economic	  sector.	  	  	   It	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  note	  what	  Chairman	  Park	  did	  not	  seek	  in	  1961.	  	  One	  American	   historian	   argues	   the	   Republic’s	   “gesture”	   to	   send	   combat	   troops	   to	  Vietnam	  in	  1965	  was	  “an	  effort	  to	  keep	  U.S.	  troops	  on	  the	  Korean	  peninsula”	  to	  deter	  any	  possible	  DPRK	  aggression	  and	  ensure	  the	  postbellum	  status	  quo.7	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  1961.	  In	  three	  high-­‐level	  meetings,	  the	  Chairman	  never	  asked	  for	  a	  commitment	  or	  promise	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  stationing	  of	  US	  soldiers	  in	  Korea.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	   subject	   was	   only	   tangentially	   addressed	   when	   Secretary	   Rusk	   took	   it	   upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Memo,	  Bob	  Komer	  (NSC	  Staff	  Member)	  to	  Walter	  Rostow	  (National	  Security	  Advisor),	  9	  March	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea	  General,	  1/61-­‐3/61.”	  [emphasis	  in	  original]	  6	  Memcon,	  Secretary	  Rusk	  and	  Chairman	  Park,	  5	  Nov.	  1961,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  22:527-­‐528.	  7	  See	  Nicholas	  Evan	  Sarantakes,	  “In	  the	  Service	  of	  Pharaoh?	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Deployment	  of	  Korean	  Troops	  to	  Vietnam,	  1965-­‐1968,”	  Pacific	  Historical	  Review	  68:3	  (August	  1999),	  425-­‐449.	  	  As	  the	  title	  alludes,	  Dr.	  Sarantakes	  focuses	  his	  article	  on	  dispelling	  the	  notion	  that	  Korea	  was	  a	  subservient	  client	  state	  blindly	  following	  the	  White	  House’s	  orders.	  	  He	  asserts	  Korea	  sent	  soldiers	  to	  Vietnam	  “because	  it	  was	  in	  South	  Korea’s	  national	  interest…”	  Much	  of	  his	  article	  is	  spent	  arguing	  that	  Korea’s	  decision	  to	  fight	  in	  SE	  Asia	  kept	  US	  soldiers	  stationed	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  ensured	  the	  country’s	  security.	  	  Whether	  by	  choice	  or	  not,	  he	  does	  not	  evaluate	  Park’s	  1961	  troop	  offer.	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himself	   to	   assure	   Park	   that	   Korea	   “could	   rely	   completely	   on	   the	   presence	   of	  American	  armed	  forces	  in	  Korea	  as	  tangible	  and…	  convincing	  evidence	  of	  the	  United	  States	  commitment	  in	  Korea.”8	   	  When	  the	  Chairman	  did	  have	  an	  audience	  with	  the	  president,	  he	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  domestic	  economic	  and	  military	  aid,	  and	  not	  on	  the	  continued	  presence	  of	  US	  ground	  troops	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  	  If	  US	  troop	  levels	  were	  important	  to	  the	  ROK	  in	  1961,	  Park	  would	  have	  addressed	  it	  during	  his	  visit.	  	   To	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  their	  mission,	  Park	  prepared	  himself	  and	  his	  staff	  to	  connect	   ideologically	   and	   personally	   with	   America’s	   policy	   makers	   during	   their	  Washington	  visit.	   	  Washington’s	  Korean	  interpreter,	  Dr.	  Paul	  S.	  Crane,	  felt	  that	  one	  particular	  statement	  Chairman	  Park	  made	  was	  incredibly	  telling.	  	  “He	  wished	  to	  say	  things,”	   Dr.	   Crane	   recalled	   four	   years	   later,	   “which	   would,	   as	   he	   said,	   ‘pierce	   the	  
hearts	   of	   Americans’	   –	   something	   that	  would	   get	   next	   to	   them.”9	   	   The	   interpreter	  expounded	  upon	  his	  point	  at	  length,	  citing	  specific	  examples	  of	  Park’s	  premeditated	  diplomatic	  approach:	  I	  think	  his	  whole	  presentation	  was	  aimed	  to	  be	  psychologically	  palatable	  to	  the	  American	  officials.	  Examples	  of	  this	  were	  shown	  when	  the	  entertainment	  was	  set	  up	  at	  the	  reception	  at	  the	  Korean	  dinner	  for	  Secretary	  [of	  State	  Dean]	  Rusk.	  Knowing	  the	  Secretary	  to	  be	  from	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  musicians	  played	  “Dixie”	  first…	  	   He	  kept	  bringing	  up	  personal	  things	  with	  different	  generals,	  such	  as	  General	  Lemnitzer,	  to	  which	  General	  Lemnitzer	  responded	  very	  warmly,	  so	  that	  my	  feeling	  was	  that	  Chairman	  Pa[r]k	  had	  studied	  the	  people	  with	  whom	  he	  talked	  very	  carefully	  and	  presented	  himself	  in	  a	  way	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Memcon,	  Park	  and	  Rusk,	  14	  Nov.	  1961,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  22:532.	  9	  Memorandum	  of	  Dr.	  Paul	  S.	  Crane’s	  Personal	  Observations	  of	  the	  Visit	  to	  the	  United	  States	  November	  13-­‐17,	  1961,	  Undated,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  “POL-­‐7	  Park	  Chung	  Hee,	  Korea	  1965.”	  [my	  emphasis]	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that	  would	  appeal	  to	  them.	  He	  was	  more	  interested	  in	  giving	  them	  what	  he	  thought	  they	  wanted	  to	  hear	  than	  what	  he	  really	  felt,	  believed,	  or	  intended	  to	  do.	  This	  was	  shown	  in	  almost	  every	  exchange	  throughout	  the	  meeting.	  One	  got	  the	  feeling	  this	  was	  put	  on	  strictly	  for	  their	  benefit	  and	  that	  this	  was	  carefully	  worked	  out.	  Every	  time	  he	  made	  a	  statement,	  his	  
interpreter	  had	  a	  copy	  of	  it	  in	  his	  pocket,	  so	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
extemporaneous	  exchange…I	  think	  on	  the	  Korean	  side	  every	  word	  of	  every	  statement	  had	  been	  carefully	  gone	  over…	  This	  was	  my	  distinct	  impression.10	  	  In	   addition	   to	  his	   carefully	  manicured	   statements	   and	  personal	  niceties,	  Park	  also	  made	  a	  noticeable	  endeavor	  to	  resolve	  the	  long-­‐pending	  treaty	  to	  normalization	  of	  diplomatic	   relations	   between	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea	   and	   Japan.	   	   En	   route	   to	  Washington,	   Park	   met	   with	   Japanese	   Prime	   Minister	   Ikeda.	   	   This	   trip	   signaled	   a	  marked	   change	   from	   President	   Rhee’s	   venomous	   denunciations	   of	   Japan	   and	   his	  obduracy	   with	   respect	   to	   a	   normalization	   of	   relations.	   	   It	   was	   also	   a	   domestic	  gamble.	  	  But	  the	  SCNR	  accepted	  the	  risk	  of	  resuming	  negotiations	  despite	  persistent	  public	   fear	   of	   a	   second	   Japanese	   colonization.	   	   Chairman	   Park	   pursued	   the	   treaty	  because	  it	  harbored	  the	  potential	  to	  benefit	  Korea	  in	  several	  aspects.	  	  First,	  Japan’s	  grants/loans	   would	   provide	   Korea	   with	   much	   needed	   funds	   to	   develop	   their	  economy.	  (Under	  the	  guise	  of	  aid,	  as	  Japan	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  any	  terminology	  mentioning	   reparations	   or	   an	   indemnity	   from	   World	   War	   II	   or	   colonization)	  	  Second,	   if	  Korea	  genuinely	  endeavored	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  historic	  discord,	   it	  would	  play	   well	   in	  Washington.	   	   After	   all,	   the	   US	   was	   literally	   demanding	   a	   perceptible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.	  [my	  emphasis]	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change	   in	   the	   traditional	   Korean	   reluctance	   to	   cooperate	  with	   Japan.	   	   In	   late	   July	  1961,	   the	   US	   State	   Department	   instructed	   the	   Embassy	   in	   Seoul	   to	   stress	   the	  settlement’s	   overall	   significance	   in	   the	   Korean	   government’s	   economic	   wellbeing	  and	  physical	  welfare.	  	  Ambassador	  Berger	  reiterated	  the	  message	  and	  went	  further,	  threatening	  Park	  and	  the	  ROK	  Foreign	  Minister	  Lee	  that	  the	  “willingness	  of	  Korea	  to	  avail	   itself	  of	   Japanese	  assistance	  will	  be	  major	  determinant	  of	  our	   future	  attitude	  toward	  further	  US	  project	  assistance.”11	  	  Finally,	  If	  Park	  desired	  to	  enjoy	  any	  degree	  of	   autonomy	   or	   rein	   in	   the	   region,	   he	   needed	   to	   resolve	   the	   Japanese	   issues	   or	  otherwise	  remain	  perpetually	  dependent	  upon	  the	  United	  States	  and	  isolated	  in	  its	  own	   region.	   	   The	   ROK-­‐Japan	   issue	   illuminates	   the	   broader	   aims	   of	   the	   Korean	  delegation.	   	  While	  the	  SCNR	  and	  Park	  were	  not	  slavish	  clients	  of	  the	  US,	  they	  were	  still	  highly	  susceptible	  to	  Washington’s	  diplomatic	  pressure	  in	  1961.	  	  However,	  the	  chairman	  tried	  to	  coalesce	  his	  plan	  for	  Korea	  with	  US	  strategy	  in	  the	  Far	  East.	  	  	  	   The	  final	  aspect	  of	  Park’s	  attempt	  to	  “pierce	  the	  hearts	  of	  Americans”	  was	  his	  unsolicited	  offer	  of	  Korean	  soldiers	  for	  service	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  The	  chairman	  saved	  this	  measure	   for	   his	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   conversation	   with	   the	   President	   and	   his	   immediate	  advisors	   at	   the	   White	   House	   on	   November	   14th.	   	   Kennedy	   began	   the	   afternoon	  meeting	  speaking	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  Communist	  advances	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	  	  Before	  he	  asked	  Park	   for	  his	  appraisal	  of	   the	  situation,	  he	  opined,	   “Viet-­‐Nam	  was	  a	  common	  problem,	   not	   just	   a	  U.S.	   one,	   and	  he	  wondered	  whether	   the	   Chairman	  might	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Embtel	  189,	  Seoul	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  30	  July	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea	  General,	  7/61-­‐2/62.”	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some	   ideas	  on	   this	   source.”	   	  Without	  hesitation,	  Park	  suggested	   that	   “Korea	  had	  a	  million	   men	   well	   trained	   in	   this	   type	   of	   warfare	   [guerilla	   warfare]…With	   U.S.	  approval	  and	  support,	  Korea	  could	  send	  to	  Viet	  Nam	  its	  own	  troops	  or	  could	  recruit	  volunteers	  if	  regular	  troops	  were	  not	  desired.”	  	  Park	  then	  assured	  Kennedy	  that	  “he	  had	  discussed	  this	  question	  with	  his	  senior	  ROK	  officers”	  prior	  to	  departing,	  and	  “all	  were	  enthusiastic.”	   	  Kennedy	  expressed	  appreciation	   for	   the	  offer	  and	  assured	  his	  guest	  that	  he	  would	  discuss	  the	  offer	  with	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  McNamara.	  	  Shortly	   thereafter,	   Park	   mentioned	   his	   hope	   that	   Korea	   could	   receive	   specific	  exemptions	  in	  the	  Buy	  American12	  policy.	  	  Park	  expanded	  his	  argument,	  expressing	  his	  belief	  that	  Korea’s	  plight	  was	  analogous	  to	  divided	  Germany,	  wherein	  each	  side	  needed	  to	  maintain	  economic	  strength	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  the	  other,	  or	  face	  falling	  “far	  behind	  in	  many	  respects.”	  	  Park	  then	  segued	  into	  crux	  of	  his	  discourse,	  declaring	  his	  “primary	   objective…was	   to	   seek	   the	   President’s	   positive	   support	   for	   the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  Korean	  armed	  forces	  at	  their	  present	  strength	  and	  also	  for	  the	  implementation	   of	   economic	   reforms	   and	   regeneration.”	   	   The	   chairman	   pressed	  whether	  the	  US-­‐Korean	  avowed	  alliance	  and	  friendship	  would	  “mean	  support	  would	  be	   forthcoming”	   soon.	   	   For	   the	   second	   time	   that	   meeting,	   Kennedy	   deflected	  questions	  of	  aid	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  SE	  Asia—Vietnam	  and	  Laos	  in	  particular—was	  presenting	  great	  difficulties	  during	  Congressional	   aid	  appropriations	  and	  he	   could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  “Buy	  American”	  policy	  was	  implemented	  to	  halt	  the	  flight	  of	  US	  gold.	  	  Under	  its	  terms,	  aid	  materials	  sent	  to	  Vietnam	  had	  to	  have	  upwards	  of	  90%	  of	  their	  product	  originated	  in	  the	  US.	  	  This	  policy	  virtually	  forbade	  Korea	  from	  selling	  its	  most	  profitable	  materials	  to	  the	  US.	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not	   “do	   as	   much	   as	   [he]	   would	   like.”	   	   Moments	   later,	   as	   he	   bid	   the	   President	  goodbye,	  Park	  bluntly	  asked	  if	  he	  could	  have,	  before	  leaving,	  a	  “refreshing	  answer”	  to	  his	  request	  for	  support.	  	  Yet	  again,	  Kennedy	  deflected	  the	  Chairman’s	  request.13	  	   The	  next	  day,	  during	  his	  farewell	  call	  with	  the	  US	  president,	  Park	  relayed	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  hardships	  Korea	  would	  be	  face	  in	  the	  next	  year,	  and	  expanded	  upon	  his	  previous	  aid	  request.	   	  Park	  asked	   the	  President	   for	   “special	  assistance”	   for	   the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  SCNR’s	  Five	  Year	  Development	  Plan	  and	  Kennedy	  was	  forced	  to	  tell	  Park	  again	   that	  he	   could	  not	  make	  a	   commitment.	   	  At	   this	  point,	  Park	   revived	  his	  prior	  offer	  of	  troops	  for	  Vietnam,	  but	  added	  his	  “Government	  was	  willing,	  whenever	  the	  President	  desired	  it	  or	  gave	  his	  consent	  to	  support	  forces	  in	  Viet-­‐Nam	  or	  other	  countries	   with	   guerilla-­‐type	   troops.”	   Park	   added,	   “these	   guerilla	   forces	   should	   be	  derived	   from	   several	   different	   countries	   as	   an	   international	   group	   signifying	  willingness	   to	   fight	   for	   freedom	   in	  a	  Free	  World.”	   	  Kennedy	  addressed	   the	   second	  offer	  by	  stating	  his	  belief	  that	  aid	  to	  South	  Vietnam	  “should	  be	  in	  economic	  support,	  equipment,	   communications	   and	   other	   support	   activities,”	   not	   combat	   troops.	  	  Although,	   if	   these	   types	   of	   aid	   proved	   impotent,	   “it	   would	   be	   necessary,”	   the	  president	   believed,	   “to	   decide	   on	   the	   need	   for	   this	   type	   of	   guerilla	   help	   from	  Korea.”14	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Memcon,	  SCNR	  Delegation	  and	  President	  Kennedy,	  14	  Nov.	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea,	  Subjects,	  Park	  Visit	  11/61-­‐12/61.”	  14	  Memcon,	  Park	  and	  Kennedy,	  15	  Nov.	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSC,	  Korea,	  “Korea,	  Subjects,	  Park	  Visit	  11/61-­‐12/62.”	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   Park	  sat	  in	  a	  car	  with	  his	  colleagues	  following	  the	  meeting.	  	  As	  the	  delegation	  left	   the	  White	   House,	   he	   became	   “quite	   morose,”	   having	   failed	   to	   accomplish	   his	  goals.	  	  He	  was	  going	  to	  return	  home	  empty-­‐handed.	  	  The	  dejected	  chairman	  mused	  aloud,	  “If	  we	  don’t	  get	  help,	  our	  Government	  is	  going	  to	  die.”15	  	   With	   regard	   to	   the	  Vietnam	   issue,	   this	  meeting	   revealed	  what	   exactly	   Park	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  proffered	  his	  soldiers.	  If	  the	  trip	  was	  as	  well	  orchestrated	  as	  Dr.	   Crane	   believed,	   then	   the	   Vietnam	   offer	   was	   certainly	   the	   visit’s	   planned	  crescendo;	   it	  was	   the	  overture	  he	   felt	   could	   “pierce	   the	  hearts	  of	  Americans,”	   and	  bring	  him	  closer	   to	  expanded	  economic	  aid.	   	   In	  one	  respect,	   this	   says	  a	  great	  deal	  about	   the	   foreign	  perception	  of	  America’s	   involvement	   in	   former	   Indochina.	   	  After	  all,	   the	  US	  had	  supported	   the	  French	  with	  billions	  of	  dollars	  until	   their	  defeat	  and	  then,	  almost	  instantaneously,	  grasped	  the	  reins	  away	  from	  the	  dying	  empire.	  	  Since	  1954,	   Washington	   had	   triumphed	   its	   “miracle	   man”	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   Vietnam,	  (South	  Vietnam)	  President	  Ngo	  Dinh	  Diem	  and	  supported	  his	   country	  with	  US	  aid	  and	   hundreds	   of	   military	   advisors/trainers.	   	   To	   the	   Korean	   military	   officer,	   like	  Park,	   the	   American	   determination	   to	   support	   Diem,	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   increasing	  internal	   dissent	   and	   warfare,	   indicated	   the	   US’s	   global	   interests.	   	  When	   Kennedy	  asserted	  the	  geostrategic	  importance	  of	  South	  Vietnam,	  Park	  immediately	  parroted	  the	   same	   rhetoric	   and	   offered	   his	   soldiers	   or,	   in	   his	   zeal	   to	   gain	   approval	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Memo,	  Dr.	  Paul	  S.	  Crane’s	  Personal	  Observations,	  Undated,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  “POL-­‐7	  Park	  Chung	  Hee,	  Korea	  1965.”	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plan,	   the	   use	   of	   volunteers.	   	   Not	   surprisingly,	   the	   offer	   was	   raised	   early	   into	   the	  meeting,	  before	  Park	  made	  his	  pitch	  for	  new	  US	  aid.	  	  	   The	   second	   troop	   offer	   further	   illuminates	   Park’s	   intent,	   to	   establish	   a	  relationship	   in	  which	   the	  US	  relied	  on	  Korea	   for	  something	   it	  needed	  and	  wanted.	  	  And,	  as	  Park	  said,	  South	  Korea	  was	  home	  to	  an	  abundant	  population—with	  600,000	  active	  soldiers—and	  endemic	  underemployment	  and	  unemployment.	  	  This	  was	  one	  of	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  gestures	  that	  the	  ROK	  could	  afford	  to	  make.	  	  The	  implication	  is	   threefold.	   	  For	  one,	  Park	  did	  not	   reiterate	  his	   troop	  offer	  at	   the	  second	  meeting.	  	  He	  created	  an	  entirely	  new	  offer	  that	  eliminated	  South	  Vietnam	  from	  its	  terms.	  	  Each	  of	  his	  offers	  preempted	  a	  request	  for	  economic	  assistance,	  in	  which	  the	  troops	  were	  meant	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   facilitating	   or	   ingratiating	   action—or	   an	   underhand	   quid	   pro	  
quo—for	   more	   aid	   to	   Korea.	   	   In	   short,	   the	   offer	   was	   malleable	   because	   it	   was	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end:	   US	   assistance.	   	   Second,	   Park’s	   alteration	   of	   the	   offer	   points	   to	  hollowness	  of	  the	  chairman’s	  Cold	  War	  rhetorical	  justification	  for	  the	  proposal.	  	  The	  second	  and	  more	  desperate	  offer	  did	  not	  mention	  South	  Vietnam	  or	  Korea’s	  desire	  to	  halt	  Communism	  in	  Asia,	  rather	  Park	  made	  clear	  that	  ROK	  soldiers	  or	  volunteers	  were	  available	  for	  any	  conflict	  if	  the	  president	  ever	  so	  desired.	  	  	  	  Nonetheless,	   in	   the	   months	   following	   Park’s	   Washington	   visit,	   the	   SCNR	  continued	  undeterred	  in	  exploring	  the	  feasibility	  of	  sending	  Korean	  troops	  to	  South	  Vietnam.	   	   In	   January	   1962,	   Pacific	   Commander	   Admiral	   Harry	   Felt	   informed	  Washington	   that	   the	   Korea	   military	   attempted	   on	   several	   occasions	   to	   solicit	   a	  troops	  request	  from	  him.	  	  Secretary	  Rusk	  saw	  little	  merit	  in	  inserting	  ROK	  soldiers	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into	   the	   counterinsurgency	  effort	   since	   the	  US	   “would	  have	   to	  pay	   for	   this”	   in	   the	  form	   of	   transportation,	   logistical	   services,	   and	   military	   advisors.	   	   Practically	   and	  strategically,	  it	  made	  more	  sense	  to	  “pay	  the	  Vietnamese	  to	  do	  the	  job	  themselves.”	  	  	  	  However,	  Rusk	  made	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  Korea’s	  assistance	  and	  those	  of	  other	  interested	  third	  counties.*	  	  According	  to	  the	  secretary,	  the	  US	  would	  accept	  Australia’s	   offer	   of	   military	   trainers	   if	   the	   Kennedy	   administration	   deemed	   the	  action	   	   “politically	  wise,”	  and	   if	   the	  Australians	  agreed	   to	  serve	  under	   the	  Military	  Assistance	  Advisory	  Group	  (MAAG).16	  	  	  Secretary	   Rusk’s	   statements	   allude	   to	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	   United	   States	  incorporation	  of	  third	  countries	  into	  their	  counterinsurgency	  efforts.	   	   In	  late	  1961,	  as	   President	  Kennedy	   informed	  Park,	  material	   assistance	   for	  Diem’s	   Vietnam	  was	  preferred.	   	   Any	   offer	   of	   military	   assistance	   coordinated	   with	   the	   US	   needed	   to	  improve	   the	   public	   perception—domestic	   and	   international—of	   the	   conflict.	   	   The	  Eisenhower	   administration	   in	   fact	   sought	   Australia’s	   assistance	   during	   their	   pre-­‐Dien	   Bien	   Phu	   scramble	   to	   assemble	   a	   unified	   coalition,	   but	   owing	   to	   Britain’s	  intransigence	   on	   the	   issue	   and	  Australia’s	   close	   ties	  with	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	   no	  such	   alliance	   materialized.	   	   In	   1961	   Australia	   was	   a	   desirable	   ally	   in	   Vietnam	  because	  it—along	  with	  France,	  New	  Zealand,	  Pakistan,	  the	  Philippines,	  Thailand,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “Third	  countries”	  or	  “Third	  country	  nationals	  (TCNs)”	  were	  terms	  used	  in	  the	  State	  and	  Defense	  Departments	  to	  denote	  armed	  forces,	  countries,	  or	  civilians	  from	  allies	  other	  than	  Vietnam	  or	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Korea,	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  Thailand,	  the	  Philippines,	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  China,	  in	  addition	  to	  others,	  fell	  under	  this	  category.	  16	  Letter	  from	  Edwin	  Martin	  (Political	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  Pacific)	  to	  Sterling	  Cottrell	  (Director	  of	  Vietnam	  Task	  Force),	  19	  Jan.	  1961,	  FRUS,	  1962-­‐1963,	  2:54.	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United	   Kingdom,	   and	   the	   US—was	   a	   signatory	   of	   the	   1954	   Manila	   Pact,	   which	  created	   the	   Southeast	   Asian	   Treaty	   Organization	   (SEATO).	   	   Secretary	   Dulles	   and	  President	   Eisenhower	   engineered	   SEATO	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   Geneva	  Accords	   as	   a	  bulwark	   in	   Asia	   similar	   to	   NATO	   that	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   collective	   deterrent	   to	  Communist	  aggression.	  	  South	  Vietnam,	  Cambodia,	  and	  Laos	  were	  unable	  to	  sign	  the	  treaty	  due	  to	  restrictions	  implemented	  at	  the	  Accords,	  but	  were	  added	  as	  protocol	  nations,	  under	  the	  SEATO	  umbrella.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  alliance,	  the	  premise	  behind	  Australia’s	   commitment	   was	   strong	   and	   it	   provided	   an	   example	   of	   united	   action	  fighting	  Communist	  subversion.	  	  Consequently,	  in	  May	  1962	  when	  Australia	  agreed	  to	   send	   some	   thirty	   jungle	   warfare	   specialists	   to	   the	   GVN,	   in	   part	   a	   response	   to	  Secretary	  Rusk’s	  public	  plea	  for	  a	  “helping	  hand”	  in	  South	  Vietnam,	  all	  parties	  billed	  it	  as	  a	  fulfillment	  of	  “obligations	  under	  the	  SEATO	  treaty.”17	  	  	  From	   an	   American	   standpoint,	   South	   Korea	   was	   a	   less	   favorable	   ally	   in	  Vietnam	  because	  it	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  SEATO	  or	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  remained	  a	   peripheral	   country	   that	   lacked	   international	   credibility.	   	   The	   previous	   section	  outlined	  the	  United	  States’	  role,	  in	  many	  regards,	  as	  Korea’s	  hegemonic	  parent	  state.	  	  American	  influence	  was	  blatantly	  pervasive	  in	  the	  Korean	  military,	  which	  Syngman	  Rhee	  placed	  under	  the	  control	  of	  an	  American	  and	  United	  Nations	  Command.	   	  The	  ROK	  could	  only	  send	   its	   troops	   to	  Vietnam	   if	   the	  UN	  Commander	  authorized	   their	  deployment.	  	  Further,	  Korea	  was	  dependent	  upon	  the	  US	  military	  for	  transportation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  “Australians	  Offer	  Token	  Assistance	  to	  Vietnam,”	  NYT,	  10	  May	  1962.	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and	  logistical	  support.	  	  Thus,	  if	  Korean	  soldiers	  served	  in	  Vietnam	  it	  would	  do	  little	  in	   the	  way	   of	   presenting	   the	   case	   that	   there	  was	   legitimate	   international	   support	  behind	   President	   Diem’s	   government;	   it	   would	   only	   prove	   America’s	   continued	  interest	   in	  the	  region.	   	  The	  record	  shows	  Park	  was	  aware	  Korea’s	  shortcomings	   in	  this	  respect	  and	  explains	  why	  he	  suggested	  to	  Kennedy	  during	  their	  second	  meeting	  that	  ROK	  soldiers	  enter	  Vietnam	  as	  members	  of	   a	   confederation	  of	   regional	   allies.	  Park	   added	   this	   language	   to	  his	   second	  offer	   because	   it	   offered	   an	  opportunity	   to	  somewhat	  legitimize	  an	  ROK	  mission	  in	  Vietnam.	  Secondly,	  while	  South	  Korea	  was	  heralded	   as	   an	   anti-­‐Communist	   bastion,	   it	  was	   not	   an	   admirable	   democracy.	   	   The	  United	   States	   had	   supported	   a	   through	   and	   through	   dictator	   in	   Rhee	   and	   the	  Kennedy	   administration	  was	  quick	   to	   give	   their	   support	   to	  Park	   after	  his	  military	  coup.	   	   At	   the	   time	   of	   his	   offer,	   Park	   ruled	   the	   country	   as	   an	   unelected	   military	  general.	   	   A	   professor	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Minnesota	   and	   consultant	   for	   the	  International	   Cooperation	   Administration	   expressed	   his	   dismay	   over	   the	   state,	   or	  lack	   thereof,	   of	   democracy	   and	   civil	   rights	   under	   what	   he	   termed	   the	   “military-­‐police	   dictatorship”	   in	   South	  Korea.	   	   “Freedom	   is	   gone	   in	   the	  Republic	   of	   Korea…	  unless	   constitutional	   democracy	   is	   promptly	   restored	   in	   Korea,	   the	   United	   States	  ought	   to	  withdraw	   completely	   its	   economic	   and	  military	   support.	   	   Because	  of	   our	  strong	   identification	   with	   Korea,	   a	   totalitarian	   dictatorship	   of	   the	   right	   is	   just	   as	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damaging	   to	   America’s	   international	   position	   as	   a	   totalitarian	   dictatorship	   of	   the	  left.”18	  	   Korea’s	   very	   public	   shortcomings	   in	   international	   prestige	   forced	   the	   State	  Department	   to	   keep	   the	  ROK	   government	   disconnected	   from	   South	  Vietnam	   even	  when	  they	  believed	  collaboration	  between	  their	  two	  of	  their	  preeminent	  Asian	  allies	  was	  beneficial.	  	  US	  policy	  makers	  in	  the	  1960’s	  often	  tried	  to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  the	   Korean	  War	   and	   the	   insurgency	   in	   Vietnam.19	   	   So	   in	   May	   1962	  when	   the	   US	  learned	  through	  intelligence	  channels	  that	  Korea	  would	  dispatch	  a	  military	  mission	  to	  Saigon,	  the	  news	  was	  received	  rather	  optimistically	  by	  American	  military	  sources.	  	  Admiral	   Worth	   H.	   Bagley,	   an	   aid	   to	   General	   Taylor,	   believed	   the	   Korean	   group	  “appear[ed]	  to	  be	  useful,	  can	  probably	  be	  absorbed	  without	  military	  complications,	  and	  will	  achieve	  the	  political	  objectives.”	  	  The	  idea	  gained	  headway	  in	  the	  Pentagon,	  where	  Admiral	  Ulysses	  S.	  Sharp,	  future	  Pacific	  Commander,	  quietly	  approached	  the	  ROK	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff	   and	   requested	   he	   prepare	   in	   “great	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Glenn	  D.	  Paige,	  “Letter	  to	  the	  Times:	  Korea	  Called	  Police	  State,”	  NYT,	  25	  June	  1961.	  19	  Diplomats	  saw	  parallels	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  because	  each	  was	  a	  divided	  country	  with	  a	  Communist	  neighbor	  to	  the	  North,	  but	  their	  histories	  and	  modes	  of	  conception	  were	  very	  different.	  	  From	  a	  military-­‐strategic	  standpoint,	  the	  parallel	  was	  entirely	  erroneous.	  	  Korea’s	  climate	  is	  milder	  and	  its	  mountains	  are	  covered	  in	  deciduous	  forests.	  During	  the	  winter,	  snowfalls	  and	  the	  trees	  are	  bare,	  allowing	  for	  easy	  tracking	  and	  identification	  of	  enemies.	  	  The	  greatest	  disparity	  was	  the	  war’s	  overall	  nature.	  	  Korea	  faced	  a	  frontal	  assault	  from	  a	  conventional	  army,	  with	  scattered	  resistance	  within	  its	  borders.	  An	  internal	  insurgency	  comprised	  of	  Southerners	  threatened	  Diem’s	  government.	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secrecy”	   a	   contingency	  plan	   for	   the	  deployment	   of	   a	  Korean	   combat	   unit.20	  Under	  Secretary	   of	   State	   George	   Ball	   agreed	   with	   the	   military	   rationale	   behind	   an	   ROK	  mission	  and	  believed	   that	   the	  Korea’s	   “intelligence	  management	  matériel	   and	  anti	  aircraft”	   might	   aid	   the	   Army	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Viet	   Nam	   (ARVN)	   and	   Military	  Advisory	  Command	  Vietnam	   (MACV).	   	   But,	   forced	  by	  political	   considerations,	   Ball	  instructed	   the	   Embassy	   in	   Saigon	   to	   refrain	   from	   endorsing	   the	   Korean	   mission	  openly,	  and	  only	  to	  not	  “discourage”	  it.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  image,	  the	  ROK	  survey	  team	  needed	  to	  be	  “quiet”	  and	  “covert.”21	  	   Aside	  from	  military	  aid,	  Korea	  had	  very	  little	  to	  offer	  in	  the	  way	  of	  assistance.	  	  Park	  and	  the	  SCNR	  were	  powerless	  to	  make	  the	  critical	  economic	  contributions	  that	  Washington	   emphasized	   as	   paramount	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1962.	   	   During	   the	   Sixth	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Conference	  in	  Honolulu,	  Secretary	  McNamara	  operated	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  victory	  was	  achievable	  in	  under	  three	  years	  and	  accordingly	  he	  implemented	   an	   agenda	   to	   reduce	   the	   US	   and	   foreign	   role	   in	   South	   Vietnam	   and	  empower	   the	   ARVN.	   	   Before	   the	   anticipated	   withdrawal	   of	   US	   assisting	   forces	   in	  1965,	   the	   ARVN	   needed	   to	   acquire	   the	   expertise	   and	   logistical	   skill	   the	   US	  MACV	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Memcon,	  General	  Kim	  Chong-­‐oh	  (former	  Chairman	  of	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  ROK)	  and	  Winthrop	  Brown,	  8	  October	  1962,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  Country	  Director,	  “Korean	  Domestic	  Situation-­‐	  Student	  Demonstrations.”	  21	  Memorandum,	  Worth	  H.	  Bagley	  (Naval	  Aide	  to	  the	  President’s	  Military	  Representative)	  to	  General	  Maxwell	  D.	  Taylor	  (President’s	  	  Military	  Representative),	  3	  May	  1962,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  2:373-­‐374;	  Deptel,	  State	  to	  Embassy	  in	  Vietnam,	  3	  May	  1962,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  2:374-­‐375.	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currently	  provided	  them.22	  	  But	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  of	  the	  army’s	  health	  was	  the	  overall	  welfare	  of	  the	  country.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Vietnam	  Working	  Group	  declared	   the	   GVN	   needed	   to	   “take	   appropriate	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   measures	   to	  mobilize	  the	  full	  resources	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  the	  struggle	  with	  the	  Viet	  Cong.”	  	  Part	  of	  the	   Working	   Group’s	   plan	   included	   coordinating	   economic	   assistance	   from	   third	  countries,	   with	   a	   particular	   emphasis	   placed	   on	   commodity	   imports	   formerly	  financed	  by	  the	  US	  aid	  program.23	  	  But	  Korea	  was	  itself	  trying	  to	  win	  assistance	  from	  the	   United	   States	   and	   could	   not	   contribute	   economically	   with	   its	   inchoate	   and	  pilfered	  economy.	  	  The	  amalgamation	  of	  these	  hindrances	  eliminated	  the	  ROK	  from	  involving	  itself	  in	  the	  war.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  
	   Since	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea’s	   inception,	   inefficient,	   corrupt,	   and	   desultory	  government	   and	   economic	   practices	   had	   arrested	   the	   country’s	   potential	   for	  progress.	   	   Chairman	   Park	   Chung	   Hee	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   Korean	   people’s	  discontent	   and	   the	   military’s	   disillusionment	   when	   he	   diligently	   and	   carefully	  crafted	   the	  May	  16	  military	   coup.	   	   The	   SCNR	   legitimized	   their	   revolution	   under	   a	  banner	  of	  nationalism	  and	  economic	  reform,	   thus	   the	  Five	  Year	  Development	  Plan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	  Pentagon	  Papers:	  The	  Defense	  Department	  History	  of	  United	  States	  Decisionmaking	  
on	  Vietnam	  [The	  Senator	  Gravel	  Edition]	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1971),	  2:175-­‐176.	  23	  Letter,	  Chalmers	  B.	  Wood	  (Director	  of	  Vietnam	  Working	  Group)	  to	  Frederick	  E.	  Nolting	  Jr.	  (US	  Ambassador	  to	  Vietnam),	  6	  July	  1962,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  2:503;	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  Task	  Force,	  1	  July	  1962,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  2:486.	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was	  designed,	  in	  fine,	  to	  kick	  start	  Korea’s	  economy	  and	  build	  a	  nation	  stronger	  than	  it	   northern	   brother.	   	  Washington,	   and	   Vietnam	   for	   that	  matter,	  was	   an	   incidental	  stop	  on	  this	  path.	   	  While	  Park	  was	  not	  a	  party	  to	  President	  Rhee’s	  1954	  Indochina	  troop	   offers,	   he	   resurrected	   the	   tactic	   with	   a	   brand	   of	   tenacity	   similar	   to	   his	  predecessor	   and	   essentially	   issued	   President	   Kennedy	   a	   blank	   check	   for	   ROK	  combat	   soldiers.	   	   Desperate	   to	   return	   home	  with	   precious	   aid	   and	   a	   token	   of	   US	  support,	   Park	   may	   have	   even	   appeared	   obsequious	   to	   some	   Americans,	   but	   his	  meticulous	  preparation	  was	  	  to	  build	  his	  government’s	  strength	  and	  support.	  	  	  	   From	  the	  American	  standpoint,	  Korea	  was	  an	  important	  ally	  in	  the	  Far	  East,	  and	  one	  that	  needed	  to	  begin	  walking	  on	  its	  own	  two	  feet	  so	  that	  care	  could	  shift	  to	  Southeast	  Asia.	  	  For	  over	  a	  decade,	  Korea	  consumed	  more	  military	  and	  economic	  aid	  than	   any	   other	  American	   ally,	   but	  was	   still	   dependent	   upon	   its	   parent	   state.	   	   The	  Kennedy	  administration	  greeted	  the	  military	  coup	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli	  and	  continued	  assisting	   the	   nation	   under	   a	   “general	   policy	   toward	   Korea	   and	   not	   from	   [a]	  commitment	   to	   any	   individual	   or	   group.”24	   	   US	   Military	   advisors	   greeted	   Korea’s	  generous	   offers	   of	   military	   assistance	   with	   optimism,	   and	   even	   designed	   a	  contingency	  plan	   that	   included	  Korean	   combat	  units.	   	  While	   the	  prospect	   of	   extra	  soldiers	  was	   palatable	   to	   some,	   the	   concept	  was	   implausible	   from	   a	   public	   policy	  standpoint.	   	   Korea	   lacked	   the	   international	   credentials	   and	   accolades	   that	   made	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  Memo,	  Rusk	  to	  Winthrop	  Brown,	  5	  August	  1961,	  JFK,	  NSF,	  Korea,	  “Korea	  Cables,	  7/21/62-­‐8/3/62.”	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countries	   like	   Australia	   valuable	   allies	   in	   a	   very	   public	   posturing	   battle	   with	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   and	   Communist	   China.	   	   As	   long	   as	   the	   Kennedy	   administration	  remained	   theoretically	   detached	   from	   Vietnam	   and	   hesitant	   to	   commit	   its	   own	  soldiers,	  there	  was	  no	  possibility	  of	  Korean	  involvement.	  	  The	  ROK	  was	  an	  avenue	  of	  last	   resort,	   one	   that	   was	   only	   employed	   when	   President	   Lyndon	   Johnson	   had	  exhausted	  other,	  more	  preferable,	  alliances.	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3.	  	  ARMED	  INTERVENTION	  
Korea	  &	  The	  United	  States,	  A	  Symbiotic	  Alliance	  	  
	   The	   Americanization	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Vietnam’s	   civil	   war	   escalated	   in	  August	  1964	  after	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  two	  naval	  skirmishes	  occurred	  in	  Vietnam’s	  Gulf	   of	   Tonkin.	   	   Congress	   responded	  with	   the	   Gulf	   of	   Tonkin	   Resolution,	   thereby	  extending	   the	   president	   a	   constitutional	   license	   to	   “take	   all	   necessary	   steps,	  including	   the	   use	   of	   armed	   force,”	   to	   aid	   member	   and	   protocol	   states	   of	   SEATO.	  	  Newly	   elected	   President	   Park	   Chung	   Hee	   and	   the	   ROK	   privately	   reiterated	   their	  Kennedy-­‐era	  troop	  offers	  for	  Vietnam	  to	  the	  Johnson	  administration.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  rapid	   escalation,	   Korea’s	   combat	   troop	   proposals	   were	   rejected	   in	   favor	   of	   non-­‐combat	   engineer	   and	   medical	   support	   units.	   	   However,	   American	   force	   level	  moderation	   quickly	   evaporated	   and	   within	   a	   year	   massive	   Korean	   troop	  commitments	  became	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  plan	  of	  action	  in	   South	   Vietnam,	   albeit	   after	   the	   United	   States	   sent	   large	   numbers	   of	   its	   own	  soldiers.	   1	   	   One	  month	   after	   the	  Tonkin	  Resolution,	   the	  ROK	   sent	   a	   130-­‐man	  ROK	  Mobile	   Army	   Surgical	   Hospital	   (MASH)	   and	   ten	   Taekwondo	   instructors	   to	   South	  Vietnam,	   this	   small	   contingent	   was	   the	   only	   force	   of	   its	   own	   the	   Republic	   fully	  funded.	   	   Beginning	   in	   December	   of	   the	   same	   year,	   Korea	   augmented	   their	  commitment	   to	   include	   an	   engineer	   and	   construction	   support	   group,	   dubiously	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  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  Choosing	  War:	  The	  Lost	  Chance	  for	  Peace	  and	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  of	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named	   the	   “Dove	  Unit”,	   tasked	  with	   rebuilding	  war	  damaged	   infrastructure.	   	   This	  contingent	  raised	  the	  total	  number	  of	  ROK	  soldiers	  in	  Vietnam	  to	  2,556	  and	  signaled	  an	  era	  of	  US	  concessions	  and	  payments	  for	  Korean	  soldiers.	  	  By	  summer’s	  end,	  Park	  initiated	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	   ROK	   Army’s	   Capital	   or	   “Tiger”	   Division	   and	   the	   2nd	  Marine	  Corp	  or	   “Blue	  Dragon”	  Brigade,	   totaling	   over	  18,000	   soldiers.	   	   In	   between	  the	  winter	  of	  ’65	  and	  summer	  of	  ’66,	  LBJ	  secured	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  9th	  Infantry	  Division	   	   (“White	   Horse”)	   and	   another	   marine	   brigade	   with	   supporting	   logistical	  forces.	   	   The	   White	   Horse	   division	   owns	   an	   ignominious	   distinction	   as	   the	   most	  expensive	  US	  concession	  for	  allied	  assistance	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War—two	  months	  of	  financial	  and	  political	  negotiations	  were	  necessary	  to	  win	  the	  services	  of	  those	  23,	  865	  Korean	  soldiers.2	  	  The	  US	  abided	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  agreement,	  established	  in	  a	  memorandum	  authored	  by	  Ambassador	  Winthrop	  Brown	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   “Brown	   Memorandum”)	   until	   the	   White	   Horse	   Division	   was	   demobilized	   in	  1973.3
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  of	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  P.	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Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  Quest	  for	  Consensus	  
1964	  and	  the	  More	  Flags	  Program	  	  
In	  December	  1963,	  just	  a	  month	  after	  he	  took	  the	  presidential	  oath	  of	  office,	  Johnson	  penned	  a	  concerned	  memorandum	  to	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  General	  Maxwell	  Taylor	  and	  CIA	  Director	   John	  McCone	   that	  voiced	  his	  alarm	  over	  recent	  developments	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	  “The	  more	  I	  look	  at	  South	  Vietnam,	  the	  more	  I	   think	   we	   must	   be	   very	   quick	   and	   firm	   in	   getting	   the	   best	   possible	   men	   on	   the	  job…it	   is	   clear	   to	   me	   that	   South	   Vietnam	   is	   our	   most	   critical	   military	   area	   right	  now.”1	   	   Although	   Johnson’s	   Congressional	   track	   record	   and	   patented	   “treatment”	  gave	  him	  renown	  as	  a	  through	  and	  through	  Washington	  politician,	  he	  was	  involved,	  to	  an	  extent,	  in	  US-­‐Asian	  foreign	  policy	  before	  Kennedy’s	  assassination	  pressed	  him	  into	  the	  executive	  office.	  	  Recall	  April	  3,	  1954	  when	  Secretary	  Dulles	  consulted	  then	  Senator	  Johnson	  and	  other	  select	  Congressional	  leaders	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  enflamed	  Indochina	   situation.	   	   In	   addition,	   as	   Vice-­‐President,	   Johnson	   sat	   in	   on	   policy	  meetings	   and	   traveled	   to	   South	   Vietnam	   in	   1961	   as	   Kennedy’s	   eyes	   and	   ears—although	  Johnson	  was	  not	  present	  during	  Chairman	  Park’s	  visit	  to	  the	  White	  House.	  	  	  	   When	   the	   reigns	  of	  United	  States	   foreign	  policy	  were	  dropped	   in	   Johnson’s	  lap,	   there	   was	   no	   fundamental	   reevaluation	   of	   Washington’s	   approach	   to	   the	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insurgency	  in	  South	  Vietnam.	  	  Historian	  Fredrik	  Logevall	  contends,	  “Determination	  was	   thus	   the	  watchword	  of	   the	  new	  administration	   from	   its	   first	  days,”	   there	  was	  “no	  examination	  of	  whether	  such	  an	  objective	  was	  vital	  to	  U.S.	  security,	  or	  whether	  such	   an	   objective	   was	   attainable,	   no	   serious	   investigation	   of	   possible	   alternative	  solutions	   to	   the	   conflict.”2	   	   One	   alternative	   LBJ	   pursued	   was	   further	  internationalization	  of	  aid	  to	  Vietnam.	   	  American	  trainers	  and	  advisors,	  along	  with	  clandestine	  special	  forces,	  were	  already	  in	  place	  during	  the	  Kennedy	  administration,	  but	   as	   their	   presence	   continued	   to	   drag	   on,	   Johnson	   expanded	   his	   predecessor’s	  insipient	  policy	  to	  generate	  outside	  sources	  of	  financial	  assistance	  and	  third	  country	  support	   from	   SEATO	   nations	   for	   the	   embattled	   Saigon	   government.	   	   	   Assistance	  from	   allies	   was	   about	   to	   take	   on	   exponential	   importance	   in	   mid	   1964	   when	   US	  material	  assistance	  and	  enemy	  efforts	  began	  to	  outstrip	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  ARVN	  and	  GVN.	  	  LBJ	  needed	  to	  locate	  avenues	  of	  support	  for	  his	  policies	  and	  keep	  abreast	  of	  the	  surging	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  counterinsurgency	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  while	  ensuring	  US	  foreign	  policy	  was	  prudent	  and	  realistic.	  Historically,	   LBJ	   was	   often	   unclear	   with	   his	   opinions	   and	   designs	   for	   US	  policy	   in	   SE	   Asia.	   	   He	   had	   a	   habit	   of	   expressing	   viewpoints	   that,	   at	   their	   root,	  conflicted	   with	   each	   other.	   	   Dating	   back	   to	   France’s	   Indochina	  War,	   Johnson	   and	  seven	  of	   his	   fellow	  Congressional	   leaders	   told	  President	  Eisenhower	   that	  he	  must	  “obtain	  commitments	  of	  a	  political	  and	  material	  nature	  from	  our	  allies,”	  before	  they	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  Choosing	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  The	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  and	  the	  Escalation	  of	  War	  in	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would	  consider	  authorizing	  military	  action.	   	   Johnson,	  among	  the	  others,	  expressed	  his	   fear	   that	   US	   involvement	   in	   Indochina	   could	   lead	   to	   a	   Korean	   War	   scenario	  where	  the	  United	  States	  supplied	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  combat	  soldiers.3	  	  Seven	  years	  later,	  in	  a	  summary	  report	  of	  his	  1961	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  to	  the	  GVN,	  LBJ	  warned	  Kennedy	   he	   had	   “better	   be	   sure	   we	   are	   prepared	   to	   become	   bogged	   down	  chasing…guerillas	   over	   the	   rice	   fields	   and	   jungles”	   of	   Vietnam	   before	   he	   took	   the	  “plunge”	   into	   SE	  Asia.	   	   In	   the	   very	   same	  document	   he	   concluded	   the	  political	   and	  military	   circumstances	   “ultimately”	   may	   necessitate	   US	   “direct	   involvement”	   to	  “hold	   the	   situation.”	   	   He	   concluded	   roughly,	   questioning	   the	   utility	   of	   State	   and	  Department	  of	  Defense	  policies	   that	   restricted	  US	  officer	   travel	   for	   safety	   reasons.	  “There	  will	  be	  perhaps	  some	  casualties”	  if	  the	  restriction	  were	  lifted	  ”but	  if	  we	  are	  not	   prepared	   to	   take	   them	   in	   small	   numbers	   now,	   how	  will	   we	   take	   them	   in	   the	  great	  numbers	  which	  will	  be	  involved	  if	  we	  become	  directly	  involved?”	  	  Perhaps	  the	  greatest	   disparity	   in	   his	   convictions	   occurred	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   his	  inauguration.	   	   During	   his	   first	   Vietnam	   planning	   meeting,	   Johnson	   reflected	   on	  recent	  Congressional	  and	  broader	  criticism	  of	  US	  Vietnam	  policy,	  the	  assassination	  of	   President	  Ngo	  Dinh	  Diem,	   and	   the	   feeling	   that	   he	   had	   “never	   been	   happy	  with	  [US]	  policy	  in	  Vietnam.”	   	  LBJ	  ordered	  the	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  South	  Vietnam,	  Henry	  Cabot	  Lodge,	  to	  get	  the	  situation	  “cleaned	  up”	  and	  under	  control	  in	  short	  order.	  	  The	  president	   was	   “anxious	   to	   get	   along”	   and	   “win	   the	   war”	   through	   conventional	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means,	  not	  “social	  reforms.”	  	  Within	  several	  days	  the	  president	  seemed	  to	  create	  his	  own	  foreign	  policy	  maxim:	  “Lyndon	  Johnson	  is	  not	  going	  down	  as	  the	  president	  who	  lost	  Vietnam.	  Don’t	  you	  forget	  that.”	  4	  In	   the	   spring	   of	   1964	   LBJ	   and	   Secretary	   Rusk	   created	   a	   new	   program	   to	  solicit	  foreign	  aid	  for	  Vietnam	  from	  America’s	  allies,	  loosely	  named	  the	  “More	  Flags”	  policy.	  	  Johnson	  first	  mentioned	  the	  program	  in	  response	  to	  a	  reporter’s	  question	  on	  Vietnam,	  when	  he	  declared:	  I	  anticipate	  that	  [the	  US]	  will	  have	  stepped	  up	  activity	  [in	  Vietnam]	  that	  will	  cost	  more	  money…I	  would	  hope	  that	  we	  would	  see	  some	  other	  flags	  in	  there,	  other	  nations	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  SEATO	  meeting,	  and	  other	  conferences	  we	  have	  had,	  and	  that	  we	  could	  all	  unite	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  in	  that	  area	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  destroy	  freedom.5	   	  The	  More	  Flags	  program	  was	  implemented	  to	  alleviated	  some	  of	  LBJ’s	  domestic	  and	  international	  political	  fears.	  	  If	  successful,	  commitments	  from	  large	  western	  nations	  and	  US	  regional	  allies	  would	  bolster	  the	  United	  States’	  stance	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  and	  aid	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  global	  consensus	  for	  the	  imperiled	  region,	  protecting	  the	  US	  from	  a	  “going	  it	  alone”	  scenario.	  	  With	  allies	  would	  come	  reassurances	  and	  support	  for	   pacification	   programs	   and	   training,	   and	   the	   formalized	   commitments	   of	  More	  Flags	   could	   serve	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   military	   alliance,	   should	   the	   insurgency	   erupt	  beyond	  the	  GVN’s	  control.	   	  According	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  one	  of	  the	  program’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Report	  by	  the	  Vice-­‐President,	  Undated,	  FRUS,	  1961-­‐1963,	  4:635-­‐637;	  Logevall,	  
Choosing	  War,	  77.	  5	  Public	  Papers	  of	  the	  Presidents	  of	  the	  United	  States:	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson,	  1963-­1964	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Office	  of	  the	  Federal	  Registrar,	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Service,	  1965),	  1:285.	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primary	  objectives	  was	  to	  “quiet	  domestic	  concern	  over	  American	  casualties”	  which	  amounted	   to	   somewhere	   near	   230	   reported	   deaths	   since	   December	   1961.6	   	   The	  program	  was	  also	  a	  response	  to	  political	  criticism	  leveled	  at	  the	  president	  since	  he	  took	   office.	   	   Former	   Vice-­‐President	   Richard	   Nixon	   lambasted	   Johnson	   at	   a	  Republican	   fundraising	   dinner,	   telling	   his	   audience	   that	   Eisenhower’s	   “grand	  alliance”	  in	  Europe	  was	  “coming	  apart	  at	  the	  seams	  under	  Johnson	  and	  our	  allies	  are	  following	   policies…	   diametrically	   opposed	   to	   our	   interests.”7	   	   Fellow	   Republican,	  Senator	  Barry	  Goldwater	  was	  likewise	  critical	  of	  the	  president,	  opining	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Times	   that	   LBJ	  was	   responsible	   for	   a	   “drift	   and	   deterioration	   of	   United	   States	  leadership	  in	  the	  world	  today.”	  	  The	  senator	  concluded	  with	  his	  belief	  that	  to	  put	  out	  “the	  fires”	  in	  Vietnam,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  work	  “through	  our	  allies,	  through	  our	  friends.”8	  One	  week	  after	  Johnson’s	  speech,	  Secretary	  Rusk	  cabled	  America’s	  embassies	  with	  the	  program’s	  guidelines.	  	  The	  telegram	  called	  “upon	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  Free	  World	   to	   express	   their	   support	   for	   the	   Vietnamese	   Government	   and	   provide	  evidence	  of	  that	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  practical	  and	  material	  contributions	  to	  the”	  GVN.	   	   If	   the	   program	  went	   according	   to	   plan,	   the	   State	  Department	  would	   secure	  various	  forms	  of	  civic	  aid	  from	  as	  many	  donor	  nations	  as	  possible.	  	  According	  to	  the	  document,	  ‘The	  nature	  and	  amount	  of	  the	  contributions”	  the	  US	  sought	  was	  not	  “as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  “Need	  for	  Morale	  in	  Saigon	  is	  Cited,”	  NYT,	  8	  May	  1961.	  7	  “Nixon	  Assails	  Johnson	  as	  Unable	  to	  Lead	  World,”	  NYT,	  11	  February	  1961;	  8	  “Goldwater	  Assails	  Policy:	  Senator	  Sees	  U.S.	  Role	  as	  World	  Leader	  Deteriorating,”	  NYT,	  2	  February	  1964.	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significant	  as	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  being	  made.	  	  The	  basic	  objective	  is	  to	  have	  Free	  World	  Governments	   display	   their	   flags	   in	   Viet	  Nam	   and	   indicate	   their	   recognition	   of	   the	  fundamental	   nature	   of	   the	   struggle	   there.”9	   	   At	   this	   juncture,	   the	   policy	   was,	   as	  stated,	  primarily	  designed	  to	  amass	  publicity	  and	  a	  veneer	  of	  support	  for	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  	  Twice	  in	  May	  1964,	  Johnson	  and	  Rusk	  cabled	  lists	  of	   current	   aid	   provided	   to	   South	   Vietnam	   under	   the	   More	   Flags	   program	   to	  numerous	  US	  embassies	  around	  the	  world.	   	  The	  administration	  took	  the	   liberty	  of	  including	   any	   country	   that	   provided	   any	   aid	   to	   South	   Vietnam,	   regardless	   of	   its	  origins	   or	   motivations.	   	   Despite	   France	   and	   Pakistan’s	   opposition	   to	   US	   foreign	  policy	   in	   SE	  Asia,	   their	   non-­‐political	   flood	   relief	   aid	  was	   included	   in	   the	   list;	   even	  Switzerland’s	  donation	  of	  microscopes	  was	  publicized.	  	  Unabashed,	  Rusk	  forwarded	  the	  More	   Flags	   report	   and	   list	   to	   all	   possible	   donor	   countries,	   dubiously	   claiming	  that	   38	   countries	   were	   connected	   to	   the	   effort.	   	   It	   was	   later	   revealed	   in	   a	  congressional	   hearing	   that	   “more	   than	   half”	   of	   the	   countries	   listed	   as	  More	   Flags	  donors	  were	  “contributing	  less	  than	  $25,000	  a	  year.”10	  At	  the	  same	  moment	  Secretary	  Rusk	  was	  approving	  the	  More	  Flags	  cables	  for	  distribution,	  the	  Times	  reported	  that	  their	  correspondents	  uncovered	  a	  general	  “lack	  of	   enthusiasm”	   for	   any	   extension	   of	   the	   war	   among	   government	   officials	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Robert	  M.	  Blackburn,	  Mercenaries	  and	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  “More	  Flags”:	  The	  Hiring	  of	  
Korean.	  Filipino,	  and	  Thai	  Soldiers	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  (Jefferson,	  NC:	  McFarland	  &	  Company	  Publishers,	  1994),	  12-­‐13.	  10	  United	  States	  Security	  Agreements	  and	  Security	  Abroad,	  US	  Congress,	  Senate	  Hearings	  (1970),	  1551.	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civilians	   in	   NATO	   countries.11	   	   Not	   surprisingly,	   when	   the	   More	   Flags	   program	  initially	  debuted,	  it	  fell	  flat.	  	  In	  three	  weeks,	  LBJ’s	  twenty-­‐five	  requests	  garnered	  no	  new	  assistance.	   	  A	   foreign	  service	  officer	  and	  More	  Flags	  program	  coordinator	   for	  the	  Office	  of	  Regional	  Affairs,	  Far	  East	  admitted,	  “I	  would	  be	  less	  than	  frank	  if	  I	  did	  not	   say	   that	   the	   responses	   on	   the	   part	   of	  most	   countries	   have	   been	   by	   and	   large	  disappointing.”12	   	   A	   frustrated	   LBJ	   authorized	   Rusk	   to	   inform	   prospective	   donors	  that	   “on	   a	   case	   by	   case	   basis”	   the	   US	  would	   consider	   “financing”	   the	   expenses	   of	  donor	   countries	   “if	   necessary	   to	   prevent	   [the]	   aid	   offer	   from	   being	  withdrawn.”13	  	  Johnson	  evidently	   felt	   that	   covert	   funding,	  which	  eliminated	  any	   true	  merit	   to	   the	  program,	  was	  necessary	  given	  the	  overall	  pessimistic	  international	  opinion	  on	  South	  Vietnam	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  counterinsurgency	  was	  escalating.	  	  The	  administration	  was	  eager	  to	  include	  countries	  like	  France	  and	  Pakistan	  under	  the	  More	  Flags	  donor	  umbrella	   and	   entice	   new	   assistance	   with	   US	   dollars	   because	   the	   plan’s	   greatest	  value	  lay	  in	  its	  size	  and	  length	  on	  paper.	  	  Washington’s	  policy	  makers	  believed	  that,	  if	   cultivated,	   assistance	   to	   the	   GVN	   would	   “snowball”	   among	   western	   countries,	  gaining	   more	   momentum	   as	   the	   program	   expanded	   and	   thereby	   broadening	   the	  conflict’s	  credibility	  domestically	  and	  internationally.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  “NATO	  Allies	  Differ	  on	  Vietnam	  Policies,”	  NYT,	  2	  March	  1964.	  12	  Assessment	  of	  the	  International	  Situation,	  Prepared	  by	  Ruth	  Bacon,	  13	  August	  1965,	  RG	  59,	  NACP,	  Lot	  Files	  68D329,	  Box	  2.	  13	  “Of	  the	  29	  nations,	  the	  aid	  from	  at	  least	  ten,	  and	  possibly	  as	  many	  as	  14,	  nations	  constituted	  humanitarian	  relief	  assistance.	  	  These	  nations	  sent	  their	  aid	  to	  South	  Vietnam	  as	  a	  compassionate	  response	  to	  the	  devastating	  monsoon	  flooding	  of	  the	  previous	  winter	  and	  spring	  and	  not	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  any	  More	  Flags	  request.”	  Ibid.,	  13-­‐28.	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  The	  State	  Department’s	  offer	  to	  finance	  donor	  countries’	  aid	  was	  a	  harbinger	  of	   the	   exorbitant	   payments	   conceded	   to	   some	   governments	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	  service	   of	   their	   military.	   	   Once	   the	   More	   Flags	   program	   failed	   to	   win	   genuine	  additional	   support,	   the	   administration	   wasted	   no	   time	   offering	   to	   compensate	  donors.	   	  One	  year	   later,	   after	  no	  major	  ally	  of	   the	  United	  States	  agreed	   to	   commit	  substantial	  numbers	  of	  combat	  troops	  to	  the	  Vietnam,	  LBJ	  adopted	  a	  similar	  policy	  that	   paid	   several	   countries—most	   prominently	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea—for	   the	  services	  of	  its	  soldiers.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  More	  Flags	  program	  operated	  as	  little	  more	  than	  an	   aggrandized	   fraud	   that	   failed	   to	   engineer	   even	   an	   illusory	   sense	   of	   consensus	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	   its	  western	  allies.	   	   Instead	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  policy	  for	  SE	  Asia	  that	  merited	  broader	  international	  recognition	  and	  support,	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  created	  a	  (failed)	  program	  that	  aimed	  to	  generate	  token	  support	  for	  the	  same	  unpopular	  foreign	  policy.	  	  	  In	   March	   1965,	   American	   intervention	   in	   South	   Vietnam	   escalated	  precipitously	  when	  President	  Johnson	  sent	  US	  Marines	  to	  land	  on	  the	  beaches	  of	  Da	  Nang.	   	  LBJ’s	  decision	  to	  expand	  the	  visible	  US	  combat	  role	  engendered	  a	  change	  in	  the	  More	   Flags	   program.	   	   Token	  material	   assistance	  was	   no	   longer	   the	   preferred	  commitment.	   	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   manpower	   drain	   of	   the	   Korean	  War,	   the	   US	  needed	   to	   fight	   in	   conjunction	  with	  allied	  nations	  whose	  willingness	   to	   send	   their	  soldiers	   into	  battle,	  so	  the	   logic	  went,	  buttressed	  Washington’s	   international	  clout.	  	  When	   the	   State	   Department	   and	   Pentagon	   concluded	   more	   Korean	   troops	   were	  required	   in	   South	   Vietnam,	   they	   informed	   the	   ROK	   government	   in	   a	   joint	   State	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Defense	  cable,	  “the	  degree	  of	  assistance	  we	  obtain	  from	  our	  Free	  World	  allies	  assists	  in	   maintaining	   credibility	   U.S.	   military	   posture	   and	   lessens	   likelihood	   	   [of]	   ill-­‐considered	  actions	  by	  the	  Communist	  bloc.”14	  	  Naturally,	  three	  quarters	  of	  the	  cable	  was	   comprised	   of	   descriptions	   of	   the	   aid	   and	   forces	   other	   Free	   World	   allies	  provided.	  	  Once	  American	  ground	  forces	  officially	  landed	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  a	  combat	  role,	   More	   Flags	   focused	   on	   attaining	   third	   country	   troop/advisor	   commitments,	  becoming	  a	  “More	  Bodies”	  program	  in	  reality.	  	  When	  word	  of	  US	  concessions	  began	  to	   leak	   in	   the	   US,	   ROK	   troops	   in	   Vietnam	   were	   derided	   as	   the	   United	   States’	  “mercenary”	  force	  in	  Vietnam.15	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Embtel	  Draft	  Additional	  Forces	  for	  South	  Vietnam,	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  to	  AmEmbassy	  Seoul,	  Undated,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  Records	  Relating	  to	  Korea,	  1952-­‐1966,	  “DEF-­‐6-­‐Armed	  Forces	  Korea	  1965”	  15	  Koreans	  were	  not	  the	  only	  soldiers	  that	  were	  branded	  “mercenary”.	  	  Troops	  from	  the	  Philippines,	  Thailand,	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  were	  derided	  as	  well	  for	  their	  nation’s	  acceptance	  of	  US	  aid	  and	  concession	  is	  exchange	  for	  troop	  commitments.	  	  See	  Blackburn,	  Mercenaries	  and	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  ‘More	  Flags’,	  31-­‐66.	  	  	  
	  	   	   	  
86	  
Fruition	  
The	  United	  States’	  Inclusion	  of	  Korean	  Soldiers	  	  
	  
	  
	   4,198.	   	   Remarkably,	   this	   is	   the	   number	   of	   days	   that	   elapsed	   between	  President	   Syngman	  Rhee’s	   first	   offer	   to	   send	  Korean	   troops	   to	   Indochina	   and	   the	  actual	  date	  that	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea’s	  combat	  soldiers	  stepped	  foot	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  In	  eleven	   and	   a	   half	   years	   the	   ROK	   submitted	   tens	   of	   official	   and	   unofficial	   troop	  deployment	   proposals	   to	   the	   US	   government.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   Koreans	   operated	   in	  such	   a	   large	   capacity	   in	   South	   Vietnam	   is	   even	  more	   astounding	   in	   light	   of	   their	  tumultuous	  post	  1946	  history.	   	  Throughout	   the	  1950’s	  and	  early	  1960’s	  American	  diplomats	   bemoaned	   Korea’s	   economic,	   bureaucratic,	   and	   governmental	  shortcomings.	   	   Furthermore,	   between	  1960	  and	  1964,	   four	  different	   governments	  controlled	  the	  Republic.	  	  And	  yet,	  less	  than	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  nation’s	  inception,	  the	   lowly	   Republic	   of	   Korea	   entered	   the	   next	   major	   Asian	   war	   abreast	   with	   the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  largest	  third	  country	  military	  contingent.	  	  	  	  	  When	   Park	   Chung	   Hee,	   as	   chairman	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Council	   for	   National	  Reconstruction,	  failed	  to	  win	  President	  Kennedy’s	  approval	  for	  his	  1961	  troop	  offer,	  the	   ROK	   military	   initiated	   several	   short	   lived	   and	   unfruitful	   military	   missions	   to	  South	  Vietnam.	  	  After	  President	  Johnson’s	  inauguration	  and	  the	  intensification	  of	  the	  NLF	   counterinsurgency,	   Korean	   military	   offers	   reappeared	   as	   the	   newly	   elected	  President	   Park	   Chung	   Hee	   once	   again	   sought	   to	   win	   economic	   concessions	   and	  establish	   a	   degree	   of	   Korean	   autonomy	   in	   Asia.	   	   In	   1964	   Park	   directed	   his	   close	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friends	  and	  advisors	   to	  present	   informal	  proposals	   to	  US	  diplomats,	   usually	  while	  speaking	  on	  an	   incidental	   topic.	  (ROK	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US,	   fellow	  veteran	  of	  the	  Japanese	   Kwangtun	   Army,	   Kim	   Chung	   Yul	   was	   entrusted	   to	   make	   offers	   in	  Washington,	  D.C.)	  	  US	  Ambassador	  Samuel	  Berger	  was	  randomly	  approached	  by	  one	  of	  Park	  advisors	  during	  a	  March	  1964	  dinner	  party.	  	  The	  aid,	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  Kim	  Hyong-­‐chol,	   informed	  Berger	   if	   the	  US	  was	  agreeable,	   the	  Korean	  government	  was	  prepared	  to	  “offer	  three	  to	  four	  thousand	  troops	  from	  ROK	  army	  to	  assist”	  the	  US	  and	  South	  Vietnam	  “in	   carrying	  war	   to	  North	  Vietnam.”	   	  Kim	  believed	   that	   the	  ROK	   could	   avoid	   any	   political	   problems	   if	   they	   employed	   “volunteers	   or	   veterans	  from	  reserves.”16	  The	   State	   Department	   and	   LBJ	   were	   still	   reluctant	   to	   endorse	   any	   ROK	  combat	   offer.	   	   Ambassador	   Berger	   responded	   with	   angered	   frustration	   to	   Kim	  Hyong-­‐chol’s	   offer	   and	   a	   rumor	   that	   Kim	   Chong-­‐pil,	   Chairman	   of	   the	   ruling	  Democratic-­‐Republican	  Party,	  might	  offer	  Korean	  volunteers	  to	  Vietnam	  during	  his	  upcoming	  trip	   to	  Saigon.	   	  The	  ambassador	  rebuked	  the	  DRP	  Chairman,	   instructing	  him	  that	  his	  “gestures	  may	  embarrass	  not	  only	  our	  current	  efforts	   in	  Vietnam,	  but	  also	  current	  ROK-­‐Japan	  [diplomatic	  normalization]	  negotiations.”	  Two	  days	  later	  the	  State	  Department	  sent	  a	  warning	  to	  the	  embassy	   in	  Saigon	  warning	  them	  that	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Embtel	  1128,	  Berger	  to	  State,	  7	  March	  1964,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Central	  Files	  1964-­‐1965,	  “POL	  7	  KOR	  S,	  Visits.	  Meetings	  1/1/64.”	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troop	  offer	  Kim	  issued	  was	  not	  authorized.17	  	  Despite	  their	  concurrence	  with	  Berger,	  only	   six	   days	   later	   the	   State	   Department	   drafted	   a	   joint	   State-­‐Defense	   telegram	  assessing	  the	  utility	  of	  ROK	  soldiers	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Symptomatic	  of	  the	  early	  date,	  the	  cable	  failed	  to	  see	  any	  “significant	  military	  contribution	  ROK	  could	  advisably	  make.”	  	  But,	  hinting	  at	  a	  change	  in	  policy,	  “ROK	  forces	  might	  have	  both	  practical	  and	  political	  impact	  in	  support	  of	  special	  capacities	  in	  civic	  action	  field.”18	  	  Korea	  was	  becoming,	  at	   least	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   American	   policy	  makers,	   a	   possible	   ally	   in	   the	  war	   despite	  lacking	  any	  desirable	  military	   assets.	   	   It	   is	   likely,	   given	   the	  proximity	  of	  Rusk	  and	  LBJ’s	  April	  initiation	  of	  the	  More	  Flags	  policy	  and	  this	  specific	  case	  in	  March,	  that	  the	  positive	   attributes	   of	   the	  ROK	  military	   offer	  were	   an	   inspiration	   behind	   the	  More	  Flags	  program.	  	  Berger’s	  diplomatic	  scuffle	  helped	  set	  the	  unofficial	  boundaries	  that	  dictated	  the	  triangular	  US-­‐ROK-­‐GVN	  aid	  coordination	  protocol.	  	  The	  incident	  and	  diplomatic	  rebuff	  informed	  South	  Korea	  of	  the	  need	  to	  present	  their	  ideas	  and	  offers	  directly	  to	  the	  United	  States	  first,	  not	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  government.	  	  It	  would	  then	  be	  up	  to	   the	   State	   Department,	   Defense	   Department,	   and	   US	   Embassy	   to	   appraise	   the	  political	  and	  military	  substance	  of	   the	  proposal.	   	  When	  the	  dust	   from	  this	   incident	  had	   settled	   and	   Kim’s	   trip	   concluded	   without	   incident,	   the	   ROK	   Vice	   Foreign	  Minister	   cabled	   the	   American	   Embassy	   and	   assured	   Berger	   if	   the	   ROK	   had	   any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Embtel	  1142,	  Berger	  to	  State	  11	  March	  1964,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Central	  Files	  1964-­‐1965,	  “POL	  7	  KOR	  S,	  Visits.	  Meetings	  1/1/64.”	  18	  Deptel	  09117,	  State	  to	  Seoul,	  	  18	  March	  1964,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Central	  Files	  1964-­‐1965,	  “POL	  7	  KOR	  S,	  Visits.	  Meetings	  1/1/64.”	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further	   thought	   on	   military	   contributions,	   their	   “first	   act	   would	   be	   to	   consult	  U[nited]	  S[tates]	  G[overnment].”19	  	  In	  1964	  Vietnam	  was	  already	  marginalized	  from	  the	  third	  country	  assistance	  dialogue.	  	  All	  future	  ROK	  negotiations	  bypassed	  Saigon,	  traveling	  exclusively	  between	  Seoul	  and	  Washington.	   	  The	  GVN	  was	  not	  notified	  of	  third	  country	  decisions	  until	   the	  US	  Embassy	   instructed	   the	  government	   to	  accept	  an	  offer.	  Before	  the	   first	  Korean	  combat	   troops	  deployed,	  Washington	  ordered	  the	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  South	  Vietnam	  Maxwell	  Taylor	  to	  “discuss	  with	  GVN	  introduction	  of	   ROK	   regimental	   combat	   teams	   and	   suggest	   GVN	   request	   such	   a	   force	   ASAP.”	  	  Taylor	  appeared	  as	  disconnected	   from	  US	  policy	  as	   the	  Vietnamese,	   informing	   the	  State	   Department	   that	   he	   “badly	   needed	   clarification	   on	   our	   purposes	   and	  objectives…it	   is	   not	   going	   to	   be	   easy	   to	   get	   ready	   concurrence	   for	   the	   large	   scale	  introduction	   of	   foreign	   troops.”20	   After	   the	   US	   Ambassador	   to	   Korea,	   Winthrop	  Brown	   had	   completed	   extensive	   negotiations	   with	   the	   ROK	   government	   for	   their	  first	  combat	  division	  (the	  “Tiger”	  division	  totaling	  over	  18,000	  soldiers)	  he	  and	  Park	  waited	  weeks	   to	   receive	   the	   formal	   request	   Ambassador	   Taylor	   had	   been	   told	   to	  acquire.	  	  When	  the	  message	  arrived	  the	  text	  was	  crafted	  in	  the	  style	  of	  a	  thank-­‐you	  note.21	  	  The	  exasperated	  Ambassador,	  required	  by	  US	  policy	  to	  obtain	  a	  formal	  GVN	  request,	  was	  forced	  to	  request	  another	  cable,	  but	  the	  delay	  was	  long	  enough	  to	  miss	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Embtel	  1276,	  Berger	  to	  State,	  9	  April	  1964,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Central	  Files	  1964-­‐1965,	  “POL	  7	  KOR	  S,	  Visits.	  Meetings	  1/1/64.”	  20	  Neil	  Sheehan,	  Hendrick	  Smith,	  E.W.	  Kenworthy,	  and	  Fox	  Butterfield,	  The	  Pentagon	  
Papers	  (NY:	  Bantam	  Books,	  1971)	  444.	  21	  Embtel	  6486,	  Brown	  to	  State,	  7	  June	  1965,	  LBJL,	  NSF,	  CF,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68.”;	  Embtel	  1204,	  Brown	  to	  State,	  14	  June	  1965,	  LBJL,	  NSF,	  CF,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68.”	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the	  closing	  of	  Korea’s	  National	  Assembly	  and	  the	  issue	  was	  postponed	  until	  the	  end	  of	  August.	  	  	  Whether	   this	   was	   an	   instance	   of	   South	   Vietnamese	   agency—successfully	  delaying	   an	   unpopular	   foreign	   military	   mission—or	   a	   symptom	   of	   logistical	   and	  bureaucratic	  division	  between	  the	  GVN	  and	  US	  Embassy,	  it	  highlights	  the	  disconnect	  between	   South	   Vietnamese	   officials	   and	   US	   foreign	   policy	   and	   explains	  why	   later	  requests	   for	   “allied	   aid	   resulted	   from	   U.S.	   initiatives,”	   while	   the	   “government	   of	  South	   Vietnam	   seems	   to	   have	   acted	   merely	   as	   the	   agent	   transmitting	   the	   formal	  requests”	   between	   other	   nations.22	   	   A	   January	   15,	   1965	   cable	   from	   Secretary	   of	  Defense	  McNamara’s	   office	   delineated	   the	   “mechanics	   and	  policy”	   associated	  with	  the	  imminent	  arrival	  of	  Korea’s	  DOVE	  unit:	  	  Legal	   Aspects:	   It	   is	   essential	   in	   order	   to	   assure	   effectiveness	   of	   third	  country	   participation	   and	   US	   contribution	   to	   the	   participation	   that	  appropriate	  permissions	  and	  exemptions	  are	  obtained	   from	  GVN.	   	  Each	  third	   country	   must	   have	   rights	   and	   exemptions	   from	   GVN	   in	   areas	   of	  currency	  controls,	  taxes,	  criminal	  jurisdiction,	  ect.	  to	  permit	  it	  to	  operate	  effectively	   and	   to	   receive	   the	   entire	   benefits	   of	   US	   assistance.	   US	  must	  also	   secure	   from	   GVN	   the	   rights	   to	   grant	   those	   benefits	   to	   each	   third	  country	  in	  VN.23	  	   	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Stanley	  Robert	  Larsen	  and	  James	  Lawton	  Collins,	  Allied	  Participation	  in	  Vietnam	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Department	  of	  the	  Army,	  1976),	  5.	  23	  Deptel	  3800,	  Sec.Def.	  to	  AmEmbassy	  Seoul,	  15	  January	  1965,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  Records	  Relating	  to	  Korea,	  1952-­‐1966,	  “Grants,	  Economic	  Assistance,	  Korea	  1965.”	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One	  month	  prior	  to	  McNamara’s	  cable,	  President	  Johnson	  officially	  requested	  more	   troops	   from	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea.	   	  Ambassador	  Brown	  was	  “to	  urge	  at	   this	  time	  that	  Korean	  Govt…	  send	  additional	  units	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  hopefully	  to	  arrive	  in	  Vietnam	  in	  next	  thirty	  days.”	  	  Knowing	  Park’s	  desire	  to	  send	  combat	  troops,	  which	  the	  ROK	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  recently	  reiterated	  to	  the	  Ambassador,	  Brown	  informed	  Park	  that	  “foreign	  combat	  units	  would	  not	  be	  desirable,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  type	  of	  war.”24	  Park	  immediately	   agreed	   to	   send	   a	   non-­‐combat	   unit,	   but	   noted	   that	   he	   was	   willing	   to	  send	  two	  full	  ROK	  divisions	  at	  anytime.	   	  This	  troop	  commitment—called	  the	  DOVE	  unit	  because	  it	  was	  officially	  non-­‐combat—was	  a	  more	  substantial	  force,	  consisting	  of	  2,400	  men	  trained	  in	  construction	  and	  engineering.	  	  In	  order	  to	  see	  that	  the	  troop	  deployment	   occurred,	   Ambassador	   Brown	   and	   UN	   Commander	   General	   Howze	  agreed	   to	   avoid	   the	   “problem”	   that	   would	   arise	   if	   they	   asked	   Park	   to	   defray	   a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  DOVE	  unit’s	  cost.	   	  There	  was	  “no	  point	  making	  demands	  we	  will	   have	   to	   go	   back	   on	   to	   get	   the	   contribution	   we	   want.”25	   	   Based	   on	   their	  recommendation,	   LBJ	   conceded	   four	   new	   rights	   to	   the	   ROK	   government.	   One,	  Washington	  would	  consult	  the	  ROK	  before	  it	  considered	  lowering	  US	  troop	  levels	  in	  South	   Korea.	   	   Two,	   the	   1965	   Military	   Assistance	   Program	   (MAP)	   transfer	   was	  suspended.	   	  Three,	   the	  US	  government	  would	  pay	   full	   per	  diem	  allowances	   to	   the	  soldiers	   in	   the	   unit.	   	   And	   fourth,	   Korea	   would	   receive	   extra	   monetary	   assistance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Deptel	  08586,	  George	  Ball	  to	  W.	  Brown,	  17	  December	  1964,	  LBJL,	  NSF,	  CF,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68.”	  25	  Embtel	  14903,	  W.Brown	  to	  State,	  19	  December	  1964,	  LBJL,	  NSF,	  CF,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68.”	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through	  the	  PL-­‐480	  “Food	  for	  Peace”	  program.26	  	  From	  Korea’s	  standpoint,	  this	  was	  an	   excellent	   step	   forward.	   	   The	   MAP	   was	   a	   constant	   source	   of	   agitation	   in	   the	  government	   because	   an	   enormous	   percentage	   of	   the	   ROK	   budget	   went	   towards	  maintaining	  the	  ROK	  army.	  	  In	  order	  to	  wean	  the	  ROK	  off	  of	  US	  assistance,	  Congress	  implemented	  the	  MAP	  transfer	  program.	  	  Each	  year	  some	  items	  in	  the	  ROK	  defense	  budget	   were	   shifted	   out	   of	   US	   aid	   coverage	   and	   cycled	   into	   the	   ROK	   budget.	  	  Essentially,	   the	   program	   gradually	   decreased	   the	   amount	   of	   aid	   South	   Korea	  received	  each	  year.	  	  After	  President	  Park	  succeeded	  in	  exchanging	  the	  DOVE	  unit	  for	  a	  suspension	  of	  the	  MAP	  transfer	  program,	  he	  actually	  increased	  US	  aid	  to	  the	  ROK	  by	   $100	   million.	   	   On	   December	   30th	   the	   agreement	   was	   finalized,	   and	   the	  government	  prepared	  to	  release	  a	  statement	  announcing	  their	  contribution,	  but	  not	  before	   Ambassador	   Brown	   instructed	   the	   Koreans	   to	   remove	   a	   paragraph	  attributing	  the	  decision	  to	  a	  United	  States	  request.	  	  The	  Ambassador	  also	  needed	  to	  remind	   ROK	   officials	   that	   the	   overseas	   per	   diems	   paid	   to	   soldiers	   were	  confidential.27	  The	   DOVE	   unit	   negotiations	   served	   as	   a	   catalyst	   in	   Korea	   and	   the	   United	  States.	   	   One	   the	   one	   hand,	   some	   Americans	   saw	   great	   potential	   in	   an	   expanded	  Korea	  role.	  	  Ambassador	  Lodge	  believed	  “the	  contribution	  of	  truly	  significant	  value”	  was	  ROK	  military	  personnel	   “who	  would	   share	   in	   the	   really	   dangerous	  work…the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Tae	  Yang,	  Kwak.	  “The	  Anvil	  of	  War:	  Legacies	  of	  Korean	  Participation	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War”	  Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Harvard	  University,	  2006),	  90.	  27	  Embtel	  21275,	  W.Brown	  to	  State	  December	  30,	  1964,	  LBJL,	  NSF,	  CF,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68”;	  W.	  Brown	  to	  State,	  23	  June	  1965,	  FRUS,	  1964-­‐1968,	  29:120.	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type	  of	  work	  where	  our	  men	  are	  getting	  killed	  and	  wounded.	  Why	  not	  use	  a	  few	  of	  them	   here?”28	   Ambassador	   Brown	   noted	   that	   ROK	   troops,	   instead	   of	   additional	  American	  soldiers,	  could	  alleviate	  the	  need	  for	  trained	  manpower	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  and	   do	   it	  while	   saving	   the	   US	   government	   a	   “great	   deal	   in	   blood	   and	   treasure.”29	  	  Even	  with	  the	  US	  paying	  the	  per	  diem	  allowance	  to	  ROK	  soldiers,	  by	  the	  numbers,	  they	  cost	  far	  less.	   	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense	  spent	  approximately	  $13,000	  a	  year	  to	  support	  an	  American	  infantryman	  in	  Vietnam,	  while	  a	  Korean	  soldier	  cost	  half	  as	  much,	  between	  $5,000	  and	  $7,800.	  30	  	  From	  President	  Park’s	  perspective,	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  was	  an	  opportunity	  to	  elevate	  his	  country’s	  financial	  bargaining	  power.	  	  In	  1965,	  the	  parallel	  between	  the	  Vietnam	   and	   Korean	   Wars	   did	   not	   escape	   many	   Koreans.	   	   America’s	   1950	   war	  mobilization	   and	   overseas	   purchases	   fueled	   Japan’s	   post-­‐World	   War	   II	   re-­‐industrialization	  and	  brought	  the	  war-­‐ravaged	  country	  back	  to	  life.	  	  Kim	  Yong-­‐sung,	  the	   ROK	   Chief	   of	   Trade	   Promotion,	   cautioned	   the	   State	   Department	   that	   the	  “Japanese	  had	  made	  some	  two	  billion	  dollars	  out	  of	  the	  Korea	  War…and	  the	  Koreans	  did	  not	  want	  that	  to	  happen	  again”	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Kim	  informed	  the	  US	  official	  that	  the	  Korean	   people	   “would	   never	   understand”	   it	   if	   their	   “generous	   support”	   of	   the	   US	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Embtel	  2162,	  Lodge	  to	  State	  and	  Embassy	  Seoul,	  9	  May	  1964,	  Texas	  Tech	  Vietnam	  Archive,	  Douglas	  Pike	  Collection,	  Allied	  Participants,	  Box	  33.	  29	  Embtel	  6816,	  W.	  Brown	  to	  State,	  10	  July	  1965,	  LBJ,	  NSF,	  CF,	  Korea,	  “Vol	  11	  7/64-­‐5/68.”	  30	  A	  private	  in	  the	  ROK	  army	  earned	  $1.20	  per	  month	  serving	  at	  home,	  but	  in	  Vietnam	  the	  US	  government	  paid	  him	  $1.00	  per	  day,	  increasing	  his	  salary	  25-­‐times.	  Blackburn,	  
Mercenaries	  and	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  More	  Flags,	  65.	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position	   in	  Vietnam	  was	  not	  rewarded	  “by	  the	  diversion	  of	  substantial	  amounts	  of	  U.S.	  dollar	  aid	  to	  Vietnam	  to	  procurement	  in	  Korea.”	  	  Mr.	  Kim’s	  primary	  concern,	  he	  said,	  was	  “that	  Korea	  should	  be	  given	  every	  possible	  break	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  U.S.	  aid,”	  because	  otherwise	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  ROK	  role	  in	  Vietnam	  would	  die.31	  President	  Johnson’s	  decision	  to	  accept	  ROK	  combat	  troops	  was	  not	  difficult	  in	  most	  respects.	   	  Since	  Korea’s	  non-­‐combat	  troops	  had	  entered	  South	  Vietnam,	  Park	  and	  his	  deputies	  had	  only	  intensified	  their	  offers	  to	  fight.	   	   Just	  after	  the	  DOVE	  unit	  landed	   in	   Vietnam,	   Korea’s	   CIA	   Director	   confided	   to	   National	   Security	   Advisor	  Chester	  Cooper,	  that	  Park	  placed	  great	  emphasis	  on	  Vietnam	  and	  was	  “willing	  to	  do	  almost	  anything	  that	  President	  Johnson	  requested.”	   	  Unfortunately	  for	  Johnson,	  his	  other	  allies	  did	  not	  share	  the	  same	  sentiments	  as	  the	  Korean	  executive.	   	  Britain	   in	  particular	   was	   his	   most	   troubling	   case.	   	   LBJ	   was	   finding	   it	   harder	   to	   commit	   US	  prestige	  and	  soldiers	  to	  Vietnam	  when	  America’s	  closest	  ally	  refused	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  In	   1965	   Johnson	   expressed	   his	   frustration	   with	   Britain’s	   neutrality,	   as	   evidenced	  when	  he	  yelled	  at	  British	  Labour	  party	  leader	  Harold	  Wilson	  “If	  you	  want	  to	  help	  us	  some	   in	   Vietnam	   send	   us	   some	   men	   and	   send	   us	   some	   folks	   to	   deal	   with	   these	  guerillas.	   	  And	   announce	   to	   the	   press	   you	   are	   going	   to	   help	   us.”	   And	   by	   July	   1965,	  McGeorge	  Bundy	  had	  told	  a	  British	  diplomat	  that	  LBJ	  wanted	  British	  troops	  in	  South	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  Chon	  Sang-­‐chin	  (Director	  Economic	  Affairs	  Bureau	  ROK),	  Kim	  Yong-­‐sung	  (Chief,	  Trade	  promotion	  Section),	  Chong	  Soon-­‐kun	  (Economic	  Cooperation	  Section),	  W.N.	  Turpin	  (Office	  of	  East	  Asian	  Affairs),	  July	  13,	  1965,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  Records	  Relating	  to	  Korea,	  1952-­‐1966,	  “AGR-­‐12-­‐3	  Surplus	  &	  Shortages	  1965,	  Korea.”	  
	  	   	   	  
95	  
Vietnam	   right	   then,	   so	  much	   so	   that	   “such	   a	   contribution	  would	  be	  worth	   several	  hundred	  million	  dollars.”32	  	  While	  this	  enticement	  did	  not	  elicit	  a	  response	  in	  Britain,	  it	  did	  in	  third	  world	  Northeast	  Asia.	  	  Once	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  realized	  that	  no	  substantial	  number	  of	  troops	  would	  be	  forthcoming	  from	  its	  allies,	  he	  looked	  to	  Korea.	   	   Negotiations	   for	   combat	   soldiers	   picked	   up	  where	   they	   had	   left	   off	   in	   the	  DOVE	   unit	   negotiation,	   but,	   knowing	   of	   their	   leverage,	   Park	   and	   the	  ROK	  drove	   a	  very	  hard	  bargain.	  	  The	  second	  round	  of	  deliberations	  took	  several	  months	  and	  was	  particularly	   controversial	   because	   the	   United	   States	   conceded	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  financial	  and	  military	  objects.	   	  Ambassador	  Brown	  withheld	  his	   full	  opinion	  of	   the	  process	   and	   its	   outcome,	   but	   still	   informed	   the	   State	   Department	   “the	  manner	   in	  which	   [the	   negotiation]	   was	   handled,	   particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   financing	   the	  dispatch,	  has	  left	  a	  sour	  after-­‐taste	  that	  will	  dissipate	  slowly.”	   	  He	  also	  complained	  that	   the	   ROK	   officials	   were	   becoming	   overly	   “fascinated”	   with	   the	   prospect	   of	  financial	   gain	   in	   Vietnam.	   	   Brown	   thought	   someone	   needed	   to	   remind	   President	  Park	   and	   other	  ROK	   leaders,	   “Vietnam	  had	  not	   changed	   the	   laws	   of	   economics.”33	  	  True,	  Vietnam	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  fundamental	  laws	  of	  economics,	  but	  it	  did	  alter	  the	  fundamental	   nature	   of	   the	   US-­‐Korean	   relationship.	   	   The	   text	   below	   of	   the	   two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Sylvia	  Ellis,	  Britain,	  America,	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Praeger,	  2004),	  50,	  116.	  33	  Airgram	  A-­‐388,	  W.Brown	  to	  State,	  6	  April	  1966,	  RG	  59,	  Central	  Policy	  Files	  1964-­‐1966,	  “Pol	  15-­‐2	  KOR	  S,	  1/1/65”;	  MemCon,	  Chong	  Il-­‐kwon	  (Prime	  Minister,	  ROK),	  Winthrop	  G.	  Brown,	  January	  18,	  1966,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  Records	  Relating	  to	  Korea,	  1952-­‐1966,	  “Defense	  Affairs,	  DEF	  6	  Armed	  Forces.”	  	  
	  	   	   	  
96	  
agreements	   highlights	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   Korea	   exploited	   its	   leverage	   over	   the	  American	  policy	  makers.	  One	  historian’s	  recent	  work	  estimates	  the	  total	  dollar	  sum	  directly	  attributable	  to	  Korea’s	  Vietnam	  War	  era	  agreements	  with	  the	  US	  is	  $4.624	  billion.34	   	   All	   three	   agreements	   (DOVE	   unit	   1964,	   Tiger	   Division	   1965,	   and	  White	  Horse	   Division	   1966)	   were	   exponential	   increases	   from	   the	   prior	   agreement	   and	  brought	  new	  concessions	  to	  the	  impoverished	  nation.	  	  	  	   Negotiated	  Terms	  for	  First	  ROK	  Division	  (Tiger),	  1965	  1.	   No	  U.S.	  or	  ROK	  force	  reductions	  in	  Korea	  without	  prior	  consultation.	  	  2.	   FY	  66	  MAP	  Korea	  level	  not	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  deployment	  of	  Korean	  	  	   forces	  to	  SVN.	  	  3.	   FY	  66	  MAP	  Korea	  to	  include	  $7	  million	  add-­‐on	  to	  $150	  million	  level	  	  	   to	  provide	  fill-­‐out	  TE	  (100%)	  for	  three	  ready	  reserve	  divisions.	  	  4.	   FY	  66	  MAP	  Transfer	  Program	  to	  be	  suspended	  for	  FY	  66	  and	  transfer	  items	  in	  program	  (construction	  materials,	  raw	  blanket	  material,	  POL)	  will	  be	  OSP	  from	  Korea	  ($5.1	  million).	  Ambassador	  Brown	  was	  given	  authority	  to	  suspend	  subsequent	  year’s	  Transfer	  Programs	  at	  his	  discretion,	  as	  long	  as	  ROK	  maintains	  at	  least	  one	  division	  in	  South	  Viet-­‐Nam.	  	   5.	   ROK	  forces	  in	  Korea	  to	  be	  modernized	  in	  firepower,	  communications	  and	  mobility.	  (FY	  66	  MAP	  Korea	  provided	  for	  a	  large	  buy	  of	  tanks,	  artillery,	  communication	  equipment,	  vehicles,	  and	  an	  improved	  anti-­‐	  infiltration	  system.	  However,	  many	  of	  these	  items	  are	  carried	  over	  from	  FY	  65	  MAP	  Korea	  which	  has	  been	  cut	  sharply	  from	  previously	  planned	  program	  level.	  FY	  67-­‐71	  MAP	  Korea	  programs	  are	  at	  about	  $160	  million	  per	  year,	  which	  is	  improvement	  over	  earlier	  plans.)	  6.	   For	  Korean	  forces	  deployed	  to	  South	  Viet-­‐Nam,	  the	  US	  will	  provide:	  equipment,	   logistical	   support,	   construction,	   training,	   transportation,	  subsistence,	   overseas	   allowances,	   funds	   for	   any	   legitimate	   non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Tae	  Yang	  Kwak,	  “The	  Anvil	  of	  War:	  Legacies	  of	  Korean	  Participation	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War”	  (Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Harvard	  University,	  2006),	  22.	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combat	   claim	   which	   may	   be	   brought	   against	   ROKFV	   in	   SVN,	   and	  restitution	  of	  ROKFV	  cash	  losses	  not	  as	  result	  ROKFV	  negligence.35	  	  	   	  	  Brown	  Memorandum,	  Term	  for	  Second	  ROK	  Division	  (Capital),	  1966	  	  
Military	  Assistance	  	  1.	   To	  provide	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  substantial	  items	  of	  equipment	  for	  the	  modernization	  of	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  forces	  in	  Korea.	  2.	   To	  equip	  as	  necessary,	  and	  finance	  all	  additional	  won	  costs	  of,	  the	  additional	  forces	  deployed	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  3.	   To	  equip,	  provide	  for	  the	  training	  and	  finance	  complete	  replacement	  of	  additional	  forces	  deployed	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  4.	   To	  contribute	  to	  filling	  the	  requirements	  determined	  by	  our	  two	  Governments	  to	  be	  necessary,	  following	  completion	  of	  a	  joint	  United	  States-­‐Republic	  of	  Korea	  study,	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  anti-­‐infiltration	  capability.	  5.	  	   To	  provide	  equipment	  to	  expand,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  arsenal	  for	  increased	  ammunition	  production	  in	  Korea.	  6.	   To	  provide	  communications	  facilities	  for	  the	  exclusive	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  use,	  the	  character	  of	  which	  is	  to	  be	  agreed	  between	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  officials	  in	  Seoul	  and	  Saigon.	  These	  facilities	  will	  meet	  requirements	  for	  communication	  with	  your	  forces	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  7.	  	   To	  provide	  four	  C-­‐54	  aircraft	  to	  the	  Republic	  Korea	  Air	  Force	  for	  support	  of	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  forces	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  8.	  	   To	  provide	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  military	  barracks	  and	  bachelor	  officers	  quarters	  and	  related	  facilities	  for	  troop	  welfare	  such	  as	  cooking,	  messing,	  sanitation	  and	  recreational	  facilities	  from	  proceeds	  of	  the	  Military	  Assistance	  Program	  (MAP)	  excess	  sales.	  9.	  	   To	  assume	  the	  costs	  of	  overseas	  allowances	  to	  these	  forces	  at	  the	  scale	  agreed	  between	  General	  Beach	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defense	  Kim	  Sung	  Eun	  on	  March	  4,	  1966.	  10.	  	   To	  provide	  death	  and	  disability	  gratuities	  resulting	  from	  casualties	  in	  Vietnam	  at	  double	  the	  rates	  recently	  agreed	  to	  by	  the	  Joint	  United	  States-­‐Republic	  of	  Korea	  Military	  Committee.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Memo,	  “Information	  Regarding	  Korean	  Military	  Assistance	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Viet-­‐Nam	  for	  Use	  in	  Congressional	  Hearings”,	  William	  Bundy	  to	  Rusk,	  9	  May	  1966,	  NACP,	  RG	  59,	  Bureau	  of	  EA	  Affairs,	  Country	  Director,	  “Troops	  to	  Viet-­‐Nam,	  April-­‐May	  1966.”	  (my	  emphasis)	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Economic	  Assistance	  	   1.	   	  	   To	  release	  additional	  won	  to	  the	  Korean	  budget	  equal	  to	  all	  of	  the	  net	  additional	  costs	  of	  the	  deployment	  of	  these	  extra	  forces	  and	  of	  mobilizing	  and	  maintaining	  in	  Korea	  the	  activated	  reserve	  division	  and	  brigade	  and	  support	  elements.	  2.	  	   	  	   To	  suspend	  the	  MAP	  transfer	  program	  for	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  substantial	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  forces,	  i.e.,	  at	  least	  two	  divisions,	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam,	  with	  offshore	  procurement	  in	  Korea	  in	  United	  States	  fiscal	  year	  1967	  of	  items	  suspended	  in	  fiscal	  year	  1966	  plus	  those	  on	  the	  fiscal	  year	  1967	  list.	  3.	   	  	   a.)	  To	  procure	  in	  Korea	  insofar	  as	  practicable	  requirements	  for	  supplies,	  services	  and	  equipment	  for	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  forces	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  and	  to	  direct	  to	  Korea	  selected	  types	  of	  procurement	  for	  United	  States	  and	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  forces	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  in	  cases	  in	  which:	  	   	  1.	  Korea	  has	  the	  production	  capability,	  	  	   	  2.	  Korea	  can	  meet	  specifications	  and	  delivery	  schedules,	  	  3.	  It	  may	  be	  reasonably	  determined	  that	  Korean	  prices	  are	  fully	  competitive	  with	  other	  possible	  sources	  in	  the	  Far	  East,	  and	   	  4.The	  procurement	  conforms	  in	  other	  respects	  to	  the	  regulations	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  	   Supplies,	  services	  and	  equipment	  which	  meet	  this	  definition	  will	  be	  listed	  on	  a	  “natural	  source”	  list	  from	  which	  procurement	  will	  be	  made	  exclusively	  from	  Korean	  sources	  without	  soliciting	  bids	  from	  non-­‐Korean	  producers.	  	   	  	   b.)	  To	  procure	  in	  Korea,	  in	  competition	  only	  with	  United	  States	  suppliers,	  as	  much	  as	  Korea	  can	  provide	  in	  time	  and	  at	  a	  reasonable	  price	  of	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  goods	  being	  purchased	  by	  the	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (AID)	  for	  use	  in	  its	  project	  programs	  for	  rural	  construction,	  pacification,	  relief,	  logistics,	  and	  so	  forth,	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  	   	  	   c.)	  To	  the	  extent	  permitted	  by	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam,	  to	  provide	  Korean	  contractors	  expanded	  opportunities	  to	  participate	  in	  construction	  projects	  undertaken	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  and	  by	  American	  contractors	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  and	  to	  provide	  other	  services,	  including	  employment	  of	  skilled	  Korean	  civilians	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam.	  	  4.	   To	  increase	  its	  technical	  assistance	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  in	  the	  general	  field	  of	  export	  promotion.	  5.	  	   To	  provide,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  $150	  million	  AID	  loans	  already	  committed	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  in	  May,	  1965,	  additional	  AID	  loans	  to	  support	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  as	  suitable	  projects	  are	  developed	  under	  the	  same	  spirit	  and	  considerations	  which	  apply	  to	  the	  $150	  million	  commitment.	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6.	   If	  justified	  by	  performance	  under	  the	  1966	  Stabilization	  Program,	  to	  provide	  $15	  million	  of	  Program	  Loans	  in	  1968,	  which	  can	  be	  used	  for	  the	  support	  of	  exports	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  and	  for	  other	  development	  needs.36	  	  	  	   Korea’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  provides	  a	  uniquely	  valuable	  timeline	  of	  both	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea’s	  development	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  Cold	  War	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Asia.	  	  Korea	  surmounted	  a	  variety	  of	  hurdles	  to	  exist	  in	  a	  volatile	  region	  prone	  to	  war	  in	  the	  1950’s	  and	  1960’s.	  	  Syngman	  Rhee	  and	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  were	  both	  successful	  in	  their	  negotiations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  kept	  large	  quantities	  of	  US	  aid,	  necessary	  for	  the	  ROK’s	  survival,	  flowing	  into	  the	  country.	  	  Rhee	  developed	  his	  own	  brand	  of	  brinksmanship	  and	  it	  certainly	  did	  not	  endear	  him	  to	  US	  diplomats,	  but	  he	  used	  it	  effectively	  to	  maintain	  a	  place	  of	  importance	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  His	  offer	  of	  troops	  for	  Indochina	  was	  primarily	  a	  ploy	  to	  resume	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  unite	  the	  peninsula	  under	  his	  leadership.	  	  Rhee	  exploited	  the	  widening	  disconnect	  between	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  and	  France	  to	  interject	  his	  proposal…and	  it	  nearly	  worked.	  	  Korean	  soldiers	  were	  deemed	  unacceptable,	  in	  fine,	  because	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  achieve	  Britain’s	  support	  for	  an	  international	  anti-­‐Communist	  coalition.	  	  Without	  an	  international	  organization	  backing	  US	  action,	  the	  deployment	  of	  ROK	  soldiers	  (carried	  to	  the	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theater	  of	  war	  on	  US	  ships)	  would	  have	  been	  a	  publicity	  nightmare,	  drawing	  charges	  of	  imperial	  dominance	  and	  the	  employment	  of	  mercenaries.	  	  	  	   Park	  Chung	  Hee	  wasted	  no	  time	  upon	  assuming	  power	  of	  the	  country	  through	  a	  military	  coup	  to	  offer	  the	  services	  of	  his	  soldiers	  to	  President	  Kennedy.	  	  The	  military	  general	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  transferred	  and	  spent	  in	  the	  United	  States	  military,	  and	  he	  was	  also	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  economic	  windfall	  that	  swept	  Japan	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  	  Driven	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  modernize	  and	  empower	  his	  small	  nation,	  Park	  continued	  to	  offer	  his	  soldiers	  for	  US	  plans	  while	  trying	  to	  acquire	  more	  aid	  for	  his	  Five	  Year	  Development	  Plan.	  	  Park	  seemed	  destined	  to	  fail	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  Rhee,	  but	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  presidency	  changed	  all	  that.	  	  Park	  did	  not	  have	  to	  change	  his	  offer	  of	  troops,	  adopt	  a	  new	  political	  policy,	  or	  increase	  human	  rights	  to	  win	  the	  US	  approval	  of	  his	  requests	  for	  increased	  aid	  and	  trade.	  	  Really,	  Park	  was	  in	  the	  right	  place	  at	  the	  right	  time	  just	  as	  LBJ	  set	  about	  to	  manufacture	  support	  for	  the	  war	  in	  South	  Vietnam.	  	  After	  several	  months	  passed,	  and	  LBJ	  had	  committed	  his	  own	  soldiers	  to	  the	  war,	  Korea	  was	  again	  back	  in	  demand,	  but	  this	  time	  for	  combat	  troops	  that	  would	  establish	  an	  aura	  of	  international	  sacrifice	  in	  the	  GVN.	  	  LBJ	  received	  50,000	  Korean	  soldiers	  that	  no	  one	  else	  would	  provide	  and	  an	  ally	  in	  his	  unpopular	  war	  and	  Park	  finally	  won	  the	  funds,	  and	  economic	  opportunities	  he	  needed	  to	  transform	  South	  Korea.	  (what	  the	  former	  ROK	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affair	  described	  as	  “Digging	  for	  Gold	  in	  the	  Jungles	  of	  Vietnam”)	  	  The	  largest	  problem	  with	  their	  alliance	  though,	  and	  the	  More	  Flag	  program	  in	  whole,	  was	  pointed	  out	  by	  Senator	  Stuart	  Symington	  in	  that	  “The	  fact	  of	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the	  matter	  is	  that	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  were	  deceived	  as	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  venture.”37	  	   	  
Conclusion	  	  	   The	   story	  of	  Korea’s	   involvement	   in	   the	  Vietnam	  War	  has	  many	   facets	   that	  illustrate	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  ability	  to	  transform	  nations	  and	  politics	  across	  the	  world.	  	  In	  Northeast	  Asia,	  these	  events	  portray	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  where	  Syngman	  Rhee,	  despite	  his	  attempts	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  assertive	  policy,	  was	  mired	  in	  a	  state	  of	  dependency.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  predicament	  was	  his	  own	  making,	  but	  his	  policies	  were	  largely	  a	  derivative	  and	  symptom	  of	  the	  United	  States	  own	  Cold	  War	  actions.	  	  However,	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  was	  able	  to	  carve	  himself	  a	  place	  in	  Korea’s	  history	  as	  a	  president	   capable	   of	   leveraging	   the	   United	   States.	   	   What	   this	   thesis	   identifies	   as	  exceedingly	  important	  is	  the	  way	  both	  of	  these	  leaders	  identified	  Southeast	  Asia	  as	  an	   arena	   where	   South	   Korea	   could	   manipulate	   the	   United	   States	   foreign	   policy	  machine	  over	  successive	  administrations.	  	  	  	   Rhee	  was	  the	  first	   leader	  to	  recognize	  that	  America’s	  record	  of	  harmful	  and	  ill-­‐guided	   intervention	   in	   Asia’s	   politics	   had	   earned	   it	   few	   friends.	   	   Korea’s	   first	  president	  tried	  to	  stand	  by	  the	  US	  government	  when	  its	  traditional	  allies	  kept	  away.	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Until	  Rhee	  could	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  between	  his	  country	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  he	  was	  hopelessly	  doomed	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  weak	  dependent.	   	  But	  two	  things	  kept	  the	  plan	  from	  working.	   	  One,	  Rhee’s	  mercurial	  demeanor	  and	  desultory	  politics	  helped	  make	  him	  an	  “unsuitable	  ally”	  and	   two,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  simply	  not	  ready	   to	  fully	  intervene.	   	  The	  real	  defining	  characteristic	  that	   led	  to	  the	  rapid	  acceptance	  of	  Park’s	  carbon	  copied	  offers	  of	  assistance	  to	  Vietnam	  was	  the	  US	  attitude.	   	  Park	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  offers	  in	  anyway,	  his	  administration	  simply	  continued	  to	  doggedly	  offer	  their	   troops	   for	  service	  under	   the	  American	  cause.	   	   In	   fact	  he	  made	  his	  offers	   less	  appetizing,	  demanding	  exorbitant	  concessions	  from	  a	  US	  State	  Department	  that	  was	  used	   to	   dictating	   the	   US-­‐ROK	   relationship.	   	   President	   Park’s	   real	   success	   was	  recognizing	  when	  US	  policy	  was	  prone	  to	  exploitation	  and	  extracting	  the	  full	  amount	  of	   concession	   he	   could,	   helping	   build	   his	   country	   into	   an	   industrial	   and	   regional	  power	  superior	  to	  its	  northern	  brother.	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